Security in Physical Distribution Networks

A Survey study of Swedish transport operators

Thesis for Doctorate in Engineering degree

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Abstract

The objective of this study is to understand what factors influence the security of physical distribution networks. Thereafter it aims to bring to light what security measures exist today to enhance security and finally how to determine the profitability of security investments.

Eight stakeholders affecting security in physical distribution networks are identified and combined into a Physical Distribution Security System (PDSS): the law enforcement agency, transport and distribution operators, business security certifications, insurance companies, security providers, cargo criminals, contract regulatory associations and authority. The actions of these actors on security are formulated in terms of 19 hypotheses in which factors as criminal prosecution, law enforcement agencies resource allocation, willingness to pay for security, impact of business and authority security certifications, premium discounts etc., are put into relation with the security of distribution companies. The tenability of the hypotheses is tested by means of a survey study sent to 577 physical carriers based in Sweden (response rate 36.4%). By means of multivariate statistical techniques, 9 of the 19 hypotheses are rejected determining the exclusion from the PDSS of the business and authority certifications (AEO). The hypotheses that were considered tenable confirm the following factors as significantly affecting the magnitude of security investments as well as the number of security incidents:

- Prosecution of criminals. Companies perceiving that criminals are not properly prosecuted by the Swedish courts of justice have lower security investments and are more affected by security incidents.
- Law enforcement agency resource allocation. Companies perceiving that the Swedish law enforcement agency is not allocating enough resources to mitigate cargo crime have lower security investments and are more affected by security incidents.
- Collaborative activities. Companies participating to collaborative activities to benchmark security or start security partnerships and initiatives have higher security investments and are affected by a fewer number of security incidents.
- Just in Time. Companies perceiving that the enhanced safeguard of cargo may corrupt Just In Time operations and deliveries have lower security investments and are more affected by security incidents.

- Premium discounts. Companies that receive premium discounts whenever security solutions are implemented have higher security investments and are less affected by security problems.
- Uncertainty of security prototypes. Companies that have too many doubts about new and more advanced security products and especially their integration in existing IT systems and business processes have lower security investments and are more affected by security incidents.
- The criminals' opportunistic behavior. Companies fearing the opportunistic behavior of criminals that have access to technical and economical resources and may learn how to deceive security solutions have lower security investments and are more affected by security problems.
- Security requirements agreements. Companies that experience difficulties in the process to agree on security measures to be applied within a transport assignment and thereafter to be specified in the transport contract have lower security investments and are more affected by security incidents.
- Contract complexity. Companies that experience the bureaucracy related to transportation contract agreements as too complex have lower security investments and are more affected by security problems.
- Risk sharing. Companies that do not share risks in transport contract agreements have lower investments and are affected by a higher number of security incidents.

Examining previous research we found that many of these factors are still unknown to the supply chain and logistics academic field (prosecution of criminals, resource allocation, collaborative activities, uncertainty of security prototypes, contract complexity). Other factors as the specification of security requirements in contract agreements, JIT and the cargo criminals' behaviors are confirmed. Other as the length of distribution networks, conflicts with logistics performance and willingness to pay are rejected. Finally the role of the authority is also mentioned in previous research. However this study doesn't show significant relationships with the security of transportation companies. In particular, the findings reveal that transportation companies in Sweden that are AEO compliant have higher security budget but still a higher number of security incidents.

To facilitate the choice of security measures and determine their impact on security threats, this study proposes two approaches: a multi-layered logistics framework and an investment model based on experts' judgments, quantitative risk assessment and Reliability Block Diagram techniques. The multi-layered logistics framework describes supply chains as split into six layers where security measures may be applied. The framework may be used by managers to qualitatively identify weak spots and related countermeasures in supply chains. Finally, quantitative risk assessment combined with Reliability Block Diagrams and Monte Carlo techniques are exploited to give an example of how to compare costs and benefits, in the form of risk reductions, of technical security systems for road transport operations (i.e. GPS, RFID, eseals etc.) against cargo theft.

Keywords: supply chain security, physical distribution security, cargo security, transportation security, Quantitative Risk Assessment, cargo theft, antagonistic threats.

Abstrakt

Syftet med denna studie är att förstå vilka faktorer som påverkar säkerheten i fysisk distribution (d.v.s. godstransporter). Den belyser vidare vilka säkerhetsåtgärder som finns idag för att öka säkerheten samt slutligen hur man kan fastställa lönsamheten för säkerhetsinvesteringar.

Åtta aktörer som påverkar säkerheten i fysisk distribution identifieras och dessa kombineras till ett säkerhetssystem för fysisk distribution (PDSS) : brottsbekämpande myndigheter, transportoch distributionsoperatörer, verksamhets- och säkerhetscertifieringsföretag, försäkringsbolag, säkerhetsleverantörer, transportbrottslingar, avtalsreglerande företag och tullverket. Dessa aktörers agerande definieras i 19 hypoteser där faktorer som åtal av transportbrottslingar, de brottsbekämpande myndigheternas insatser, varuägarnas vilja att betala för säkerhet, resultat av företagens och tullverkets säkerhetscertifieringar, rabatter på försäkringspremier etc., sätts i förhållande till distributionsföretagens säkerhetsarbeten och säkerhetsnivåer. Hypotesernas hållbarhet har testats i en enkätstudie som besvarats av 210 transportföretag i Sverige (svarsfrekvens 36.4%). Studien visar, med hjälp av multivariata statistiska metoder, att 9 av de 19 hypoteserna förkastades. Därför uteslöts aktörerna som är ansvariga för företags och tullverkets säkerhetscertifieringar (AEO) från ramverket PDSS. De hypoteser som ansågs hållbara bekräftade följande faktorer som väsentligt påverkar omfattningen av säkerhetsinvesteringar, liksom antalet säkerhetsincidenter:

- Åtal mot brottslingar. De företag som uppfattar att brottslingar inte åtalas och döms på ett korrekt sätt av de svenska domstolarna investerar mindre i säkerhet och har högre antal säkerhetsincidenter.
- De brottsbekämpande myndigheternas insatser. De företag som upplever att de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna inte tilldelar tillräckliga resurser för att bekämpa problemet investerar mindre i säkerhet och har högre antal säkerhetsincidenter.
- Samarbetsaktiviteter som organiseras av de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna. De företag som deltar i samarbetsaktiviteter för att jämföra säkerheten och starta säkerhetsinitiativ och partnerskap investerar mindre i säkerhet och har ett färre antal säkerhetsincidenter.
- Just In Time (Just In Time tankesätt av transportföretag). De företag som uppfattar att det förstärkta godsskyddet kan påverka Just In Time operationer och leveranserna negativt investerar mindre i säkerhet och har ett högre antal säkerhetsincidenter.

- Rabatter på försäkringspremier. De företag som inte erbjuds premierabatter från försäkringsbolag när säkerhetslösningar införs investerar mindre i säkerhet och har ett högre antal säkerhetsincidenter.
- Osäkerhet kring nyttan av nya säkerhetsprodukter. De företag som har alltför många tvivel om nya och mer avancerade säkerhetsprodukter och speciellt deras integration i befintliga IT-system och affärsprocesser investerar mindre i säkerhet och har högre antal säkerhetsincidenter.
- De kriminellas opportunistiska beteende. De företag som fruktar brottslingarnas opportunistiska beteende, det faktum att brottslingarna har tillgång till tekniska och ekonomiska resurser och att de snabbt kan lära sig hur man lurar säkerhetslösningar investerar mindre i säkerhet och har högre antal säkerhetsincidenter.
- Identifiering av säkerhetskrav i transportavtal. De företag som upplever svårigheter med processen att komma överens med avsändare, mottagare och serviceleverantörer om skyddsåtgärder som skall tillämpas vid ett specifikt transportuppdrag och därefter precisera dessa i transportavtalet, investerar mindre i säkerhet och har högre antal säkerhetsincidenter.
- Transportavtalens komplexitet. De företag som upplever byråkratin som krävs för att sätta ihop transportavtal som alltför komplex investerar mindre i säkerhet och har högre antal säkerhetsincidenter.
- Riskdelning. De företag som inte delar risker med avsändare, mottagare eller serviceleverantörer i transportavtalet investerar mindre i säkerhet och har högre antal säkerhetsincidenter.

I tidigare forskning fann vi att många av dessa faktorer fortfarande är okända i den akademiska världen (åtal mot brottslingar, resursfördeling, samarbetsaktivitieter, osäkerheten kring nya säkerhetsprodukter, kontraktkomplexitet och riskdelning). Några av de faktorer som tidigare föreslagits i den akademiska litteraturen såsom specifikation av säkerhetskrav i transportavtal, JIT, och de kriminellas opportunistiska beteende, bekräftas. Andra faktorer som rör längden av distributionskedjor, logistikeffektivitet och betalningsvilja avslås. Slutligen nämns också vikten av tullens säkerhetscertifiering (AEO) i tidigare forskning. Denna studie visar dock att det inte finns några signifikanta samband mellan AEO-certifiering och säkerhet i distributionskedjor.

Tvärtom visar resultaten att transportföretag i Sverige som är AEO-certifierade har högre säkerhetsbudget och samtidigt större antal säkerhetsincidenter.

För att underlätta valet av säkerhetsåtgärder och förutsäga deras inverkan på säkerhetshot, föreslår denna studie två modeller: en logistisk referensram i flera lager och en investeringsmodell som bygger på kvantitativ riskbedömning och Reliability Block Diagramtekniker som används inom vetenskapsgrenar såsom säkerhet och risk management. Referensramen beskriver försörjningskedjor som delats upp i sex nivåer där olika skyddsåtgärder tillämpas på varje nivå. Ramverket kan användas för att identifiera svaga punkter och relaterade motåtgärder i försörjningskedjor på ett kvalitativt sätt. Slutligen utnyttjas kvantitativ riskbedömning i kombination med Reliability Block Diagrams och Monte Carlo-teknik vilket illustreras i ett exempel där kostnader och nytta i form av riskreduktion för olika tekniska säkerhetssystem för vägtransporter (t.ex. GPS, RFID, e-seals etc.) mot stöld av last jämförs.

Nyckelord: risker i försörjningskedjor, säkerhet i fysisk distribution, fraktsäkerhet, transportsäkerhet, kvantitativ riskbedömning, godsstölder, antagonistiska hot.

Populärvetenskaplig sammanfattning

Antagonistiska hot mot godstransporter och logistik såsom stölder, smuggling, förfalskningar och terroristaktiviteter utgör ett stort och ofta förbisett problem. Bara i Sverige beräknas stölder under transport kosta samhället ca 1 miljard kronor årligen. Denna avhandling visar att många svenska transportföretag trots detta inte investerar i lösningar för att förbättra skydd av gods mot sådana hot. Transportföretagen i allmänhet, och i synnerhet de med lägre säkerhet tenderar att:

- 1. uppfatta att brottslingar inte åtalas och döms på ett korrekt sätt av de svenska domstolarna.
- 2. uppleva att de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna inte tilldelar tillräckliga resurser för att bekämpa problemet.
- 3. inte delta i samarbetsaktiviteter för att jämföra säkerhet och starta säkerhetsinitiativ och partnerskap.
- 4. prioritera Just In Time verksamheter och leveranser snarare än att skydda godsets integritet.
- 5. inte erbjudas premierabatter från försäkringsbolag när säkerhetslösningar införs.
- 6. ha alltför många tvivel om nya och mer avancerade säkerhetsprodukter och speciellt deras integration i befintliga IT-system och affärsprocesser.
- 7. frukta brottslingarnas opportunistiska beteende och det faktum att de har tillgång till tekniska och ekonomiska resurser och att de snabbt kan lära sig hur man lurar säkerhetslösningar.
- 8. uppleva svårigheter med processen att komma överens med avsändare, mottagare och serviceleverantörer om skyddsåtgärder som skall tillämpas vid ett specifikt transportuppdrag och därefter precisera dessa i transportavtalet.
- 9. uppleva byråkratin som krävs för att sätta ihop transportavtal som alltför komplex.
- 10. inte dela risker med avsändare, mottagare eller serviceleverantörer i transportavtalet.

I tidigare forskning fann vi att många av dessa faktorer fortfarande är okända i den akademiska världen, såsom åtal mot brottslingar, resursfördelning, samarbetsaktiviteter, osäkerheten kring nya säkerhetsprodukter, kontraktkomplexitet och riskdelning. Två av de faktorer vilka tidigare föreslagits i den akademiska litteraturen, som bestämmande för säkerhetskraven i transportavtal, bekräftas: JIT och de kriminellas opportunistiska beteende. Andra föreslagna faktorer: att risken

ökar med distributionskedjans längd, att säkerhetsåtgärder är i konflikt med logistikeffektivitet och att kunderna inte är villiga att betala för extra säkerhet avslås. Slutligen nämns också vikten av tullens säkerhetscertifiering (AEO) i tidigare forskning. Denna studie visar dock att transportföretag i Sverige som är AEO-certifierade har högre säkerhetsbudget, men trots detta har de ett större antal säkerhetsincidenter än genomsnittet.

Denna forskning visar också att, för att eliminera svaga punkter i distributionsnät, är det viktigt att stärka godsskyddet genom att kombinera olika säkerhetslösningar i form av managementstrategier, tekniska lösningar, operativa rutiner och säkerhetscertifieringar på sex dimensioner: 1) supply chain management, 2) IT infrastruktur, 3) alla noder och länkar i kedjan från råvaruleverantörer till slutkonsumenter, 4) fordonet, 5) trailern/containern, primärförpackningen och sekundärförpackningen, och 6) produkten, samt att variera skyddsåtgärderna över tiden. Tillämpning av detta flerdimensionella ramverk skulle förbättra möjligheterna för distributionsföretagen att förebygga, upptäcka och återhämta sig efter säkerhetsincidenter på ett kostnadseffektivt sätt.

Slutligen visar undersökningen att lönsamheten för säkerhetslösningar bör beräknas som en avvägning mellan deras kostnader och hur de minskar säkerhetshotens förväntade konsekvenser. I synnerhet visas hur enkla säkerhetslösningar som mekaniska lås, inbrottslarm för trailers som avger ett kraftigt ljud eller hårda skåp i stället för presenning på lastbilssläp kan vara lönsamma investeringar. Däremot är vissa säkerhetsåtgärder, som starkt kan minska godsbrottslighet, fortfarande för dyra och därför inte lönsamma (om enbart förväntad minskning av stölder räknas in). Speciellt gäller detta säkerhetslösningar baserade på Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) och angränsande tekniker som ger den mest effektiva minskningen av säkerhetshoten under vägtransport, men som inte är lönsamma investeringar (såvida inte nyttan med realtidsinformation för optimering av lager och transportresursernas utnyttjande räknas in).

Resultaten från denna studie kan användas på olika sätt. Först och främst kan förståelsen av de faktorer som påverkar transportföretagens säkerhet stimulera utvecklingen av nya certifieringar och förordningar som uppmuntrar till att öka säkerheten i svenska distributionsnätverk. Därefter kan det flerdimensionella ramverket användas för att identifiera svaga punkter och se till att alla aktörers anläggningar och tillgångar i distributionsnätverken är skyddade på ett balanserat och kostnadseffektivt sätt. Slutligen kan den metod för beräkning av lönsamheten för investeringar i

säkerhetslösningar som utvecklats i studien utnyttjas av bolag 1) för att fastställa de mest lönsamma säkerhetslösningarna, 2) för att enas om rabatter på försäkringspremier, 3) för att komma överens om ökning av fraktpris och 4) för att enas om vilket skydd som skall anges i transportavtal.

Förstärkningen av skydd i distributionsnätverken kan bidra till att minska de ekonomiska förluster som idag bärs av industriella aktörer, inklusive producenter, handels- och distributionsföretag, och Skatteverket eftersom handel med stöldgods och smuggling innebär förlust av skatteintäkter. Dessutom bör konsekvenserna för samhället inte försummas. Antagonistiska aktiviteter som stöld, smuggling, förfalskning etc. finansierar tillväxten av kriminella organisationer och även terrorism i våra samhällen. Det är väl känt att höga nivåer av kriminalitet bidrar till samhällelig degradering och hindrar ekonomisk utveckling. Slutligen kan bristen på skydd av distributionsnätverk innebära en högre sårbarhet för terrordåd, i form av smuggling av komponenter för bomber och massförstörelsevapen, eller förgiftning eller förfalskning av livsmedel och läkemedel. Enbart förfalskade läkemedel anses medföra att närmare 1 miljon människor dör i världen varje år.

Denna studie visar att logistikföretag ofta saknar kunskap om grundläggande säkerhetskrav och säkerhetsåtgärder. Ett syfte med denna undersökning var att identifiera och vetenskapligt visa vilka faktorer som är nödvändiga för att stimulera transportföretagen att förbättra sin säkerhet. Mer specifikt visas, med hjälp av en enkätstudie som skickats till 577 transportföretag i Sverige (svarsfrekvens 36,4%) och vars svar analyserats med multivariata tekniker, att de inledningsvis beskrivna 10 faktorerna påtagligt påverkar säkerheten.

Samtidigt är det väl känt att "*en försörjningskedja inte är säkrare än den svagaste av sina länkar*". Den flerdimensionella referensramen i denna undersökning syftar till att stödja beslutsfattare med att identifiera de svaga punkterna i försörjningskedjorna och därefter hitta de mest lämpliga säkerhetslösningarna. Denna del av studien genomfördes med hjälp av litteraturstudier och en enkät som skickats till en panel av svenska säkerhetsexperter. Till sist, många experter anser att säkerhetslösningarnas lönsamhet inte kan beräknas på grund av bristen på statistiska uppgifter avseende deras inverkan på säkerhetshoten. Tvärtom visar denna undersökning, att med hjälp av kvantitativa metoder som använder expertbedömningar och Monte Carlo-simulering, kan tillförlitliga investeringskalkyler tas fram.

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1 Introduction

This chapter includes a background in which the security problem in physical distribution networks is described. Further, it formulates the research problem, the research question and the purpose of the study. Finally, the delimitations and the thesis' disposition are illustrated.

1.1 Background

Supply chain security is becoming a more and more important challenge for managers (especially security managers) and national authorities (Voss et al., 2009; Voss et al., 2009; Thibault et al., 2006, Autry and Bobbitt, 2008; Sheffi, 2001; Williams et al., 2009). Statistics report the existence of several criminal activities affecting global supply chains (Ekwall, 2009; Anderson, 2007; European Parliament, 2007; OECD, 2007; IMB, 2009). The magnitude of the frequency of security incidents as well as of the related consequences are so incredibly high (Voss et al., 2009a; Elkins et al., 2005; Ekwall, 2009) that many supply chain firms have indicated "*security*" as one of their management top priorities (Thomas, 2006). In addition, it is well known that the figures publicly reported by firms may hide the real magnitude of the phenomenon; because of the negative effects it may have on the brand image of the organizations involved (Ekwall, 2009).

In this report physical distribution networks are interpreted as the facilities and infrastructure necessary to ensure the movement, through wholesaling and retailing distribution channels, of finished products to end consumers (Hesse and Rodrigue, 2004). Typical activities performed are inventory control, materials handling, packaging, order processing, transportation, warehouse site selection etc. (*ibid*). The term "*security*" generally refers to "*the state of being free or protected against danger or threat*" and it is usually related to threats that are perpetrated voluntarily against a target (Inglese Hazon, 2008). One part of security includes "*safety*" with the difference that "*security*" includes those threats that are intentionally performed on a target, while safety is based mostly on operational accidents and relates often to a potential damage to society and its individuals. ISO (2008) proposes a definition of supply chain security covering all the efforts to enhance the security of people and cargo in the supply chain against such antagonistic threats as terrorism, fraud and piracy (ISO, 2008).

Hence, given the interpretation of physical distribution networks as well as of security incidents, the expression used in this report "*Security in Physical Distribution Networks*" is associated to the following definition:

"The state of cargo moved within physical distribution networks of being protected against voluntarily attacks such as terrorism, theft, fraud, piracy, counterfeiting etc."

The security incidents considered in this study are those taking place in distribution networks, where products, components or raw materials are temporarily stored or moved between companies that are part of supply chains (networks of buyers and suppliers). Hence, all attacks deliberately perpetrated against cargo at nodes (i.e. intermodal terminals, storage warehouses, etc.) and links (road, water, rail and air transportation) of the physical distribution network. Typical security incidents may include theft, smuggling, piracy, counterfeiting of the cargo or terror and contamination (sabotage actions) (ISO, 2008; Voss et al., 2009a; Coghlan, 2006; Rodwell et al. 2007; EU Commission, 2008; European Parliament, 2007).

Theft. Products are stolen from distribution facilities or while transported to their destination (Thibault et al., 2006). According to statistics collected from TAPA EMEA in 2006, the most exploited modus operandi are: 23% burglary (breaking into a building or into a terminal area or a container), 2% fraud, or robbery (3%), where operators, by means of force, threat or intimidation, are coerced to hand over the cargo stored at a facility or while being transported. Hijacking is also a technique used to take over the vehicle and its cargo (7%) (TAPA EMEA, 2009).

Smuggling. Drugs, humans, nuclear weapons or terrorists are smuggled in containers to enter US or Europe. Stowaways and smuggling in containers take place often on the routes travelled by trucks in high risk countries like South Africa, Morocco, Tanzania, Algeria, West Africa, Eastern Europe, Colombia and China. Containers are penetrated either when they are accidentally left open or by forcing seals and locks put on the doors (Mason, 2004). It seems that in 2002, between 75 and 125 operatives belonging to the terror network of Al Qaeda infiltrated the United States through containers (*ibid*). These events pose a threat to national security and social order but also an economic burden to owners of containers or vessels (Chen et al., 2005; Mason, 2004; Thibault et al., 2006).

Piracy (Ship Hijacking). Products or raw materials in cargo or bulk ships are today being hijacked and exchanged for money. This scenario is typical of maritime transportation, where ships transporting all sorts of cargo are being hijacked by pirates and exchanged for money. According to available statistics, the number of ships attacked during the first quarter of 2009 almost doubled, if compared to 2008 (IMB, 2009). The economical losses for shipping companies are enormous. The ransoms alone vary between \$2 and \$5 million (*ibid*). However, other costs related to the capital tied up (i.e. perishable goods or high value goods), consultancy (lawyers, security officers, etc.), the resources tied up, the fuel wasted by pirates, the operations to pay the ransom, may double the losses borne by the shipping companies.

Counterfeiting. Fake products, with low cost and quality, may appear in the end of supply chains because purchased either voluntarily or involuntarily by a consignee (OECD, 2007). Illegal entities are able to infiltrate a distribution chain, conduct trading and bidding with potential buyers and finally sell fake products at competitive prices. The fake products could be illegally produced from original suppliers that are running manufacturing operations outside the scheduled time without the knowledge of the consignee. In other cases illegal industries are able to manufacture products with the same appearance as the originals but of lower quality (*ibid*).

Contamination. Products or raw materials, such as chemical substances, food or pharmaceuticals, that are moved in distribution chains can be deliberately contaminated or poisoned by terrorists or saboteurs. Examples are given by the anthrax attack in US in 2001 that injured 17 persons and killed 5 (FBI, 2009), but also the contamination of citrus fruits exported from Israel in 2003 (CFSAN, 2003), E-coli contaminated spinach in US (Voss et al., 2009) and glass contaminated chicken fillets in Sweden 2009 (Krisinformation, 2009).

1.2 Consequences of Security Incidents

The direct costs of security incidents concern first of all the value of the goods, if these are damaged, stolen, substituted or contaminated. Available figures show that stolen cargo in US amounts to \$10 to \$30 billion and in Europe to about \in 8.2 billion (Anderson, 2007; European Parliament, 2007). It has also been estimated that in Europe alone \$176 billion of goods where counterfeited in 2005 (OECD, 2007).

In addition to the direct costs, companies may also experience the economic consequences related to flow disruptions (Voss et al., 2009a). The consequences of flow disruptions may have

a high magnitude and are directly proportional to the degree of Just In Time and globalization of a supply chain, i.e. the degree of tightness and length of supply chains (Abbott et al., 2003; Crone, 2006). Security incidents taking place in the physical distribution layer often spread from the physical carrier or terminal owner, upward to the logistics service providers and thereby to the whole supply chain network. At this level, a chain reaction that forces the supply chain into temporary irrecoverable shut down is triggered, and it ends in delays, lost sales and unsatisfied customer demand (Viswanadham and Gaonkar, 2007). Other indirect costs of flow disruptions that are related to the lack of implementation of security are the following (Hess and Wrobleski, 1996; Voss et al., 2009a; Voss et al., 2009):

- Increased costs of insurance and security protection.
- Costs of internal audit activities to detect crime.
- Costs of investigation and prosecution of suspects measured in terms of lost time of security and management personnel.
- Increased selling prices and weakened competitive advantage.
- Reduced profits.
- Loss of productivity.
- Loss of business reputation.
- Deterioration in quality of service.
- Threat to the survival of the business.

Terror related threats in supply chains may also put society in danger, e.g. environmental contamination, leaks of toxic gases, population exposure or infrastructure damage (Parentela and Cheema, 2002; Sheffi, 2001). Likewise, if supply chains are not adequately protected, consumable products (e.g. food, pharmaceuticals) could be counterfeited or contaminated and smuggled into a country, giving rise to death or diseases (Thibault et al., 2006; Voss et al., 2009). These events should not be seen as remote from reality, especially after the whole world has witnessed the terror attacks in New York 2001, London 2004 and Madrid 2005. Since these attacks were performed against transportation means, the linkage with supply chains is straightforward and the hypothesis that distribution networks could be targeted by terrorists (e.g.

Al-Qaeda) should not be seen as unrealistic (Sheffi, 2001). This explains the motivations behind the development of certifications aiming to enhance the security of distribution networks. Hence, logistics and transportation managers are required to link their supply chain processes and operations to security requirements. If this is not properly done there is not only the risk to be attacked by antagonists but also to jeopardize supply chains and terribly increase transport delays and delivery uncertainty (Willys and Ortiz, 2004; Peleg-Gillai et al., 2006; Rice and Spayd, 2005; Lee and Whang, 2005; Closs and McGarrell 2004; Sheffi, 2001). Some of the most prominent authority certifications available to stakeholders are the following:

- The Authorized Economic Operator (AEO). Operators are requested to prove compliance with Customs requirements, appropriate record-keeping, and financial solvency, and to follow specific safety and security regulations (CP3 Group, 2005; CP3 Group, 2006). The compliance with the requirements ensures quick customs clearance.
- The Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT). This certification includes a set of security criteria to be followed by supply chain operators to enhance their security degree. The compliance to the security criteria ensures faster border inspections and customs' clearance (CBP, 2008).
- International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Recommendations and guidelines about the application of security systems and harmonization of operations among players in supply chains by means of security standards are given in the ISO28001 certification. Parts of the recommended security standards have been integrated into the AEO (ISO, 2008).
- International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) and SOLAS. The ISPS is a framework to ensure the safety and security of ports and vessels. Guidance to support compliance to the mandatory security requirements specified in the ISPS code is provided in the SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea) Chapter XI-2 (IMO, 2009).

1.3 Research Problem

Today security, logistics and supply chain managers have wide access to handbooks and certification programs, to enhance the protection of their assets. Technology is at the forefront and offers wide sets of devices to hinder criminals from attacking cargo (Sheffi, 2001; Urciuoli, 2009). In addition, organizations often have specialized security personnel in charge of spreading

the security culture among the employees as well as ensuring that security routines and technologies are correctly implemented and working in line with the organizations' operations (Sheffi, 2001; Lee and Whang, 2005). Security certifications like the AEO, the ISO28001 or ISPS are available to practitioners to support the understanding of security and learn how to prevent antagonistic threats (Sheffi, 2001; Rice and Spayd, 2005; Willys and Ortiz, 2004; Urciuoli and Ekwall, 2010). Despite this, statistics testify that distribution networks are more and more often targeted by criminals. Every day cargo is stolen, hijacked, and counterfeited. Further, personnel working in transportation companies are exposed to the risk for being seriously injured. Less often, we also witness episodes of terror attacks or food and pharmaceuticals contamination that have terrible consequences on our communities. Hence, we wonder how companies are coping with this situation that we don't believe is sustainable from either an economic pr a social responsibility viewpoint. More specifically, we wonder what factors are determining the security of distribution networks (Figure 1).

Previous research points out that lack of security is an important source of risk to be considered by supply chain and logistics managers (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Sheffi, 2001; Asbjørnslett, 2008). Therefore, it is fundamental to identify drivers of risks in supply chains to optimize risk mitigation strategies and consequently moderate the negative outcomes of disruptions (Williams et al., 2008; Jüttner et al., 2003). However, despite the highly scientific relevance, it appears that too little research has been performed to identify factors external to the supply chain that may influence the efforts made by firms to enact security. Voss et al. (2009) find that companies operating in the food segment are willing to trade off price and delivery reliability with greater security (customers' willingness to pay). In addition, the hypothesis about the relationship between the length of supply chains (domestic vs. global) and the demand for security is also supported (*ibid*). Other authors identify the following factors as influencing the security of supply chains: supply chain length, customers' requirements, authority regulations, and security partnerships (Giunipero and Eltantawy, 2004; Cupp et al., 2004; Craighead et al., 2007; Whipple et al., 2009).

It appears that the relevance of the security problem found in practical instances is not equally treated in the scientific literature (Williams et al., 2008; Staake et al., 2009). Moreover, more descriptive research and empirical data are needed in this research area to find the theoretical validity of existing normative studies or even to investigate the existence of further factors

influencing security that may be still unknown in the academic field (Williams et al., 2008; Voss et al., 2009a). As a consequence the research question that this study aims to answer is the following (Figure 1):

• **RQ**. What factors impact physical distribution security?



Figure 1: Factors impacting security of physical distribution chains.

1.4 Research Purpose

The purpose of this study is two-fold. First of all, this investigation aims to enhance the understanding of what factors influence the security of physical distribution carriers. The research is intended to unveil these factors in the form of hypotheses and thereafter to demonstrate their degree of influence on the security of organizations in terms of budget allocated and amount of security incidents (Figure 1). The ultimate goal of this investigation is to provide an overview of the status of security of physical distribution carriers in Sweden.

1.5 Delimitations

The security of physical distribution networks could be measured in diverse ways depending on the context of the research or the background of the researcher. To adhere to the given definition of *"security"*, it has been decided to limit the measurement of this construct by means of two indicators: the magnitude of the security budget and the amount of security incidents. The first

tells the monetary efforts made by companies to enhance security, the second gives indication of the effectiveness of the investments made.

To tailor the questions formulated in the survey and consequently enhance their understanding, it has been decided to perform the survey study exclusively with physical carriers. Hence, physical distribution operators like logistics service providers, owners of warehouses and intermodal terminals are not included in the sample; likewise manufacturing industries, wholesalers and retailers have been excluded. Finally, due to the difficulty of finding a consistent and reliable European database, the physical carriers that have been surveyed are those registered in the Swedish Business Register database (more details about the characteristics of the sample frame and size are provided in Chapter 5).

Finally, this thesis will not investigate supply chain consequences of security incidents. It is indeed important to quantify these outcomes to emphasize the importance of protecting supply chains and distribution networks. However, for time and money constraints this issue will only be considered as a topic for future research.

1.6 Thesis Disposition

This doctoral dissertation is based upon an investigation performed from 2006 and 2008 and published in a licentiate thesis in 2008 (Urciuoli, 2008). The main purposes of the licentiate study concerned 1) the identification of the influence of diverse stakeholders on the security of physical distribution networks, 2) the identification of mitigation measures to deter cargo security incidents and 3) the development of an investment model to estimate the profitability of security solutions. Hence, the aim of this doctoral study is to perform a survey study to validate the findings related to the first purpose of the licentiate study (Figure 2).



Figure 2: Overall thesis disposition and integration with licentiate study.

This report starts by introducing the research background, problem, research question, purpose and delimitation of the doctoral study. Thereafter, in Chapter 2 a comprehensive summary of the licentiate investigation is provided, including background, purposes, methodology, and findings. The content from Chapter 3 to Chapter 7 is exclusively related to the research conducted within the survey study. The last chapter summarizes all the findings of the licentiate and doctoral investigations. More specifically, this thesis consists of the following chapters:

Chapter 1. The research background, context, objectives and delimitation of this study are reported.

Chapter 2. A summary of the licentiate thesis is reported in this section.

Chapter 3. The literature collected between 2008 and 2009 is reviewed and categorized in this section.

Chapter 4. In this chapter the research hypotheses, concerning the factors impacting the security of physical distribution networks, are formulated.

Chapter 5. This chapter describes the methodological assumptions and research design followed 1) to formulate the hypotheses, 2) to develop the survey instrument and 3) to perform the analysis of the data collected. In addition, the validity and reliability of the survey study are discussed.

Chapter 6. This section contains descriptive statistics of the answers collected as well as the numerical findings of the statistical analysis performed.

Chapter 7. This chapter includes a managerial summary of the results of the survey investigation.

Chapter 8. The findings of the licentiate and doctoral investigation are reported. Delimitations, research and practical contributions as well as future research are highlighted in this chapter.

2 Licentiate Summary

This chapter summarizes the three research questions and purpose of the investigations performed in the licentiate thesis (Urciuoli, 2008). Thereafter, the answers to the research questions are presented as three separate studies organized in a structure including the background, the methodology and the findings.

2.1 Research Questions and Purpose

The study developed in this report builds upon the findings of investigations published in a licentiate thesis in 2008 (Urciuoli, 2008). Three research questions were elaborated (Figure 3):

- **RQ1.** What are the fundamental stakeholders and interactions within and outside physical distribution systems from a security perspective?
- **RQ2.** What mitigation measures can be implemented today to enhance the security of physical distribution operations?
- **RQ3.** How can existing investment and risk models be exploited to estimate the performance of security solutions and support investment decisions?

Today, according to available statistics, distribution networks are insecure (Figure 3). Therefore it is of primary importance to understand what factors are hindering security, how it is possible to protect physical distribution networks and finally to evaluate the profitability of security measures available on the market place.

By answering these three research questions, the main ambition of the licentiate investigations was to provide an understanding about how it is possible to enhance the security of physical distribution systems (*"suggestions for new system"*, Figure 3). The understanding of the business mechanisms hindering or driving security may facilitate the work to set up regulations or incentives for key stakeholders. Finally, the collection and classification of security measures as well as the development of investment models may enhance the capability of main actors to choose among wide sets of security solutions in accordance with their impacts on security and monetary benefits. The next subsections summarize the scope, methodology and findings of the three research questions. Since the findings from the first research question are used to develop the survey study presented in this report, it has been decided to shorten the summary and give a more extended presentation of the results and methodology respectively in Chapters 4 and 5.



Figure 3: The research questions identified in the licentiate thesis.

2.2 RQ1. What are the fundamental stakeholders and interactions within and outside physical distribution systems from a security perspective?

The purpose of this study is to develop a Physical Distribution Security System framework (PDSS) to identify actors and the main factors impacting the security of physical distribution networks. Very few researchers have undertaken exploratory studies to understand the difficulties encountered by industries to improve supply chain security and thereby discover the causes that determine the security of distribution chains against antagonistic threats. Some authors point out globalization and JIT as the main causes (Crone, 2006; Khemani, 2007). Yet security problems in supply chain operations were known for many years before the emergence of these factors. Other authors emphasize the importance of top management commitment, authorities' regulation, supply chain security partnerships and willingness to pay as facilitators/inhibitors of supply chain security (Autry and Bobbitt, 2008; Voss et al. 2009b). However, it is unclear how each of these factors is understood and put into practice by transportation companies. In other words, previous research doesn't unveil the practical difficulties experienced by companies to ensure, for instance, top management commitment, integration of authority regulation, the correct arrangement of supply chain security partnerships etc. These factors have not been unveiled yet by previous research, and the additional hypothesis about other reasons that may actually be significant factors for security in physical distribution networks may be suggested.

2.2.1 Methodology

A qualitative methodology is exploited in this investigation. This choice has been preferred because of the explorative nature of this study and also for the novelty of the research topic in supply chain management literature and the consequent lack of research constructs (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Autry and Bobbitt, 2008). Hence, the method followed consists of three main phases: a literature search, and collection and analysis of empirical data.

The literature search was performed within available scientific journals to investigate previous security research in the fields of supply chain and logistics management. Non-participant observations performed on the occasion of a workshop and a seminar organized in Sweden, facilitated comprehension of how the security problem is perceived by Swedish actors. In particular, the preliminary findings led to the formulation of a set of stakeholders and factors influencing the security of physical distribution. To enhance the comprehension of the roles of these actors, a total of 16 interviews were performed: 4 unstructured and 12 semi-structured. Respondents were randomly selected from a convenient sample of professionals joining a research project dealing with logistics security and in a way to represent the preliminary actors previously identified. Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics of the sample interviewed.

The interviews were completely unstructured in the beginning of the research to gain better understanding of the area and add the widest range of information. They were meant to let the respondents share thoughts about two main topics: 1) the vulnerability of physical distribution chains to antagonistic threats and 2) the main causes determining the high exposure of physical distribution chains (see Appendix 2). Once these topics became more comprehensible, semi-structured interviews with more pointed questions were used. Already after 12 interviews it was experienced that the respondents were not adding new actors or factors to the findings. Before discontinuing the data collection, four more interviews were carried out (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). Finally, by means of content analysis, themes and constructs were derived from the interviews and the notes from the observations and merged with those found in the literature material, notes from observations, and the transcribed interviews, labeled and thereafter systematically associated to stakeholders.

	Industry	Position
Respondent 1	Electronics Manufacturer	Security manager
Respondent 2	Transportation	Lawyer
Respondent 3	Road Carrier	Security Manager
Respondent 4	Logistics Service Provider	Global Security Manager
Respondent 5	Food Products	Security Manager
Respondent 6	Pharmaceutical	Security Manager
Respondent 7	Cash Transportation	Security Manager
Respondent 8	Law Enforcement Agency	Police inspector
Respondent 9	Security Certification	International Sales Manager
Respondent 10	Logistics Service Providers	Regional Security Manager
Respondent 11	Security Solution Provider	Commercial Director
Respondent 12	Road Carrier	CEO
Respondent 13	Security Solution Provider	CEO
Respondent 14	Shipping company	Senior Director
Respondent 15	Shipping Company	Corporate Security Manager
Respondent 16	Insurance Company	Claims Manager

Table 1: Demographic characteristics of the respondents.

2.2.2 Findings

The findings of this study are amalgamated into the Physical Distribution Security System (PDSS) in Figure 4, where eight actors and 19 hypotheses are brought to light as factors influencing the security of physical distribution networks. The actors that are playing a significant role in the level of security in physical distribution networks are the following:

- The law enforcement agency. This stakeholder has to ensure that criminals are prosecuted and that resources are allocated to fight cargo crime. According to the interviewed managers this is not happening today and therefore cargo crime is a profitable activity with high revenues and low risks. At the same time, this actor is organizing collaborative activities that are meant to enhance the understanding of security and stimulate the implementation of security measures.
- **Distribution and transport operators.** The difficulties encountered by these stakeholders are the willingness to pay of transport buyers, the dilemma to trade off JIT with security, and the impact on performance of security measures. In addition, the length of distribution networks is another factor influencing the security of operations.



Figure 4: The system framework (Urciuoli, 2008).

- **Insurance Companies.** According to some interviewees, insurances are being used to cover losses related to security incidents. Hence, these operators prefer to pay the excesses and higher premiums instead of purchasing security devices or implementing specific routines. In addition, some transport providers indicate the importance of obtaining premium discounts whenever security is improved.
- Security Solution Providers. The main issue experienced by these actors is that many products are still in a development phase and are too hard to integrate into an organization from both a business process and a technical viewpoint. In addition, some respondents claimed that the most advanced and effective security devices are too expensive to be implemented on a large fleet of vehicles.
- **Cargo Criminals.** Criminals are intelligent, have access to financial resources, and most of all have the capability to quickly learn and deceive security measures. Hence, some operators stated that is useless to invest in security solutions since criminals will find out how to deceive them.

- **Contract Regulatory Associations.** The role of contract regulatory associations (e.g. (e.g. International Chamber of Commerce, International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations, etc.) that develop contract agreements to share risks is brought to light by previous research. However, observations and interviews unveiled that these contracts are often not used because of their complexity. In addition, whenever contracts are used, security requirements are not specified or are difficult to agree on. This does not favor the enhancement of security.
- Authority. The authority is working by issuing security certifications. In particular, the AEO is a security certification introduced in Europe by the authority. According to data collected, it may be hypothesized that this certification may enhance security. At the same time, some respondents pointed out that this certification is still confusing. In addition, some operators perceive that these regulations may worsen efficiency and still not enhance security. Hence, this uncertainty may result in a worsening of security.

2.3 RQ2. What mitigation measures can be implemented today to enhance the security of physical distribution operations?

The purpose of this investigation is to identify the mitigation measures that may be implemented to enhance security of physical distribution networks. The ultimate goal is to determine how to narrow the knowledge gap among managers about how to protect distribution networks. Security problems often are multifaceted and dependent on the specific context (geographical, cultural etc.) in which they take place. Therefore managers need to have access to comprehensive lists of security solutions to be able to choose the ones that best fit their logistics and security requirements. The final purpose is to identify and classify existing security measures at the disposal of managers and to provide them with a framework to facilitate the work of increasing security and identifying weak spots in supply chains.

2.3.1 Methodology

To gain a clearer picture of security needs and managerial knowledge, several methodological steps had to be accomplished. First of all, a literature search was performed to depict the status of the research devoted to security, including the analysis of management strategies, technical tools and certifications. After that, a first draft of a survey was prepared and sent to a group of potential respondents. The collected results were categorized and put into a layered framework.

Survey Instrument

The table for the collection of security systems was split into six columns. The first two columns asked for open answers about the name of the known security system, hyperlinks to existing providers on the marketplace and the components constituting the system. The last four columns asked respectively for "the part of the distribution chain where the system was implementable", "Type of Security Solution (Prevention, Detection or Recovery)", "Type of Unit Load the Solution was applicable to" and "Type of Resources the Solution was applicable to". This information had to be gathered to get a deeper understanding about how security systems, procedures or certifications work. The respondents had the possibility to check boxes under each column to simplify the answering procedure or to propose possibly missing alternatives. Similarly the table for the collection of security procedures was made of five columns. The first two were open questions in which respondents could specify the name of the procedure (possibly by mentioning the corresponding ISO code), and the processes composing the procedure. The last three questions were made up of checkboxes and asked for "Type of Security Procedure (Prevention, Detection or Recovery)", "Distribution Chain's Actors involved" and "External Actors involved". These were also fundamental to understand the main processes and actors involved in the security procedure. At the end of the survey, the respondents were given the opportunity to make comments, specify their company's business area and provide their contact details.

Data Collection

The survey was sent to a group of 76 security experts. 16 members of the group returned the survey (21%) and 5 additional experts were convinced by phone to fill in the questionnaire (6%). 4 members explicitly declared that they couldn't join the investigation because of lack of time or confidentiality issues (5%). Finally, 42 managers never answered (55%) and 9 (11%) surveys could not be delivered to the email addresses collected in the database.

Data analysis and Classification

The analysis of the findings collected from the literature review and the survey, revealed three major areas in which strategies, routines and technical devices are gathered as means to improve supply chain security. These are Governmental Initiatives, Management Strategies and Operative Routines and Technical Systems (Figure 5).



Operative Routines & Technical Systems

Figure 5: The three areas for supply chain security improvement.

To enhance the ability to make effective use of the information collected, it was necessary to represent a generic logistics system by means of a multi-layered structure. In this way it is possible to conceptually explain in which part of the logistics systems the collected security measures are meant to be implemented. The multi-layered logistics framework developed has been adapted from the model used in Wandel et al. (1991) to represent transportation systems. Hence, it is composed of 6 layers (Figure 6):

- Layer 1. The first layer represents the decision makers in the supply chain that have the responsibility to allocate resources, monitor system performance and optimize costs and efficiency.
- Layer 2. This layer concerns the information flows to be transmitted through or stored at every element of supply chains. These flows can contain information about the cargo as well as about the consignor, consignee etc.
- Layer 3. Layer 3 comprises the infrastructure of transportation chains the goods travel through, including suppliers' and buyers' facilities, intermodal terminals, warehouses, Customs, and other terminals and elements of the transport infrastructure (e.g. vehicle depots, parking areas, rights of way etc.).

- Layer 4. Layer 4 is exclusively dedicated to the transport conveyance adopted during the transportation process. In this analysis four transportation modes are considered: road, rail, air and sea.
- Layer 5. Layer 5 includes the unit loads or packages used for transportation or storing purposes at the distribution terminals.
- Layer 6. Layer 6 represents the product itself or the material that is being moved in the distribution chain.



Figure 6: The multi-layered logistics framework (adapted from Wandel et al. 1991).

Finally, the security solutions are classified according to the following functions:

- Typology. Operative routines, management strategies and technical systems
- **Prevention.** The role of preventive measures is to be a step ahead of the antagonists, scare them and to provide security analysts with key information to predict threats.
- **Detection.** Detection measures register an attack taking place and send this information to personnel in charge.
- **Recovery.** Recovery measures are all solutions that support managers in recovering from an attack and reducing its consequences (i.e. detect, identify and capture the antagonists or the processes to recover stolen cargo or to set up a new shipment etc.).

- Layer protection. Applicability in multi-layered framework of distribution chains.
- Certification Compliance. Compliance with TAPA EMEA minimum security requirements.

2.3.2 Findings

In conclusion, this study has the ambition to provide supply chain and security managers with a comprehensive overview of security solutions including authority regulations, managerial strategies, operative routines and technical systems (Figure 7). It also gives the possibility to managers to benchmark their security approaches with those that have been collected in this research. In addition, the multi-layered approach developed enhances the comprehension and classification of the results and makes it easier to identify weak spots in supply chains and related countermeasures.



Figure 7: The three security measures areas applied to the multi-layered framework.

Governmental Initiatives. Only 19% of the respondents showed knowledge of the on-going governmental initiatives that may improve the security of supply chains. Hence, the bulk of information presented here has been gathered from secondary data sources. These are the following:
- Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act called for a noticeable increment of inspections and 100% screening of cargo loaded on passenger planes. Similar reforms have been adopted in Germany, UK and Singapore.
- **ISPS.** The sea sector followed the air sector when the International Ship and Port facility Security code (ISPS) was widened to include a standard framework, for the identification and assessment of vulnerabilities of sea transportation and port facilities by means of risk analysis.
- The Container Security Initiative (CSI). The Container Security Initiative (CSI) was introduced in US in January 2002. The CSI highlights the importance of developing domestic bilateral agreements to permit the exchange of Customs officers in US. In addition it is fundamental to allow benchmarking and improvement in inspection and clearance processes of containerized cargo.
- Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) was issued by the US government in April 2002, to gather representatives from the US Customs Border Protection (CBP) and the private sector and develop a list of minimum security requirements for shippers and carriers. The ultimate goal of these guidelines is the identification of less risky cargo. A Supply Chain Security Specialists team (SCSS) is in charge of this task and determines companies' security profiles according to such factors as security related anomalies, shipping geographic regions, other risk related information, or import volumes.
- Advance Manifest Rule (AMR). The AMR initiative obliges shippers to submit to US Customs detailed cargo information 24 hours before loading containers on ships. When the containers are delivered, customs officers check information, and consequently anomalies may be detected. The same information can even be used by the CBP to designate if the cargo can be loaded on a vessel or to make decisions about inspections (*Automated Targeting System*). This is important in order to reduce the number of containers to be scanned.
- The Authorized Economic Operator (AEO). The scope of the AEO initiative is to detect high-risk cargo as early as possible in supply chains and in a resource-efficient way. To gain certification, firms have to comply with a set of criteria: Customs compliance history, adoption of appropriate system for documenting commercial reports,

financial solvency, information exchange, security of conveyance, cargo and personnel as well as monitoring and follow up of guidelines' consistency and the integrity of security systems. In this way, each European Customs is stimulated to establish a partnership with the private sectors and grade their security degree.

• Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on enhancing supply chain security (79/2006). This proposal calls for improved risk assessment and cost benefits analysis as well as comprehensive harmonization of security measures by means of equal judgment of all transportation modes in an integrated way

Management Strategies. None of the managers that participated in this study mentioned managerial strategies, which are instead collected exclusively from previous literature. The focus of these measures is mainly on supply chain risk management to mitigate disruptions' consequences (layer 1 in Figure 6). Some of these are the following (a comprehensive list is available in Urciuoli, 2008 or likewise in Urciuoli, 2009):

- Supply chain restructuring. To rethink and make more resilient supply chains by reducing transport content, using transportation more efficiently, improving sourcing strategy and increasing buffers and inventories.
- Hedging and flexible strategies. Application of strategies aiming at balancing profits and losses in a supply chain as well as increasing redundancy.
- **Risk Management.** Extended usage of risk management activities, in particular "*what if*" analysis to identify risk sources and related countermeasures.
- Collaboration and outsourcing. Improve collaboration and outsourcing with suppliers by introducing risk-sharing contracts.
- **Total Quality Management.** Implementation of Total Quality Management (TQM) to achieve higher security at lower costs.
- **Resources Backup.** Improve knowledge and process backup.
- **Decentralization.** Exploit decentralization of operations and redundancy to recover supply chains in case of forced shut down.
- **Public-private cooperation.** Improve public-private cooperation, assets reorganization and introduction of a security manager who is familiar with corporate environment issues and with risk assessment techniques.

Operative Routines and Technical Systems. Operative routines refer to all the procedures put into operation to enhance the security against antagonistic threats. The managers who responded to the survey have provided most of the collected procedures. The most mentioned operative routines include access control, personnel identification, employee background screening, check up of security measures, cargo screening etc. (a comprehensive list is available in Urciuoli, 2008) or likewise in Urciuoli, 2009).

Technical systems can automate operative and strategic measures by means of a combination of hardware (e.g. sensors to capture data) and software (e.g. middleware or Decision Support Systems). Prominent technical systems include biometrics and surveillance systems, IT security technologies such as Firewalls, Secure Socket Layers (SSL), Application Authentication, Virtual Private Networks (VPN) as well as systems for Access Control (or Identity Management or Authentication) etc. (layer 2 in Figure 6) Other technical systems are those meant to protect physical objects and include vehicle or perimeter alarms, vehicle immobilizers, locks or fuel cap locks (layers 3 to 6 in Figure 6). Track and Trace systems are also well known among practitioners. These are made up of a unit containing a GPS and a GSM/GPRS modem to communicate the position of the transport conveyance to a remote server. Other security solutions to prevent tampering or intrusion in unit loads are locks, hard walls or reinforced curtains, devices for immobilization, tamper evident seals etc. Locks and tamper evident seals are available as mechanical or electrical systems. Examples of mechanical locks are padlocks, bolts, and cable locks. Examples of seals are cup seals and metal strap seals. Electronic seals (RFID tags) are instead made up of a body that can be installed on multiple levels of physical objects, thus from single items to pallets, containers, and transportation conveyances. To collect the data stored on the tags, RFID readers have to be installed at specific locations (usually the facilities of the distribution system). Often these solutions allow nesting, which gives the possibility to identify items in pallets, pallets in containers and so forth. Further, sensors like GPS, biometrics, satellite communication systems, IR motion detection, and acoustics, temperature, weight, flow and shock vibration and more, can be added. Sensor technology is finally coupled with diverse web-services (often based on SOA - Service Oriented Architecture) as track and trace, time/geo-fencing, alerts, event management and so on (a more comprehensive list is provided in Urciuoli, 2008 or Urciuoli, 2009).

2.4 RQ3. How can existing investment and risk models be exploited to estimate the performance of security solutions and support investment decisions?

The purpose of this last investigation is to determine the possibility of applying existing risk management and investment models to determine the profitability of security measures in distribution networks. To enhance the clarity of the work performed within this research question, this part is split into two sub-sections: the first showing the application of the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) methodology to evaluate the impact of transport security solutions; the second to demonstrate how the integration of Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) may enable the estimation of security measures combined into hybrid systems.

2.4.1 Application of QRA Approach

The purpose of the first part of this study is to present one of the best-known approaches used in the risk management discipline, the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) as it is described in Kaplan (1997). The application of the approach on a hypothetical transport assignment may demonstrate its feasibility for the evaluation of security solutions against cargo crime. It seems that still too little research has focused on the quantification of the impacts of transport security solutions. In addition, the few quantitative studies found in the literature don't take advantage of the methodologies developed within the risk and safety management discipline that acknowledge many years of experience related to the evaluation of measures to minimize, monitor, and control risks (Lee and Whang, 2005; Talas and Menachof, 2009).

2.4.2 Methodology

The methodology used in this investigation follows three main phases of the QRA approach (Kaplan, 1997; Haimes, 1998; Johansson, 2003): identification of scenarios, collection of body of evidence and scenario quantification.

Scenario Identification. The identification of scenarios is meant to determine the possible attacks against a system. The set of risk scenarios to be used in a Quantitative Risk Assessment should be complete, finite and disjoint (Kaplan, 1997; Haimes and Garrick, 2001). Hence, real problems may be assumed as "an underlying continuum to be carved up or partitioned into a finite set of scenarios" (*ibid*). Kaplan (1997) suggests viewing any risk scenario, S_i , considered in an analysis as a deviation from the normal conditions specified by the analyst in an initial scenario S_0 ; "one is to think of S_0 as a trajectory in the state space of the system"

The case considered in this investigation is a road transportation assignment in which a container loaded with generic cargo is moved between two warehouses (node 1 to node 2). This is also depicted in Figure 8, where the transportation network is represented in the form of nodes and links. Hence, by following the recommendations given by Kaplan (1997), this case may be considered as the S_0 scenario from which End States are identified.



Figure 8: Scenario identification from initiating events to end states.

Collection of Body of Evidence. Statistics data and expert panels may be utilized to gather evidence of possible security incidents (Kaplan, 1997). To enhance the accuracy and reliability of the data, it is a good practice to combine different data sources like literature, databases, experts' judgments etc. In this case the Bayes' theorem may be applied according to the equation below (Apostolakis, 1986; Kaplan, 1997).

The body of evidence used in this study consists of cargo theft statistics, the costs of security measures, the impact of the security measures on the cargo theft scenarios, and the average annual shipments carried out in Sweden. The data have been collected from primary and secondary sources by means of interviews, statistics data stored in electronic databases and experts' judgments.

Cargo Theft Statistics

Statistical data were gathered to determine the frequency of theft attacks against transport operations. This was performed by gathering data corresponding to theft incidents from 2006 to 2007 available from the Swedish HOBIT database, built and provided by the Swedish Law Enforcement Agency, and the TAPA EMEA (Transported Assets Protection Association) Incident Information System (IIS) (Table 2). This study assumes that the statistics about the *modus operandi* collected on a European level can reliably represent the existing threats in Sweden.

	Modus Operandi	Frequency
μ_1	Burglary (Container)	7,39*10 ⁻⁶
μ_2	Burglary (Vehicle)	2,77*10 ⁻⁶
μ_3	Fraud (Vehicle/Container)	9,23*10 ⁻⁷
μ_4	Hijacking (Vehicle/Container)	3,23*10-6
μ_5	Robbery (Container)	9,24*10 ⁻⁷
μ_6	Robbery (Pallets)	1,52*10 ⁻⁵

Table 2: Road cargo theft modus operandi and corresponding frequency (n=6).

Costs of Security Measures

Interviews were used to gather the costs of the security solutions considered in this study. First of all, a set of nine security systems was selected among those that are mostly used by transport operators. Thereafter, companies developing these systems were selected and interviewed to find out the costs of the solutions. The costs have been mathematically formalized in a total cost vector $\overline{TC}_{\rho} = \{TC_{\rho 1}, TC_{\rho 2}, TC_{\rho 3}, ..., TC_{\rho m}\}$, where the generic element is given by the sum $TC_{\rho m} = FC_{\rho m} + VC_{\rho m}, \forall \rho \in M$, and $FC_{\rho m}$ and $VC_{\rho m}$ are respectively the fixed and monthly variable costs of a generic technology ρ_m (Table 3). The names of the companies interviewed are not provided for privacy concerns.

Scenario Quantification. The input variables used in the model to quantify the scenarios are: the theft statistics (μ_n) measured as percentage of frequency, the interest rate (*ir*), the loss value or value of shipment transported (C_{loss}), and the impact given by the introduction of security solutions (security solutions impact) (Table 4).

	Security Solutions	Fixed Costs (€)	Variable Costs (€)
$ ho_1$	Track & Trace	1 000	15
$ ho_2$	ID Tag + Readers + Sensor (E-SEALS)	52 000	0
$ ho_3$	Active RFID Tags + Readers	52 766	0
$ ho_4$	Active RFID Tag + Reader + GPS + GPRS/GSM	55 000	15
$ ho_5$	Passive RFID Tags + Readers (gates)+WIFI	53 336	0
$ ho_6$	Sound Barrier	665	5
$ ho_7$	Mechanical Locks	300	0
$ ho_8$	Vehicle Immobilizer	720	15
$ ho_9$	Reinforced Trailers	500	0

Table 3: security solutions and associated fixed and variable costs (m=9).

The impact of the security solutions, measured as the percentage of the reduction of the theft risk, is assumed to be an exogenous variable defined by three values to be used to generate random data from triangular distribution (an interval range and a mean value, respectively $[\alpha_{\rho}, \beta_{\rho}, \chi_{\rho}]$). The remaining input parameters are fixed and set by the analyst in the previous phase of the QRA approach (Table 4).

Variable	I/O variable	Туре	Symbol	Dimension
Theft Statistics	Input	Fixed	μ_n	[%]
Interest Rate	Input	Fixed	ir	[%]
Loss Value	Input	Fixed	C _{loss}	[€]
Security Solutions Impact	Input	Exogenous	$\left[lpha_{ ho}, eta_{ ho}, \chi_{ ho} ight]$	[%]
B/C	Output	Endogenous	$\left[\frac{B}{C}\right]_{\rho}$	[]
NPV	Output	Endogenous	$NPV_{ ho}$	[€]
Risk	Output	Endogenous	$\delta R_{ ho}$	[€]

Table 4: Model variables.

The endogenous variables constituting the output parameters of the mathematical model are the capital investment indexes (the B/C ratio and the Net Present Value) and the risk reductions. These parameters are calculated according to the following equations (Equations 1, 2, and 3).

$$\begin{bmatrix} B\\ \overline{C} \end{bmatrix}_{\rho_m} = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^T \left[\delta R_{\rho_m} \cdot (1+ir)^{-t} \right]}{\sum_{t=0}^T T C_{t\rho_m} \cdot (1+ir)^{-t}}, \rho_m \in \bar{\rho}$$
⁽¹⁾

$$NPV_{\rho_m} = \sum_{t=0}^{T} \left[\left(\delta R_{\rho_m} - TC_{t\rho_m} \right) \cdot (1+ir)^{-t} \right], \rho_m \in \bar{\rho}$$
⁽²⁾

$$\delta R_{\rho_m} = \sum_{\mathbf{M}} \left(\mu_n \cdot F_{Z\rho_m}^{-1}(\mathbf{r}) \cdot \Psi \right), \forall \ \mu_n \in \bar{\mu}, \rho_m \in \bar{\rho}$$
(3)

Where

 $F_{Z\rho_m}^{-1}(\mathbf{r})$, is the inverse of the cumulative triangular distribution function generated with the experts' judgments.

 δR_{ρ_m} , is the risk reduction of a generic security solution ρ_m .

 $\left[\frac{B}{c}\right]_{\rho_m}$, is the Benefit-Cost ration of the generic security solution ρ_m .

 NPV_{ρ_m} , is the Net Present Value of the generic security solution ρ_m .

 $\Psi = C_{\text{loss}} \times \frac{J_{\text{avg}}}{T_{\text{op}}}$, is the yearly average value shipped by a generic transport operator in Sweden.

T, is the calculation period of the investment.

t, time measured in years.

2.4.3 Findings

A Monte Carlo simulation has been run with 5,000 iterations and over a time period of 10 years. Examining Table 5, which depicts the maximum and minimum values as well as the standard deviations of the B/C ratios and the NPVs, it is possible to notice that only the first security solution (GPS based track and trace) may have negative values of the NPV (min=-€499) as well as values of the B/C<1 (min=0.79). This implies that there could be a small possibility that this technology could not be profitable. This is also illustrated in Figure 9 and Figure 10 where the distributions of the frequency and cumulative frequency of the NPV and B/C ratio are reported.

Security Solution	B/C	B/C (Max, min, St.Dev)	NPV (€)	NPV (€ Max, min, St.Dev.)	Risk Reduction (%)
GPS	1,23	(1.76, 0.79, 0.14)	566.5	(1,904, -499, 369)	6,3%
E-Seals	0,07	(0.10, 0.04, 0.01)	-48,142.5	(-46,363, -49,788, 651)	8,2%
A-RFID	0,07	(0.10, 0.04, 0.01)	-49,057.4	(-47,052, -50,529, 680)	7,4%
A-RFID (GPS)	0,28	(0.33, 0.22, 0.01)	-40,642.8	(-37,558, -43,851, 1097)	36,5%
P-RFID	0,06	(0.10, 0.03, 0.01)	-49,957.2	(-47,846, -51,240, 694)	8,5%
Sound Barrier	7,03	(8.63, 5.29, 0.58)	7,028.3	(8,883, 4,994, 676)	16,7%
Mech. Lock	17,43	(24.41, 9.53, 2.71)	4,928.1	(7,346, 2,569, 822)	9,3%
Immobilizer	1,44	(1.71, 1.19, 0.07)	977.1	(1,582, 428, 175)	6,5%
Reinforced Trailer	7,66	(10.62, 5.42, 0.92)	3,328.7	(4,813, 2,214, 463)	7,6%

Table 5: The computed investment indexes for the nine security solutions considered (A-RFID=Active RFID, P-RFID=Passive RFID).

RFID based solutions (e-seals, Active RFID with and without GPS, Passive RFID) are not profitable even though these devices are among the ones that are most effective on the risk reduction of the threats, i.e. Active RFID coupled with GPS gives a risk reduction of 36.5% (Table 5). Mechanical locks have the highest Benefit/Cost ratio, followed by reinforced trailer (B/C=7.66) and sound barrier (7.03). The vehicle immobilizer is also profitable, but when examining the distribution of the B/C ratio some uncertainty may be found (values below 1).



Figure 9: Frequency distribution of NPV index for GPS track and trace solution.



Figure 10: Frequency distribution of B/C ratio for GPS track and trace solution.

Sensitivity analysis is fundamental to assess the differences in the outputs of a mathematical model due to a) unexpected outcomes of the exogenous variables, b) errors committed during the measurement of the system, c) invalid model structure, d) incorrect objectives and e) improper execution of decisions (Wandel, 1985).

In this study, a nominal range sensitivity analysis has been performed to determine the impact of the input values on the outcome variables. For practical reasons, it is not possible to illustrate the sensitivity analysis for all the nine security solutions considered in this paper. Therefore, this section presents only the results of a sensitivity analysis performed for the GPS track and trace solution (ρ_1), which is one of the most common devices used by operators to monitor their vehicles' fleets. The inputs chosen in this investigation and the related plausible ranges are:

- Loss Value. This factor has a minimum value of €25,000 and a maximum of €56,000. These values have been identified by using available statistics that report the value of goods stolen in Europe (ECMT, 2002).
- Threat frequency. The panel of experts used in this investigation believed that today available statistics are too low and most of all that the existing figures should be increased by at least 30%. Hence, the minimum value corresponds to the theft statistics shown in Table 2, and the maximum value is instead calculated by incrementing these figures by 30%.

- Total cost of the solution. Data gathered from secondary sources show that the fixed costs of GPS based track and trace devices vary from about €500 to €2,000. The variable costs have been changed proportionally to the variation of the fixed costs.
- The interest rate. The interval values of the interest rate have been determined by examining the trend of this indicator on a 10-year time period from January 2000 to January 2010¹. The minimum interest rate was 1.5% and the maximum 4.75%.

The results of the analysis show that the loss value and the total cost of the solution have the most dramatic effects. The former is capable of causing the expected net present value to be as low as $-\pounds1,159$ and as high as $\pounds508$; almost similarly, the latter strongly influences the net present values that vary from $-\pounds800$ to a maximum of $\pounds702$ (Figure 11). These factors are followed rather closely by the threat frequency and the interest rate.



Figure 11. Tornado Diagram.

¹ Swedish Central Bank, REPO Rate trend.

Finally, it has to be pointed out that the available data concerning the loss value as well as the threat frequency have a high degree of uncertainty. The loss values were determined from available statistics. However, it is well known that companies do not report minor losses because it is not worth the related administrative costs. Likewise, high values are also kept hidden because of the fear of 1) bad reputation and 2) increments of premium discounts. Hence, the interval range of this variable could be larger. For the same reasons, data concerning threat frequency also have a high degree of ambiguity. In this investigation, the maximum value was substantially incremented by 30%. Nevertheless, this was also a rough estimation made in accordance with the opinions of the experts.

2.4.4 Implementation of Reliability Block Diagrams

The study presented in the previous section unveiled some difficulties related to the implementation of the QRA approach described in Kaplan (1997). These include 1) a problem related to systematically identifying security scenarios and to quantitatively modelling *the interdependency of security devices*, and 2) some concerns that appeared when trying to model the impact of the combination of security devices to be introduced in transport systems. Finally, the process exploited to gather experts' judgments was also perceived as practically unfeasible in some situations.

The first issue, the *interdependency of security devices*, implies that sometimes the implementation of a security device may not affect the security of a system, although an expert would rank the device as effective on specific threats. For instance, the implementation of a window alarm on a warehouse may have different impacts depending on the physical structure of the building. While an expert would rank the impact of the security device as high, its real effect depends on the number of weaker spots of the target, i.e. the number of windows or doors not alarmed. The approach described by Kaplan (1997) suggests the identification of the initial scenario S_0 , but analysts are not recommended to enhance the technical description of the target and, above all, assess the introduced security device in terms of existing weaker spots on the target.

Other concerns appeared when trying to assess the combination of security devices on the same transport system. For instance, the computation of the effect of a mechanical lock may be different on a curtain or rigid trailer. An expert would rank the protection degree of a mechanical

lock higher on the rigid trailer. However, when the mechanical lock is implemented on a curtain trailer, the protection degree becomes illogical, because antagonists will orient all their attacks on the curtains.

One way to solve this issue could be to enhance the description of the initial scenarios by using the experts to judge single as well as combinations of security systems. However, in this case, the process used to collect experts' judgments could become practically impossible. For instance, if one wants to evaluate the impact of *m* security devices on *n* threats, the total number of scenarios to be evaluated is given by $n \times m$, which means that the number of experts' judgments grows when *n* or *m* are increased. However, according to combinatorial mathematics, if the analyst wants to take into consideration even the interrelation between security devices against the *n* threats, the total amount of necessary experts' judgments is given by the amount of combinations of *m* security devices in groups of *k* (*k*=1 to *m*) un-ordered collections multiplied by the *n* security threats (Equation 4).

$$EJ = n \cdot C_k^m = n \cdot \sum_k \frac{m!}{k! (m-k)!}$$

$$\tag{4}$$

The figure below depicts, in accordance to Equation 4, how rapidly the number of experts' judgments increases when the number of security devices, *m*, is incremented from 1 to 10 and the number of threats, *n*, is incremented from n=2 to n=8. Thus, it is clear that the collection of experts' judgments may become soon an impractical operation (i.e. 10 security devices against 4 modus operandi require about 4,000 experts' judgments).



Figure 12: Relationship between security devices and amount of security systems for n=2,4,6,8 security threats.

2.4.5 Method Development

The implementation of Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) techniques could be one of the possible ways to solve the identified difficulties. The implementation of the RBD technique to evaluate transport security systems requires analysts to design series and parallel diagrams in which security devices are interconnected to each other's. The failure of the system is provoked by an intentional attack against one or more single components of the security system. This failure determines the interruption of the connection between the end points of the RBD. Hence, the RBD technique could be a realistic method to uncover the *interdependencies between security devices* and model them in a quantitative manner. If the failure of only one device determines the failure of the whole system then the security devices should be drawn in series structures. The security of a system, S_{SSs} , made of *n* components in series is given in the following equation (Equation 5) (Rausand and Høyland, 2004; Bergman and Klefsjö, 2004):

$$S_{SSS} = R_s(t) = E\left(\phi_s(X(t))\right) = \prod_{i=1}^n R_i(t)$$
(5)

Where

S_{SSs} = Security of System SS made of components in series

 $R_s(t) = Reliability$ or Security of the system

$$\phi_s(X(t)) = \phi_s(X_1(t), X_2(t), \dots, X_n(t))$$

= stochastic function describining the state of the system

$$E(\phi_s(X(t))) = expected value of the stochastic function \phi_s(X(t))$$

$R_i(t) = Reliability$ or Security of components i in the security system

On the contrary, when security devices are drawn in parallel it implies that an intruder will need to deceive all the devices in the system to successfully perpetrate an attack. The security SS_{SSp} of parallel structure of security devices may be formalized as it follows (Equation 6) (Rausand and Høyland, 2004; Bergman and Klefsjö, 2004):

$$S_{SSp} = R_s(t) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} (1 - R_i(t))$$
(6)

At this point, it is important to notice that when security devices are put into series structure the system is as secure as the weakest of its components. In mathematical terms this is expressed as (Rausand and Høyland, 2004; Bergman and Klefsjö, 2004):

$$R_s(t) \le \min_i(R_i(t)) \tag{7}$$

On the contrary, the introduction of security devices in parallel will make the system harder to penetrate (Equation 6).

Finally, the application of the RBD technique implies that a security analyst is merely required to determine the logical interconnections among the security components and thereby to estimate, by means of experts' judgments, the failures of the single devices against diverse security threats. The effect on the threats of the combined security devices will be quantitatively computed by means of equations 6 and 7. Keeping the amount of judgments limited may aid analysts to overcome the practical difficulties related to too many judgments.

2.4.6 A numerical Example

This section provides a numerical example in which the RBD technique is integrated with the QRA and exploited to determine the profitability of 7 security devices in a hypothetical transportation assignment. This example will consider the combination of the 7 security devices

in groups from 1 to 7 items (127 security systems) against 6 typical transport security threats (Table 2 and Table 3).

The set of technologies considered in this analysis can also be mathematically formalized into a vector $\overline{\rho} = \{\rho_1, \rho_2, \rho_3, ..., \rho_m\}$, where ρ_m is a generic technology in the set of security measures P ($\rho_m \in P$) (a detailed description of the technical solutions is given in the appendix of this paper,). To model the interdependency of the security devices considered in this example, series and parallel structures are determined and depicted in Figure 13. As it is possible to see, mechanical locks and reinforced trailers as well as e-seals and reinforced trailers are put into series structures.



Figure 13: The security solutions depicted in a Reliability Block Diagram.

This means that opening the mechanical lock or deceiving the e-seal will allow the perpetrators to access the cargo independently from the strength of the reinforced trailer or vice versa. Hence, the security of the system is given by the lowest reliability of the items in series (Equation 7). The mechanical lock and e-seal are instead put into a parallel structure because an antagonist needs to deceive both of them to manage to break into the container. Likewise, the sound barrier, the GPS based Track & Trace, the Vehicle Immobilizer and the Identification based solution can be put in parallel.

The development of parallel and series structures implies the consideration of new scenarios in which the single devices are combined in groups from 1 to 7 and assessed against the n security

threats (Figure 8). Thus, a total of $(1 + C_k^m) \cdot 2n = \left(1 + \sum_k \frac{m!}{k!(m-k)!}\right) \cdot 2n$ scenarios will be considered.



Figure 14: Scenario identification from initiating events to end states.

In the scenario quantification phase a mathematical model, Visual Basic scripts (developed in Excel macro development environment) and Monte Carlo simulations are exploited to estimate the impact of the security solutions on transportation in the form of investment indexes. The model variables are the same presented in Table 4 but this time referred to hybrid security systems SS_c. To determine the risk reduction factor of the hybrid security systems considered in this investigation (δR_{SS_c}), the reliability block diagram in Figure 13 can be mathematically formalized in equation 8.

$$S_{SS_{c}} = \left[\left(\prod_{\rho=4..7} \left(1 - F_{Z\rho}^{-1}(\zeta) \right) \cdot F_{Z\rho3}^{-1}(\zeta) \cdot \left(\prod_{\rho=1..2} \left(1 - F_{Z\rho}^{-1}(\zeta) \right) \right) \right) \right]$$
(8)

Where,

 S_{SS_c} , is the security of security system SS_c .

 SS_c , is the generic element of the security system vector $\overline{SS} = \{SS_1, SS_2, SS_3, \dots, SS_c, \}$

 $c = \sum_{k=1}^{m} \frac{m!}{k!(m-k)!}$ is the number of possible permutations of the generic $\rho_m \in \bar{\rho}$ security device in k=1...m un-ordered collections.

 $F_{Z\rho_m}^{-1}(\mathbf{r})$, is the inverse of the cumulative triangular distribution function generated with the experts' judgments made on the individual security devices ρ_m (measured as the percentage reduction of the security threat).

The Monte Carlo simulation has been run with 5,000 iterations. This amount was determined by examining the variation of the standard error as well as the convergence of the confidence interval and the stability of the mean value of the distribution. In the next tables the first ten security systems are depicted by sorting the simulation results first on the B/C ratio and then on the NPV (respectively Table 6 and Table 7).

	Security System (SS)	B/C	NPV (€)	RISK Reduction (%)
1	Mechanical Lock	17.42	4,928	9.30%
2	Sound Barrier and Mechanical Lock	7.90	10,102	28.65%
3	Reinforced Trailer	7.65	3,328	7.63%
4	Sound Barrier	7.03	7,028	16.72%
5	Sound Barrier and Reinforced Trailer	6.32	8,867	18.64%
6	Sound Barrier, Reinforced Trailer and Mechanical Lock	4.51	6,910	14.16%
7	Sound Barrier, Mechanical Lock and Vehicle Immobilizer	3.85	10,510	28.66%
8	Track and Trace, Sound Barrier and Mechanical Lock	3.52	10,015	32.52%
9	Sound Barrier, Vehicle Immobilizer and Reinforced Trailer	3.41	9,358	30.02%
10	Mechanical Lock and Vehicle Immobilizer	3.28	5,759	17.88%

Table 6: First ten security systems sorted on B/C ratio.

The highest B/C ratio is still given by the mechanical locks, followed by the parallel combination of sound barrier and mechanical locks, reinforced trailers, the sound barrier, the combination of sound barrier and reinforced trailers etc. (Table 6). The first solution showing devices in series ranks in 6th place and is made up of the combination of a sound barrier, a reinforced trailer and a mechanical lock installed on the trailer's doors (Figure 13).

The next table shows the first ten scenarios sorted on the NPV index (Table 7). The highest NPV is given by the combination in parallel of the sound barrier, mechanical lock and vehicle

immobilizer. The scenario that follows adopts a similar solution but without the vehicle immobilizer (SS_2). The first solution, that presents devices in series, ranks in 10th place and is made up of sound barrier, mechanical lock, Vehicle Immobilizer and reinforced trailer. None of the RFID solutions (e-seals and RFID active tags) appears in the tables.

	Security System (SS)	NPV (€)	B/C	RISK (δR_{ρ} , %)
1	Sound Barrier, Mechanical Lock and Vehicle Immobilizer	10,510	3.86	28.66%
2	Sound Barrier and Mechanical Lock	10,103	7.90	28.65%
3	Track and Trace, Sound Barrier and Mechanical Lock	10,015	3.53	32.52%
4	Track and Trace, Sound Barrier, Mechanical Lock and Vehicle Immobilizer	9,472	2.53	34.91%
5	Sound Barrier, Vehicle Immobilizer and Reinforced Trailer	9,359	3.41	30.02%
6	Sound Barrier and Reinforced Trailer	8,867	6.33	18.64%
7	Track and Trace, Sound Barrier and Reinforced Trailer	8,858	3.13	25.43%
8	Track and Trace, Sound Barrier, Vehicle Immobilizer and Reinforced Trailer	8,412	2.32	34.95%
9	Sound Barrier and Vehicle Immobilizer	7,529	3.23	21.74%
10	Sound Barrier, Mechanical Lock, Vehicle Immobilizer and Reinforced Trailer	7,408	2.77	23.62%

2.4.7 Conclusion

This study shows both theoretically and practically, with a numerical example, that the logical interconnections used in the RBD technique may be used to estimate *the interdependencies of security devices* while keeping the number of experts' judgments required low. This approach may make the collection of experts' judgments more effective. The numerical example is run on a hypothetical transportation assignment in which 7 security devices combined in groups of 1 to 7 items (a total of 127 security systems) are assessed against 6 security threats (a total of 762 scenarios). First of all, the application demonstrates that the RBD approach may reduce the number of experts' judgments from 762 to only 42. Hence, a decrement of experts' judgments of about 94.5% that consequently makes the methodology more practical. At the same time, the methodology allows the evaluation of wider sets of security systems in which security devices are combined into security packages. As the results depicted in Table 6 and Table 7 show, the

combinations of security devices may be more profitable than single devices, both in terms of B/C ratios and NPVs.

2.5 Criticism of Licentiate Study

At the end of the licentiate work diverse limitations were identified. First of all, the first research question was based on an explorative approach whose theoretical validity is difficult to demonstrate. The last research question, related to the development of the investment model, had two main limitations: the evaluation of investments on long-term periods didn't take into account the learning capabilities of criminals. At the same time, the simulation model didn't consider other beneficial effects of some security devices on the performance of distribution networks, e.g. GPS systems may enhance on-time deliveries, quick responses etc.

To overcome these issues three possible approaches were possible. The first involved performing a survey study to enhance the generalizability of the findings from the first research question. The second was to enhance the investment model by applying game theory approaches to model the opportunistic behaviors of criminals and thereby improve the reliability of the profitability indexes along long-term investment periods. Finally, the third regarded the exploitation of the QRA approach to simulate the impact of security incidents on supply chains' efficiency in terms of inventory costs, transportation costs, unsatisfied customers' demand etc. Previous research has developed plenty of simulation models showing how supply chain disruptions determine loss of efficiency and monetary costs to operators. However, the majority of these works are addressed to safety accidents and not to security incidents.

The first alternative, the survey study, was the alternative chosen to continue the work done in the licentiate thesis. This decision was based on conceptual and practical arguments. From a conceptual viewpoint it was more interesting to generalize the results of the first research question because the findings of the second and third research questions, despite their limitations, were already useful tools that could support managers in choosing security measures. The enhancement of these tools was without any doubt a relevant contribution to previous research, but the practical contribution could have been strongly questioned, since the majority of security and risk managers today work with qualitative tools. Another belief was that the choice of a security measure is strongly dependent on the magnitude of the budget put at disposal. Hence, it is more relevant to find confirmation about the business mechanisms that determine the commitment of companies to security. The first part of the licentiate thesis tried to answer this question; however the implementation of a qualitative explorative approach penalized the findings and consequently the theoretical contribution.

From a practical viewpoint, the survey study is often a cost-efficient research design. There are some risks of receiving a low response rate, but it was believed that the adoption of anonymous post envelopes could have improved the data collection. Or at least it could have been better than performing interviews and direct observations. The game theory study required a deeper understanding of criminal psychology to develop models capable of forecasting criminals' behaviors. Hence, the lack of this knowledge as well as the complexity of setting up collaboration with experts in the criminology field influenced the decision to abandon this path. Finally, the simulation of supply chain disruptions caused by security incidents required, first of all, a case study and secondly the close collaboration between logistics companies with security experts and technology developers. This was also a problematic path for various reasons. First of all, it is well known that security is a delicate topic within companies and therefore confidentiality issues would have make it difficult to find a case. Even though the case could have been found it still remained the problem that the majority of the experts in transportation and logistics security are more favorable to adopt qualitative methods. Hence, confidentiality issues together with lack of enthusiasm to provide practical support to gather data would have made the project idea hard to perform.

As a consequence, after a careful evaluation of conceptual and practical motivations it was decided to continue the work done in the licentiate thesis by performing a survey study with Swedish physical distribution carriers. Such a study was believed to be more cost-efficient and most of all more relevant because of its research and practical contributions.

3 Literature review

This section presents the literature reviewed during the investigation performed after the licentiate study (between 2008 and 2009). The literature is classified in five research areas and articles clustered in each of the areas are briefly summarized.

The topic examined in this research appears to be relatively new in the supply chain and logistics discipline. Nevertheless, some studies have been performed and published in previous scientific literature. This section presents an overview and classification of the literature related to supply chain and transport security published between 2008 and 2009 (Table 8). More details about the methodology are given in Chapter 5. The research area identified within this study may be classified in five sub-areas:

- 1. Recommendations to enhance security.
- 2. Factors influencing supply chain security.
- 3. Security impacts.
- 4. Research agendas.
- 5. Supply chain risk management.

3.1 Recommendations to Enhance Security

Autry and Bobbitt (2008) perform a study to explore multiple approaches to mitigation of security in supply chains. The methodological approach of the authors is based on a literature review and on a self-administered survey interview with open-ended questions. 31 individuals responded to the survey during a workshop. The findings reveal four main emerging trends that are recommended to enhance security:

- Preparation and planning, highlighting the importance of resiliency as well as mutual understanding between supply chain partners and the role of insurances.
- Security related partnerships, covering contractual agreements and risk and reward sharing.
- Organizational adaptation, concerning the physical introduction of security enhancements for securing and recovery purposes.

• Security dedicated communication and technology, i.e. the implementation of GPS monitoring, RFID and similar technologies to monitor and enhance security in supply chains.

Meixell and Norbis (2008) performed a literature review to identify themes related to transport choice and carrier selection. The literature search is performed within peer-reviewed journals over the past 20 years. In addition, practitioners' articles are used as a supplement and to bring to light the current challenges in the logistics field. The findings reveal that the following themes are under-represented in transportation choice literature: environmental and energy use, supply chain security, supply chain integration, international growth and role of IT. More specifically, security is depicted as an important criterion for the carrier selection decision process to mitigate economic losses borne by companies.

	Recommendations	Factors influencing Security	Security Impacts	Research Agendas	SCRM
Autry and Bobbitt (2008)	Х				
Meixell and Norbis (2008)	Х				
Manuj and Mentzer (2008)		Х			Х
Whipple et al. (2009)		Х			
Voss et al. (2009)		Х			
Williams et al. (2009b)		Х			
Hameri and Hintsa (2009)			Х		
Williams et al. (2009a)			Х		
Staake et al. (2009)				Х	
Williams et al. (2008)				Х	Х
Asbjørnslett, (2008)					Х
$\sum =$	2	4	2	2	3

Table 8: Summary of research area.

3.2 Factors Influencing Security

Manuj and Mentzer (2008) also emphasize that many initiatives to enhance security in supply chain organizations are based on the C-TPAT certification and other similar authority regulations (e.g. International Ship and Port facility Security).

In Whipple et al. (2009) the authors try to determine whether international supply chain firms put more emphasis on security than domestic ones. The authors make use of a survey sent to a group of 1,385 respondents. The response rate was 14%. The results confirm that global supply chains place more managerial importance on security. In addition, managers of international firms experience an increased ability to detect and recover from security incidents.

Voss et al. (2009) underline the importance of willingness to pay and the concern of firms to ensure that suppliers with advanced security are selected. The authors try to assess whether firms in the food industry are willing to trade off price and delivery reliability in return for greater supply chain security. The methodology is based on Grounded Theory approach to enhance the knowledge of the topic and develop a first draft of the survey. Thereafter data were collected with a survey and analyzed by means of conjoint analysis. The sample group size was of 1,228 firms. A total of 130 managers answered the survey, giving a response rate of 10.5%. The results show that price and delivery reliability, are more important than security. In addition the authors demonstrate the positive relationship between concern over security incidents and preferences for advanced security as well as willingness to trade off price for advanced security. Finally, the findings also show that international sourcing is positively related to preferences for suppliers with higher security competences and to willingness to pay higher prices and lowering delivery reliability. The same approach is proposed in Voss et al. (2009a), but this time to compare firms in terms of the strategic priority given to security. The findings reveal that companies placing a high level of strategic importance on security have higher levels of security implementation as well as better security performance.

In another article, Williams et al. (2009b) enhance their exploration of drivers affecting security in supply chain firms. The authors exploit institutional theory as a background to determine the environmental drivers that motivate firms to engage in Supply Chain Security (SCS). The study is based on 17 in-depth interviews, and the results identify the following drivers: government (C-TPAT certification), customers (customers request higher security), competitors (firms believe

that security may ensure competitive advantage on the marketplace), and society (the impact that security breaches may have on society).

3.3 Security Impacts

Hameri and Hintsa (2009) make a study to identify drivers of change in cross border supply chains and assess their impacts on global supply chain management. The investigation is based on a Delphi panel and a literature review of 150 publications. Data collection is performed by means of semi-structured interviews with 33 industry professionals and a final workshop to compile a total of 14 supply chain change drivers and 44 supply chain parameters. In the findings 14 drivers of change in supply chains are identified. Among these, security concerns are believed to be significant and will probably continue to be a central issue for stakeholders in the future. In particular, security will shape the global business environment and affect supply chain performance.

Williams et al. (2009a) recognize the importance of security-focused culture in organizations to embrace higher security, as well as the importance of introducing activities to support security. Therefore the paper introduces a psychometric scale to measure supply chain security culture in organizations. The investigation makes use of a survey to measure the level of security culture in supply chain industries (including wholesalers, distribution, manufacturers, carriers etc.). The survey consists of five questions to measure Supply Chain Security Culture (SCSC) and five questions to measure resiliency. The survey was sent to a total of 1,753 unique individuals identified in the Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals database (CSCMP). The final response rate was 3.5%. The findings put into evidence the validity and reliability of the scale developed to measure SCSC in supply chain organizations. Finally the authors also discuss the strong positive correlation between SCSC and resiliency.

3.4 Research Agendas

Two of the articles, located in the literature review explore previous research to determine research gaps and need for future research. Staake et al. (2009) present a literature review focusing on the counterfeiting trade and its economic principles. At the end of the analysis, the authors point out that the problem exists and it is relevant in practical instances, but that still too little is known by researchers due to the low accessibility to the phenomenon. Williams et al. (2008) also complain about the lack of research in academic settings. Therefore, they set up a

research agenda for Supply Chain Security by means of a literature review. The findings classify existing articles into four approaches: inter-organizational, intra-organizational, both, or ignore. Thus the authors conclude by stating the need for more primary empirical research on Supply Chain Security.

3.5 Supply Chain Risk Management

An area of high relevance in the supply chain and logistics discipline is that of risk management. Supply chain risk management is "*the identification and management of risks for the supply chain, through a coordinated approach amongst supply chain members, to reduce vulnerability on the whole*" (Jüttner et al., 2003). Norrman and Lindroth (2004) classify supply chain risk management in a three dimensional framework in which emphasis is put on the unit of analysis, business continuity management and type of risk and uncertainty. Typical accidents in supply chains that have been widely studied in existing literature are those in which the following sources of risk are involved (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Norrman and Jansson, 2004; Paulsson, 2007; Mullai, 2007; Viswanadham and Gaonkar, 2007; Franck, 2007; Asbjørnslett, 2008; Parentela and Cheema, 2002; Harland et al. 2003):

- **Supply.** Improper selection of inbound suppliers, capability deficiency to meet customer demand.
- Strategic. All parameters affecting business strategies implementation.
- **Demand/Capacity.** Lack of flexibility to respond to demand variations in outbound flows. For instance Agrell et al. (2002) explore incentives for demand uncertainty related risks in the telecom industry. In this case the demand concerns coverage, capacity and telecom services.
- **Natural Catastrophes.** Examples of such risks are earthquakes, floods, hurricanes etc. that may damage and shutdown plants, transportation and other sensitive operations.
- **Equipment failure.** Failure of technical components that have a central role in production, transportation, storing operations.
- **Operational.** These are all the adverse internal events in supply chains that may affect the capability of industries to produce and ensure quality and timeliness. Accidents involving dangerous goods are a relevant example. Consequences are hazardous for industries and society (Parentela and Cheema, 2002; Mullai, 2007).

- Financial and Fiscal. Potential losses caused by variation of financial and taxation markets.
- **Regulatory.** The risks to which firms are exposed because of changes in regulations, i.e. environmental or security regulations.
- Legal. All risks related to litigations between or within supply chain firms, i.e. with customers, suppliers, shareholders or employees.

Supply chain security may be identified within the larger construct of Supply Chain Risk Management since "*disruptions of flows between organizations*" constitute a risk for a supply chain (Jüttner, 2005), apart from the fact that they are caused by mistakes or voluntary actions (security incidents). Hence, it may be possible to locate the discussion about security in the larger construct of supply chain risk management. Many authors point out that security in supply chains may be managed by following existing risk management models and theories (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Sheffi, 2001; Asbjørnslett, 2008). Williams et al. (2008) state that there are four constructs that can be associated with supply chain risk management and the security construct.



Figure 15: Security related model for Supply Chain Risk Management (Williams et al., 2008, adapted from Jüttner et al., 2003). These constructs are shown in the figure above (Figure 15) and are based on a framework developed by Jüttner et al. (2003) in which the following concepts are included:

- **Risk Sources.** Typical risk sources have been enumerated in this section and may include both hazards and security threats (even though the focus of the supply chain risk management discipline is on hazards-related accidents). These threats may cause disruptions of supply chains.
- **Risk drivers of supply chain strategy.** Examples of risk drivers may be the globalization and outsourcing trends that have aggravated the exposure of supply chains to risks as well as to disruption consequences.
- **Supply chain risk management strategies.** These include all activities to mitigate, control and avoid risks as well as supply chain coordination and flexibility.
- **Outcomes of supply chain risks.** The main outcomes include disruptions and vulnerability, i.e. the exposure to threats that may introduce disturbances into a supply chain (Christopher and Peck, 2004).

3.6 Conclusion

This literature review highlights the importance of performing more empirical research on the topics of logistics and supply chain security. Previous research points out that security is an important source of risk to be considered by supply chain and logistics managers (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Sheffi, 2001; Asbjørnslett, 2008). Therefore, it is fundamental to identify drivers of risks in supply chains to optimize risk mitigation strategies and consequently moderate the negative outcomes of disruptions (Williams et al., 2008; Jüttner et al., 2003). However, despite the highly scientific relevance, it appears that too little empirical research has been performed to identify factors external to the supply chain that may influence the efforts made by firms to enact security. Voss et al. (2009) find that companies operating in the food segment are willing to trade off price and delivery reliability with greater security (customers' willingness to pay). In addition, the hypothesis about the relationship between the length of supply chains (domestic vs global) and the demand for security is also supported (*ibid*). Other authors identify the following factors influencing the security of supply chains: supply chain length, customers' requirements, authority regulations, and security related partnerships (Giunipero and Eltantawy, 2004; Cupp et al., 2004; Craighead et al., 2007; Whipple et al., 2009). However, only Whipple et al. (2009) perform an empirical study to demonstrate the influence of supply chain length and security partnerships.

4 Research Hypotheses

The hypotheses that are tested with the survey performed in this study are expounded in this section. Basically, the hypotheses are those formulated in Urciuoli (2008) with some small modifications to enhance their clarity and make them suitable to the quantitative data analysis. The methodological steps followed in this explorative study are described in the next chapter.

4.1 Introduction

As shown in the next figure, this frame of reference identifies a total of eight actors interacting in an integrated Physical Distribution Security System that seem to affect the magnitude of investments made by transport operators as well as the number of incidents by which they are affected (Figure 16). The interactions of each of the actors on physical distribution security are depicted in a total of 19 hypotheses formulated in this section.



Figure 16: The Physical Distribution Security System (PDSS).

The system is outlined by combining previous research with data collected from secondary sources, observations², and a total of 16 interviews (4 unstructured and 12 semi-structured) performed with key actors in the transport security area (Table 1 in Chapter 2). The scheme for the interviews performed is provided in Appendix 2 of this report.

4.2 Law Enforcement Agency

The relevance of the law enforcement agency to prevent theft as well to support operators in recovering their shipments was affirmed in two security workshops held in Sweden³. During the events, representatives from this organization encouraged transportation companies to report cargo theft and improve collaboration with the law enforcement. The law enforcement agency was also criticized by the participants since often they don't prioritize cargo theft among their activities as well as they don't prosecute cargo criminals. The issue concerning the rare prosecution of criminals has also been found in articles published in scientific journals (Anderson, 2007; Badolato, 2000). The interviews performed confirm that operators perceive that existing laws to prosecute criminals are not strong enough to discourage thieves in taking the risk to assault cargo moving in distribution networks. As a consequence, it is not only difficult to capture thieves but also to keep them in custody.

"Criminals attack according to a trade-off between risks and revenues. The situation today is that distribution chains are easy and profitable targets. At the same time, prosecution is not severe enough to discourage perpetrators".

"Once criminals are captured, we can keep them in custody for a limited amount of time. So they are back in business after only few months."

"Prosecution should be more severe to discourage criminals attacking our distribution chains."

Other interviews confirm the relevance of the law enforcement agency in the discussion concerning physical distribution security. According to three of the respondents, the problem faced today is that the amount of received theft claims from transport operators is not high enough to justify an increment of resources to combat criminals. Transport operators are afraid to

² IF seminar, Gothenburg, March 2008.

Worskhop on Transportation Security, Jönköping, November 2007.

³ IF seminar, Gothenburg, March 2008.

Worskhop on Transportation Security, Jönköping, November 2007.

show their brands in theft statistics. In addition, they feel that this is only an administrative cost that will rarely lead to cargo recovery.

"Transport operators are afraid to show their brand names in theft statistics and therefore they don't announce the problem to the police that in its turn doesn't have the real picture of the situation".

"Operators are not claiming enough, thus we cannot allocate resources adequately."

"Our company has good cooperation with the national law enforcement agency. However, we know that many thefts are not reported by other companies. This makes it hard to combat cargo theft."

Two respondents also say that to reduce the increase in cargo theft experienced during recent years, the Swedish law enforcement agency is today working with activities to increase awareness about the cargo security problem.

"The activities organized by the law enforcement agency have contributed to increase awareness of the cargo theft problem"

"Thanks to the workshops we have had the possibility to come closer to the law enforcement agency and strengthen collaboration"

Hence, the following hypotheses are formulated:

H1a. Companies that perceive that criminals are not prosecuted are discouraged from improving security.

H1b. Companies that perceive that the Swedish law enforcement agency is not allocating enough resources are discouraged from enhancing security.

H1c. Companies that perceive as beneficial the collaboration in activities organized by the Swedish law enforcement agency are stimulated to improve security.



Figure 17: summary of hypotheses related to the impact of law enforcement agency on security (*note: arrows don't imply causal relationships*).

4.3 Distribution and Transport Operators

According to previous research, supply chain, logistics and transport operators have an influence on the security of distribution chains. This influence may be characterized by the following factors: length of distribution networks, JIT trends, willingness to pay and impacts of security on efficiency.

Globalization and JIT trends are exposing supply chains to higher risks. Moving products in foreign countries where companies lack knowledge of local culture, authorities and legislation makes it difficult to protect cargo (Crone, 2006; Khemani, 2007; Sheffi, 2001). Crone (2006) compares today's globalization strategies to the classic story of the Trojan War where the Trojans "*failed to see the risks of what appeared to be a benefit*". Voss et al. (2009a) demonstrate that international sourcing is positively related to preferences for suppliers with higher security competences. Firms expanding into foreign markets also have a tendency to enhance security (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Managers of global supply chains place more importance on supply chain security and are more likely to enhance the protection of their assets (Whipple et al., 2009). Giunipero and Eltantawy (2004) state that longer supply chains necessitate higher security.

Just in Time may increase the exposure of shipments to threats as well as the economic consequences of security incidents. Shipments arriving too early or too late to the receiving terminals have to wait outside, increasing the chance for theft (Tarnef 2006). Just in Time (JIT) trends tighten supply chains in a way to increase the consequences of disruptions and thereby

increasing the risks of security incidents in distribution networks (Khemani, 2007). According to an analysis performed by Wilson (2005), Just in Time manufacturing and deliveries or streamlined order fulfillment techniques can reduce in-transit and on-hold inventories but can also severely increase the magnitude of disruptions. None of the workshops⁴ or the interviews performed unveiled the importance of the globalization factor. However, JIT principles were under discussion during the workshop and seminars attended. More specifically, the participants were claiming that JIT increases cargo flows on the transportation networks and thereby the frequency of attacks. At the same time, other JIT practices, such as for instance shorter time windows to load/unload cargo at terminals, may force trucks to wait outside facilities and thereafter increase possibilities of attacks.

Willingness to pay by goods owners may also be an inhibitor of physical distribution security (Voss et al., 2009). Supply chain firms are not always willing to pay for firms offering advanced security transportation. Voss et al. (2009) demonstrate the positive relationship between concern over security incidents and preferences for advanced security as well as willingness to trade off price for advanced security. The findings show that price, and delivery reliability, are more important than security when contracting suppliers. Hence, this suggests that if companies want to retain market competitiveness, security investments may become an issue, especially if customers are not willing to pay (Thibault et al., 2006).

Four managers mentioned the difficulties encountered in raising their prices when enhancing security. In two of the interviews, the respondents highlighted the fact that goods owners requesting higher security also have to be willing to pay for it.

"Security costs have to be internalized into our freight rates. Thus it is difficult for us to remain competitive on the marketplace"

"Some customers are willing to pay for extra costs related to security. Thus we increase our prices. In some cases we also perform a negotiation process with the transport carriers to define how security costs, direct and indirect, have to be split"

Previous literature outlines the correlation between security and efficiency as factors that may be interrelated (Rice and Spayd, 2005; Lee and Whang, 2005; Willy and Ortiz, 2004). In Mazeradi

⁴ IF seminar, Gothenburg, March 2008.

Worskhop on Transportation Security, Jönköping, November 2007.

and Ekwall (2009) it is shown how the implementation of the ISPS-code may increase paperwork and slow down processes. Likewise, Stevenson (2005) indicates the negative impact of the ISPS code on costs and the efficiency of port terminals. Security measures are required to be built upon existing efficiency and quality processes that today are the top priority areas of transportation companies. It is well known that these actors, especially the carrier operators, face costs and time pressures from their customers and are demanded to efficiently manage products' demand volatility. At the same time, wasting time and costs, caused by infrastructure bottlenecks as well as by the high complexity of transport chains in which multiple actors with conflicting goals interact must be avoided (Urciuoli et al., 2010). Besides this, security routines constitute additional mandatory work for terminal, manufacturing or transport operators, whose personnel are forced to learn and apply new procedures on top of their duties (Rolandsson and Ekwall, 2008). Finally, existing security tools are too complex and expensive to be implemented and necessitate qualified operators as well as top management commitment to be truly effective in a transport company. As a consequence, it can be hypothesized that the performance of logistics and transportation services may be seriously compromised (Williams et al., 2008; Urciuoli et al., 2010).

The following hypotheses can be formulated:

H2a. Companies that encounter difficulties in raising freight rates are discouraged from improving security.

H2b. Companies applying JIT principles are discouraged from improving security.

H2c. Companies that are part of international distribution networks are more interested in improving security.

H2d. Companies believing that security measures may negatively affect their performance level don't improve security.



Figure 18: summary of hypotheses related to the impact of distribution and transport operators on security (*note: the arrows don't imply causal relationships*).

4.4 Business Security Certifications

Some participants to the workshops⁵ mentioned the existence of TAPA EMEA (Transported Asset Protection Association) as an organization supporting transportation buyers and sellers with recommendations and guidelines to secure transportation assets (TAPA EMEA, 2009). Participants believed that the implementation of routines and specific technologies suggested by the organization might enhance physical distribution security. Other secondary data mention the International Standards Organization (ISO) certification as a means to enhance supply chain security (Liard, 2007; ISO, 2008). The ISO proposes best practices and minimum requirements for supply chain management, recommends technologies (e.g. mechanical locks or electronic seals) and establishes communication standards for radio frequency based security solutions (Liard, 2007; ISO, 2008).

H3. Companies complying with business certifications have higher security.

⁵ IF seminar, Gothenburg, March 2008.

Worskhop on Transportation Security, Jönköping, November 2007.



Figure 19: summary of hypotheses related to the impact of Business Security Certifications on security (*note: the arrows don't imply causal relationships*).

4.5 Insurance Companies

The role of insurers concerns the coverage of the risks related to loss or damage of goods during a transportation assignment. All the mentioned parties involved in goods transportation, including consignors and consignees, LSPs and transport carriers, have the possibility to buy property or liability insurances, according to what is stated in the contract agreement. Likewise, stakeholders have the possibility to retain part of these risks to pay lower premiums (Stöth, 2004).

The role of the insurance companies is confirmed in the workshops where observations were performed⁶. The collected data reveal that operators blame the insurance companies for exerting pressure on their customers and denying premium discounts to customers retaining risks by purchasing or implementing security measures. Managers were expecting not only financial solutions but also practical support in choosing security measures and defining security levels in transport operations. Another finding from the workshops was that operators with a risk-seeking attitude could trade off the costs for insurance premiums and excesses with the costs of implementing security solutions. This was especially true if the contracted operators were not obliged, by means of contracts, to follow specific security recommendations. Two respondents declared that insurances' excesses are too high, and therefore operators prefer to bear the consequences of the losses.

"We know that if the loss is lower than the insurance excesses than we prefer to pay it ourselves"

"We have insurances and also our transport carriers do. However, we know that companies prefer to pay the losses themselves, since the excesses are too high"

⁶ IF seminar, Gothenburg, March 2008.

Worskhop on Transportation Security, Jönköping, November 2007.
Other secondary data used for the analysis and related to insurance companies concern mostly the procedures to sub-contract carriers and transfer risks, as well as current regulations to define cargo liabilities (Stöth, 2004; ICC, 2008; NSAB, 2000).

Finally, when it comes to the application of premium discounts, opinions diverge. Two respondents state that they encounter difficulties to agree on discounts. As one of them states:

"We have a dialogue with only one insurance company and they are not willing to give us premium reductions. This is nonsensical..."

Contrarily three respondents declared that it is possible to have discounts, although in some cases these are too low and affect only the excesses.

The following hypotheses are formulated:

H4a. Companies that make use of insurances to cover the economical losses of security incidents are less interested in improving security.

H4b. Companies benefiting from premium discounts don't work actively with enacting security.



Figure 20: summary of hypotheses related to the impact of Insurance Companies on security (*note: the arrows don't imply causal relationships*).

4.6 Security Providers

Security solutions providers can be distinguished in two categories: security services and technology providers. Providers of security services offer expertise in the form of education, consultancy, surveillance guards, screening and technological systems like GPS monitoring, camera surveillance, mobile-based alarms etc. Technology providers work by combining hardware sensors and software platforms to automate security processes and increase the accuracy of prevention, detection and recovery operations. Among the solutions available on the market, some are addressed to packages; others can be installed on unit loads (pallets, containers or trailers), or on the transport conveyance. Other solutions deal with protecting facilities from

external intrusion (i.e. gates, fences, access control, Closed Circuit TeleVision) (Sheffi, 2001; Urciuoli, 2009). Three of the interviewed professionals underlined the importance of using security solutions to combat criminals attacking distribution chains.

"We work intensively with detection sensors to be installed at our facilities and protect them against various threats. These sensors include motion detection or perimeter alarms to be installed at main doors or windows."

"We put great emphasis on security technologies, and when it comes to the protection of our facilities we want to be a step ahead of our competitors"

"Our terminals are highly secured although it is often difficult to have the security budget approved by top management"

While facility based security measures are widely implemented by operators, most of the security solutions intended to protect assets in movement (e-seals, track and trace) appear to be in a development stage and are experiencing difficulties in taking off. As a consequence, potential customers express concerns about the costs and the prematurity of the technology (Engler, 2007). According to Liard (2007), most companies believe that the value provided by security solutions does not justify the expensive investments in technologies that are still in a development phase. The development of integrated solutions is too hard because of the presence of too many players in supply chains (Liard 2007). Even though ISO is actively working at issuing security standards (ISO, 2008), technology providers still lack leadership from industries or governments in establishing standard requirements (Liard, 2007). None of the respondents mentioned this reasoning.

The expensiveness of security solutions is also an obstacle to the enhancement of security in physical distribution networks. This has been confirmed by three interviewed professionals as well as during the workshop in Jönköping.

"We make assessments of technologies 'on offer'. However, most of these systems cannot guarantee 100% security and cost too much money. You can imagine the financial implications of implementing these systems on a fleet of a hundred vessels"

"As a security manager I get a limited budget to spend on security. Thus it is difficult to buy more advanced technologies" "... only those companies that have access to money and resources can properly attack the problem"

H5a. Companies believing that security solutions are in a development stage and difficult to integrate do not improve security.

H5b. Companies believing that security solutions are too expensive compared to the value provided do not improve security.



Figure 21: summary of hypotheses related to the impact of Security Providers on security (*note: the arrows don't imply causal relationships*).

4.7 Cargo Criminals

Criminals' actions depend on a trade-off between costs and revenues. If risks are too high criminals will search for easier targets to attack. Criminology models the behaviors of these players according to the principle of the rational choice theory. Ekwall (2007) states that situational crime is determined by a rational choice made by weighing diverse factors such as effort, potential payoff, risk of apprehension and punishment and individual needs. A variation of situational crime is the professional theft that is based on methodical plans and takes advantage of high-tech methods to defeat protection measures (Ekwall, 2007; Ekwall and Lumsden, 2007). Ekwall (2009), according to the principles of the routine activity theory, identifies three elements characterizing cargo theft: a perpetrator, a supply chain (the criminals' target) and the lack of protective measures. Insufficient protection in one of the links of a supply chain will determine a weak point and the consequent attack (crime displacement effect) (Ekwall, 2009a). Two respondents confirmed this line of reasoning:

"Criminals search for weak points and attack in specific places where they know trucks stop."

"Criminals attack according to a trade-off between risks and revenues. The situation today is that supply chains are easy and profitable targets."

Despite this, companies are not motivated to increase their security levels. As one respondent commented, "statistics show increasing attacks against freight transportation. Nevertheless, for reasons I can't understand, operators don't consider this as a problem and are not seeking adequate protection". In one of the workshops⁷ some participants stated that security may become useless and not a profitable investment since the criminals have access to financial and technical resources to deceive existing measures.

Hence, the hypothesis is the following:

H6. Companies perceiving the opportunistic behavior of criminals do not improve security.



Figure 22: summary of hypotheses related to the impact of Cargo Criminals on security (*note: the arrows don't imply causal relationships*).

4.8 Contract Regulatory Associations

The relationships among actors involved in a shipment are regulated by specific laws. While transportation disputes are stated in international conventions and rules (e.g. CIM, CMR conventions), logistics matters concerning such operations as inventory management, labeling or packaging are not put under any convention and are primarily determined by industrial organizations or private agreements (e.g. Incoterms 2000 and NSAB 2000). Transport agreements can be performed in verbal or written form in which liabilities among transport buyers and sellers about goods losses, damages, transport etc. are defined (Stöth, 2004). In most cases, the consignor takes care of the transportation purchase and is responsible for the goods until they are delivered. However, when a transport service is bought, risks of goods damage or loss are usually transferred to a Logistics Service Provider (LSP). The contracted LSP can in turn sub-contract transport carriers and transfer its risks. Each player can purchase insurances to cover part of its risks (Stöth, 2004) (Figure 23).

⁷ Workshop on Transportation Security, Jönköping, November 2007.



Figure 23: Contractual relationships (adapted from Stöth, 2004, pp. 22).

Previous research points out the importance of security related partnerships, covering contractual agreements and risk and reward sharing among actors (Autry and Bobbitt, 2008; Voss et al., 2009b; Rice and Spayd, 2005). Customers create security expectations that have to be achieved by suppliers to retain business and remain competitive on the marketplace (Williams et al., 2009). Enacting collaboration among supply chain members and specifying security requirements in contractual agreements may improve the security of distribution chain assets and operations (*ibid*). In addition, risk-sharing and rewards are also fundamental practices to stimulate stakeholders in taking their share of responsibility and working actively with security (Autry and Bobbitt, 2008).

According to four of the interviews, it often happens that agreements are not properly formalized among all the actors, especially with the physical carriers (road, rail, sea, and air carriers), or between them (a carrier contracting another carrier). Transportation carriers are companies owning fleets of vehicles including vessels, airplanes, trucks, and in some cases even trains (train companies are usually state owned). Often, within the road sector, the transport carrier can even be the driver and his vehicle. Therefore, the complexity and administrative burden experienced, concerning laws, regulations and standard contracts, makes informal verbal agreements more congenial.

"It happens that some carriers mention and stress the complexity of the contracts or standard agreements. Large industries or LSPs can handle them, but often small-medium transport carriers can prefer verbal agreements"

"According to our experience the standard agreements are perceived as too complex and it has happened that carriers prefer verbal agreements"

"We know that in some cases carriers are engaged with verbal agreements"

"As an insurance association we have had cases in which transportation carriers had been engaged with verbal agreements"

This situation was also confirmed during the observations performed at the workshops in Sweden.⁸

Existing regulations like Incoterms or NSAB 2000 focus on the transfer of risks among actors and indicate Combiterms as a means to split costs among players. In addition, in case of a loss these agreements oblige the reimbursement of the goods invoice value plus 10% for indirect costs (ICC, 2008; NSAB, 2000). In these standard agreements, nothing is specified about security requirements for transportation assignments and how related costs should be split among actors. This is a practice strongly recommended by business and authority security certifications to ensure that security is actually enacted (Urciuoli and Ekwall, 2010). The findings from the observations also reveal that it is crucial to specify security requirements in the contracts between transport buyers and sellers.⁸

Finally, according to the observations performed⁸, it appears that the specification of security requirements in contracts requires deep understanding of physical security and achieving an agreement among parties. Companies are experiencing difficulties in justifying their security investments, especially because it is difficult to assess the impacts of security solutions (Peleg-Gillai et al., 2006; Rice and Spayd, 2005). Closs and McGarrell (2004) claim that the lack of effective security metrics may make it difficult to agree on freight rate increments. In addition, it is difficult to verify if a carrier is truly following the security measures specified in the contract. One respondent commented that whenever an agreement is arranged, "*we request our carriers to install specific security measures, but we don't really know if they follow them or not*".

The following hypotheses are formulated:

H7a. Companies that experience difficulties in agreeing on security requirements are not encouraged to improve security.

H7b. Companies that perceive the contract agreements as too complex are not encouraged to improve security.

⁸ IF seminar, Gothenburg, March 2008.

Worskhop on Transportation Security, Jönköping, November 2007.

H7c. Companies that don't share risks by means of contract agreements are not encouraged to improve security.

H7d. Companies that do not specify security requirements are not encouraged to improve security.



Figure 24: summary of hypotheses related to the impact of Contract Regulatory Associations on security (*note: the arrows don't imply causal relationships*).

4.9 Authority

Authorities are mainly afraid of the terror threats hidden in the vulnerability of international supply chains that put society in danger. These are smuggling of weapons or terrorists, contamination or counterfeiting of products and usage of transport conveyances as weapons (Lee and Whang, 2005; Sheffi, 2001; Willys and Ortiz, 2005).

Authority programs (e.g. C-TPAT and AEO) promote the usage and implementation of security routines and technologies to secure the intercontinental shipment of containers across operators and reduce delivery uncertainties caused by inspections (CBP, 2006; CBP, 2008; CP3 Group, 2005; CP3 Group, 2006). Regulations aim primarily at preventing terror attacks, but many theft threats will also be mitigated. Customs are the "right hand" of authorities in implementing the mandatory requirements for inspecting containers. Their participation, together with key technology providers, in security initiatives is fundamental to enforce fast-lanes initiatives and guarantee free-flow through borders to certified operators (CP3 Group, 2005; CP3 Group, 2006).

Previous research also confirms the central role of customs as well as private-public partnerships as means to enhance security in physical distribution (Sheffi, 2001; Rice and Spayd, 2005; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Williams et al., 2009b). Companies that aim to enhance their security should join authority certifications (Rice and Caniato, 2003; Sheu et al., 2006). Joining authorities certifications may also ensure companies to retain competition (Williams et al., 2009). Many security initiatives have been stimulated by the close collaboration between private industries and authorities (Thibault et al., 2006; Closs and McGarrell, 2004). At the same time, security regulations may jeopardize supply chains by introducing new costs in form of process variabilities, time deliveries and loss of efficiency (Voss et al., 2009). Five of the respondents mentioned that they know the AEO or C-TPAT initiatives, but only two of them declared that the AEO initiative could influence their security investments.

"We are participating in the AEO initiative set up by the European Commission and are working to gain compliance."

"Yes, we are working to meet the AEO requirements since it is our desire to secure our operations. In addition, it is important to gain compliance to simplify customs inspections and avoid transport delays."

Other authors acknowledge the importance of following the authority regulations but report also that many operators are afraid of the impacts on organizational efficiency. Security measures, in the form of inspections, are seen as conflicting with logistics efficiency. Thus, shippers are afraid to introduce new administrative costs to gain compliance that have to be internalized in their products' prices. Absence of business cases, solid ROIs and clear guidelines intimidates many operators (Lee, 2004; Rice and Spayd, 2005; DNV, 2005). According to Liard (2007) some operators are waiting for more detailed definitions from authority programs before taking investment decisions.

The following hypotheses can be formulated:

H8a. Transportation companies complying with the AEO certification have higher security.

H8b. Transportation companies that have a negative perception about the impact of AEO regulations on security and efficiency are discouraged from enhancing security.



Figure 25: summary of hypotheses related to the impact of Authority regulations on security (*note: the arrows don't imply causal relationships*).

5 Methodology

The methodology followed in this investigation is made of a combination of a qualitative explorative study and a quantitative approach, a confirmatory survey. These two methodologies are explained in this section. In particular, the five prominent steps of the survey study are expounded including survey design, sample frame definition, data collection, and data analysis. Finally, validity and reliability of the survey are discussed.

5.1 Research Approach

The methodology followed in this research is mainly based on an explorative study followed by a survey. Thus, the whole investigation is based upon a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, which is a recommended approach within logistics research (Dunn et al. 1994; Näslund, 2002; Mangan et al., 2004). Likewise, methodological triangulation, that is the usage of different research approaches, techniques and methods in the same study, may help investigators to overcome the biases and deficiencies of single method approaches (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Denzin, 1970; Mentzer and Flint, 1997).

This research has been conducted according to the abductive approach, which is a combination of inductive and deductive processes. The inductive process consists of the explorative study leading to the formulation of theoretical hypotheses (a cyclic process). The successive confirmatory study to test the hypothesis formulated is the deductive process (Figure 26).



Figure 26: Overview of the abductive research process followed in this thesis.

5.2 The Explorative Study

The explorative study is based on previous work performed in Urciuoli (2008), whose findings are summarized in the previous chapter (Chapter 4). The choice of the explorative approach has been preferred because of the explorative nature of this study and also for the novelty of the research topic in supply chain management literature and the consequent lack of research constructs (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Autry and Bobbitt, 2008). Literature review, observations and qualitative unstructured and semi-structured interviews were exploited to gather data concerning the factors impacting security in physical distribution.

The literature reviewed was collected between 2006 and 2009. Non-participant observations were performed on the occasion of a workshop about transportation security and a seminar about logistics security organized in Sweden. The notes taken during the observations and the material gathered during the literature review were used to draft a preliminary set of factors influencing the security of physical distribution systems. To enhance the understanding of the factors and the identification of the stakeholders associated with the factors a total of 16 interviews were conducted, 4 unstructured and 12 semi-structured (the interview scheme is available in Appendix 2 of this report). Already after 12 interviews it was realized that the respondents were not adding any new factors. Hence, 4 additional semi-structured interviews were performed to ensure data saturation (demographic characteristics of the sample are given in Table 1 of Chapter 2) (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Easterby-Smith et al., 1991).

Patterns and themes were identified within the transcribed texts of previous literature, observations and interviews (*ibid*). Finally, by means of comparative processes 19 hypotheses (see Chapter 4) were identified and systematically categorized in terms of the eight stakeholders of the Physical Distribution Security System shown in Chapter 2 (Figure 4).

5.3 Literature Review

The collection of relevant literature was performed by using the following keywords: "supply chain security", "physical distribution security", and "goods transportation security". Other searches were performed by using the three mentioned keywords coupled with "drivers" and "barriers" and the Boolean operator "AND".

Articles relevant to the purpose of this investigation were selected by scanning first the title and thereafter the abstract of the manuscript. In some cases it was found that some articles were

using the term "*security*" although they were related to natural disasters or other hazard accidents. This investigation makes a clear distinction between involuntary accidents that are purely random events such as natural disasters, mistakes etc. and voluntary attacks perpetrated by antagonists. More specifically, the definition of supply chain security used in this research context is the following proposed by ISO (2008):

"All the efforts required to enhance the security of people and cargo in the supply chain against such antagonistic threats as theft, terrorism, fraud and piracy"

As a consequence, only security incidents related to antagonistic attacks have been considered during the literature review. Another typology of articles that were selected by the search engine was related to supply chain vulnerability to disruptions. These were also discarded as not relevant for this investigation that is looking instead to identify the drivers of security in physical distribution networks. Finally, other articles related to supply chain IT security and privacy topics in supply chains were not taken into account.

5.4 The Survey

The survey methodology is probably the unique instrument available to researchers to perform confirmatory research and validate constructs upon a large sample group given specific time and money constraints. Generally, the steps that are necessary to perform survey research can be summarized in five stages (Figure 26) (Czaja and Blair, 2005; Forza, 2009; Groves et al., 2004).

Stage 1 – Survey Design and Preliminary Planning. In this stage the research problem and the research questions that will be addressed in the survey are generated. It is important to decide whether the survey should 1) test a hypothesis, 2) estimate the proportion of people or firms with a specific behavior, or 3) study specific topics over time to see if changes occur. In this phase it is also important to make decisions about the population of interest. This brainstorming should bring to light which organizations or which individuals, the *informants*, can provide more accurate information. Profiling the respondents is also important to make trade-offs in the analysis and balance the answers between the groups of respondents. Another issue to be discussed is how well the sampling frame represents the population eligible for the analysis. Thus, it must be clear how the sample is framed, according to which factors the selection is made and finally what percentage of the population is missing and how it will bias the final results. The next stage is to design the questionnaire by determining the kind of analysis to be performed

to answer the research questions and thereafter by evaluating the usage of open-ended, closedended questions (i.e. Likert scale) or both. Finally it is fundamental to begin considering the availability of money and time for conducting the survey. For instance web surveys are the fastest and cheapest, while face to face surveys are the most expensive (Czaja and Blair, 2005; Forza, 2009; Groves et al., 2004).

Stage 2 – **Pretesting.** In this session the sampling frame is gathered, and record-keeping forms and survey questions are prepared. The survey material is submitted to diverse individuals to get feedback on the questionnaire items. This process may be done in a formal or informal manner and family, friends, colleagues or students may be involved. Once the draft is reviewed and updated, it can be sent to real respondents for a more formal test. Also in this case comments and feedback are gathered and used to update the survey (Czaja and Blair, 2005; Forza, 2009; Groves et al., 2004).

Stage 3 - Final Survey Design and Planning. In this stage the results of the pretest are integrated in the final survey. At the same time, the experience developed in the previous step may be exploited to decide how to make the survey, i.e. by telephone interviews, e-mails, surveys etc. and how much time to allocate for following up the contacts (Czaja and Blair, 2005; Forza, 2009; Groves et al., 2004).

Stage 4 - Data Collection. Data collection has to be thoroughly monitored including reminders and follow up interviews with those who decided not to participate in the survey. It is important to keep track of the rates of refusals, non-contacts, ineligibles and completed interviews. The data collected has to be progressively transferred into a computer data file. During this process it is important to check for missing answers or inconsistencies and thereafter try, whenever possible, to contact the respondent to correct the questionnaire (Czaja and Blair, 2005; Forza, 2009; Groves et al., 2004).

Stage 5 - Data Analysis and Coding. The final stage of the survey approach consists of coding and analyzing the data. Coding is about assigning a number to the responses given in the survey questions. This is necessary to look for patterns among variables. Finally the data are analyzed according to the analysis technique chosen for the investigation and by means of specific software packages, e.g. miniTab or SPSS (Czaja and Blair, 2005; Forza, 2009; Groves et al., 2004).

5.4.1 Stage 1 - Survey First Draft and Planning

During this stage a first draft of the survey was prepared and used to determine the sample to be surveyed. The objects of interest of this study are transportation firms operating in Sweden. According to the Swedish Business Register, 28,250 firms work today with *transportation and storage activities*. These consist of transportation companies, owners of infrastructure facilities and terminals (harbors, airports, intermodal terminals, storage warehouses, etc.), service providers etc. that are all registered in the Swedish Business Register provided by Statistics Sweden.

This register is updated weekly with information retrieved by the Swedish National Tax Board. Information stored in the database contains the name of the firm, the postal address, the organization number, emails etc. (a detailed overview of the standard variables extracted from the database is given in Appendix 3 of this document).

Examining the substructure of the transportation and storage category of the database, it was noticed that both passengers and goods transportation were included. Hence, a first filter has been applied to extrapolate exclusively the companies working with goods transportation. Table 9 reports the demographic characteristics of firms working with goods transportation and storage. The first column from the left of the table shows the typology of the firm and the second the number of companies operating in Sweden in each of the categories. The last row of the table shows that a total of N=17,862 companies are registered in the database.

This investigation will focus merely on transportation companies, hence, on the security degree of the links of transportation networks. Companies like forwarders, brokers, document administrators as well as owners of terminals and infrastructure have been filtered out from the population of interest. Likewise, companies providing cargo handling and other external services to transportation companies have not been considered. Thus, examining the definition of the categories specified in Table 9 (the definitions are given in Appendix 3) it has been decided to remove the following sub-categories:

• **Support activities.** Companies working with support activities like cargo handling, 3PLs, 4PLs, customs brokers, capacity brokerage, document administration etc.

• Management of terminals and infrastructure. Companies working with the management of the transport infrastructure, terminals, marshaling yards, Air Traffic Control (ATC), warehouses etc.

TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE	No. of companies
Freight rail transport	20
Freight transport by road	14095
Scheduled sea and coastal freight water transport	60
Non-scheduled sea and coastal freight water transport	160
Scheduled inland freight water transport	6
Non-scheduled inland freight water transport	51
Scheduled freight air transport	17
Non-scheduled freight air transport	12
Warehousing and storage	187
Other service activities incidental to land transportation	711
Service activities incidental to water transportation	225
Service activities incidental to air transportation	159
Harbor cargo handling	75
Other cargo handling	161
Other transportation support activities	1508
Other postal activities	45
Courier activities	353
Newspaper distribution	17
Total	N= 17,862

Table 9: Demographic characteristics of "transportation and storage" companies stored in the Swedish Business Register.

Table 10 shows the new sample extracted from the database. This time, the population corresponds to a total of N = 14,801 companies divided into seven different groups. The second column of the table depicts the groups in the population (including subgroups of water and air transportation), and the third the number of companies in each of the groups.

	TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES	No. Of companies
1	Freight Rail Transport	20
2	Freight Road Transport	14064
3	Freight Water Transport	283
	Scheduled sea and coastal freight water transport	63
	Non-scheduled sea and coastal freight water transport	160
	Scheduled inland freight water transport	6
	Non-scheduled inland freight water transport	54
4	Freight Air Transport	29
	Scheduled freight air transport	17
	Non-scheduled freight air transport	12
5	Other postal activities	47
6	Courier activities	341
7	Newspaper distribution	16
	Total	N= 14,801

Table 10: Demographic characteristics of the population of interest.

To overcome the issues related to efficiency and expensiveness of performing a census (send the survey to all the companies of the population), it has been decided to extract a sample from the above population. The size of the sample has been computed with the equation below proposed by Cochran (1977).

$$n = \left(1 - \frac{n}{N}\right) * \frac{(Z)^2 \times p \times (1 - p)}{CI^2}$$

$$\tag{12}$$

Where

n = the sample size required for the analysis,

N = the population of interest,

Z = standard deviation score (Z score) that refers to the area under a normal distribution of values,

p = percentage of the sample picking a particular answer,

CI= confidence interval.

The sample size was calculated by considering the confidence level and interval provided in relation to the financial budget available. Hence, by exploiting Cochran's formula with 95% confidence level and p=50%, the sample size was put in relation with confidence intervals from $\pm 1\%$ to $\pm 10\%$ (Table 11). Given the cost-efficiency constraints it was decided to send the questionnaires to about 577 companies, which corresponds to a confidence interval of $\pm 4\%$. We were also conscious of the fact that not all companies were going to answer and most of all that an optimistic scenario would have implied about 95 to 193 responses (CI between $\pm 7\%$ and $\pm 10\%$.)

CI	n
1%	5825
2%	2066
3%	995
4%	577
5%	374
6%	262
7%	193
8%	149
9%	118
10%	95

Table 11: Sample size n calculated with Cochran's formula (CL=95%, p=50%).

Once the sample size was determined, it was necessary to decide the typology and size of companies to be surveyed, since these two factors were believed to affect both the response rate and the findings. To accomplish this, it was decided first of all to stratify the population according to the number of employees (size of company) and the mode of transportation of the population (Table 10). By following the SME (Small-Medium Enterprise) definition provided by the European Union⁹, the population has been split into three strata. The majority of the companies belong to the first strata (about 98%), hence small companies with 0 to 49 employees, followed by medium (1%) and large enterprises (0.1%).

The 577 companies to be extracted were first divided into proportionate strata according to the groups' typology (Table 10). 200 companies were proportionally counted in each stratum and randomly extracted from the database. Thereafter, the remaining 377 companies were selected by

⁹ <50 employees correspond to small enterprises (<u>http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/index_en.htm</u>)

including all the medium and large companies and by randomly choosing the remaining 150 companies within the small sized group. This was necessary to ensure that each of the transportation mode considered in this study was fairly represented in the group of small companies. At the same time, given the low representativeness in the population, the number of medium and large enterprises had to be maximized. The final sample and its demographic characteristics compared with the population of interest are reported in Table 12.

Number of Employees								
	0-49	50-250	> 250	Responses	Sample	Population		
Freight Rail Transport	1	4	2	7	7	21		
Freight Road Transportation	386	142	5	181	533	14064		
Freight Water Transportation	8	4	0	5	12	283		
Freight Air Transportation	1	2	0	3	3	29		
Other Postal Activities	1	0	2	3	3	47		
Courier Activities	9	0	1	2	10	341		
Newspaper Distribution	0	1	8	2	9	16		
Responses	133	62	6					
Sample	406	153	18					
Population	14630	153	18					

Table 12: Demographic Data.

5.4.2 Stage 2-3 – Pretesting and Final Survey Design

Pretesting

The preliminary draft of the survey was tested with 3 academics professionals, 1 language expert (the survey had to be translated into Swedish) and 1 administration officer. A new version of the survey was tested with 10 professionals working on the topic of transportation and logistics security. The comments received were used to update the survey's format, layout and wording. In addition, some questions were modified, others added and others eliminated.

Final Survey Design

When collecting data with a survey it is important to decide what variables to use. More specifically it is crucial to decide 1) what to measure and 2) how to measure it. This is basically done by stating a hypothesis in which two variables may be identified: a predictor and an outcome. The predictor is an independent variable that is thought to predict an outcome variable.

The outcome is a dependent variable that is thought to change as a function of changes in the predictor variable (Hair et al., 2009). Both the outcome and the predictor variables may be assessed by means of metric and non-metric measurement scales (*ibid*):

- Non-metric measurement scales. Non-metric scales are used to describe differences in terms of types and kind in case a specific property is present or not. Examples of non-metric scales are nominal and ordinal scales:
 - Nominal Scale. A nominal scale is basically made up of names or labels to which numbers are assigned to allow basic statistical computations. Popular examples of nominal scales include gender (male or female, nominal binary variable), categorical (religion, occupation, political party affiliation etc.) etc.
 - Ordinal Scale. Variables using ordinal scales indicate only relative positions in an ordered series. Thus the variables can be ordered or ranked in relation to the attribute possessed.
- Metric measurement scales. In metric scales, different objects differ from each others in the amount or degree of a particular attribute. Variables using metric measurement scales are quantitative and may be distinguished in interval and ratio scales. Both of the scales are characterized by the fact that the distances between two adjacent objects in the scale are equal on any part of the scale. In addition, almost any mathematical operation may be performed on these scales.
 - Interval Scale. Interval scales are similar to ratio scales with the only difference that they use an arbitrary zero point. Moreover in interval scales it is not possible to say that a specific point is a multiple of some other point on the scale.
 - **Ratio Scale.** Ratio scales make use of an absolute zero point and points on the scale may be related to each other in terms of multiples.

The choice of metric and non-metric scales is fundamental to determine which multivariate techniques are most applicable to the data (Hair et al., 2009). For instance, non-metric data cannot be used for dependent variables in multiple regressions, discriminant analysis, MANOVA etc. (*ibid*). As a consequence, the outcome variables chosen for this investigation will be based

on metric scales (interval and ratio scales). On the other hand, the predictor variables will be based on a combination of metric and non-metric scales.

This section begins by presenting the outcome variables to determine the firms' efforts invested in security. Next, the predictor or independent variables are outlined. The variables are going to be identified directly from the objectives and hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4. Therefore to enhance the clarity of this process each sub-section begins by recalling these statements and thereafter explaining how the variables are derived.

The process of measuring the predictor variables, identified in the eight hypotheses illustrated in the previous section, consists of formulating several questions to be subsequently joined as composite measures (*summated scales*). According to Hair et al. (2009) this is necessary to obtain a well-rounded perspective of the concept as well as to enhance the accuracy of the responses by focusing on the average of a set of responses instead of relying on single ones.

5.4.2.1 Outcome Variables

To measure the construct of *security* that is used in all the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4, it has been decided to choose two outcome variables measuring respectively the magnitude of investments in security and the number of security incidents suffered by a company. The exploitation of these two indicators is believed to give a sufficient understanding of the degree of security of the respondents. The magnitude of security investments may tell how much attention the company pays to security issues. The number of security incidents tell instead how successful are the monetary efforts made by companies.

Table 13: Question to measure security budget in SEK.

Ente secu	Enter the budget (in SEK) that your organization allocated for security expenditures in 2009 (incl. Costs for security measures and investigation costs):											
[1]	Specify here:											(SEK)
[2]	Don't know.											
[3]	[3] Don't want to answer.											
Table	Table 14: Question to measure the number of security incidents.											
Ente	er the total numbe	er of	secu	urit	y ino	cide	nts	(ba	oth	sto	ppe	d and not stopped) that your organization has borne
In 20	009:											
[1]	Specify here:]
[2]	Don't know.											-
[3]	Don't want to answ	wer.										

The plan for this survey is to exploit MANOVA techniques to determine the relationship between security and a certain set of predictors; thus the outcome variables had to be quantitative, continuous and unbounded (Hair et al., 2009). The security budget as well as the number of security incidents are measured by means of two ratio variables (the scales contain absolute zero points, and points on the scale may be related to each other in terms of multiples). The first variable indicates the budget at disposal of the firms to combat security threats in 2009 (Table 13), and the second measures the number of security incidents in which the firms have been involved in the same year (Table 14). To increase the power of the MANOVA it is also necessary that the outcome variables be correlated with each other (Hair et al., 2009). The relationship between security budget and security incidents; low security budgets are assumed to determine a higher amount of security incidents.



Figure 27: Outcome Variables to measure the Security construct.

5.4.2.2 Predictor variables

The hypotheses formulated in the previous section are proposed again to enhance the clarity of the process to identify the predictor variables (composite measures or summated scales) and the related sets of questions used in the survey.

Law Enforcement Agency

H1a. Companies that perceive that criminals are not prosecuted are discouraged from improving security.

H1b. Companies that perceive that the Swedish law enforcement agency is not allocating enough resources are discouraged from enhancing security.

H1c. Companies that perceive as beneficial the collaboration in activities organized by the Swedish law enforcement agency are stimulated to improve security.

The above hypotheses correspond to three main constructs: the degree of prosecution of criminals, the allocation of resources and finally the collaboration degree between distribution firms and the Swedish law enforcement agency.

The construct concerning the degree of prosecution of criminals once they are captured is measured by means of a set of six questions based on a five point Likert scale (1, *Strongly Disagree* to 5, *Strongly Agree*). The hypothesis formulated in H1a points out that if the operators perceive that the legal system is not prosecuting their offenders, they will feel discouraged in working with security and will consequently abandon or limit to the essential any security initiative. Hence, the purpose of this set of questions is to measure the perception of the work done by the legal system to prosecute criminals (Table 15).

Table 15: Set of questions to measure perception of criminals' prosecution degree.

In 2009	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Can't answer
the Swedish Prosecutor's effort to prosecute transport offenders was very good.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
\dots when criminals who attacked our business were arrested, there has been a long time before they have been released from prison.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
cargo criminals have always been promptly captured and kept in custody by the Swedish police and the Prosecutor.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
\ldots our confidence in the efforts of law enforcement authorities to prosecute offenders has increased.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we have noticed that criminals, once arrested stayed away from our operations.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we have noticed that cargo crime has always been severely punished.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

The second construct that was developed in the questionnaire concerns the allocation of resources made by the Swedish law enforcement agency. A set of six questions based on a five-point Likert scale (1, *Strongly Disagree* to 5, *Strongly Agree*) have been developed to measure how firms perceive this issue as a function of the efforts made by the law enforcement agency as well as in relation to the reporting frequency of security incidents (Table 16).

Table 16: Set of questions to measure the perception of the resource allocation issue.

In 2009	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Can't answer
our organization has always reported security incidents to the law enforcement agency.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
the law enforcement efforts to arrest criminals have been very good.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
the law enforcement agency has devoted sufficient resources to combat cargo crime.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we have always reported security incidents to law enforcement authorities as we have confidence that appropriate action against offenders will be taken.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
reporting security incidents was a top priority in our organization.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we noticed that the more we reported security incidents, the better the efforts of law enforcement authorities had been.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

Finally, six more questions, based on five-point Likert scales (1, *Strongly Disagree* to 5, *Strongly Agree*), have been constructed to measure how firms perceive the degree of collaboration offered by the law enforcement agency (H2a. *Companies that encounter difficulties in raising freight rates are discouraged from improving security*.

H2b. Companies applying JIT principles are discouraged from improving security.

H2c. Companies that are part of international distribution networks are more interested in improving security.

H2d. Companies believing that security measures may negatively affect their performance level don't improve security.

Table 17). Questions included the participation frequency in the activities, the stimulation perceived to increase security as well as the improvements to prevent and recover after security incidents.

Distribution and Transport Operators

H2a. Companies that encounter difficulties in raising freight rates are discouraged from improving security.

H2b. Companies applying JIT principles are discouraged from improving security.

H2c. Companies that are part of international distribution networks are more interested in improving security.

H2d. Companies believing that security measures may negatively affect their performance level don't improve security.

Table 17: Set of questions to measure perception of collaboration with the law enforcement agency.

In 2009	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Can't answer
our organization has always taken part in seminars and other activities organized by the national law enforcement agency.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
our organization, by participating in seminars and activities organized by the law enforcement authorities, was stimulated to increase security.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
our organization, by participating in seminars and activities organized by the law enforcement authorities, was stimulated to increase knowledge about how to protect themselves from such incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we have noticed that, during seminars and activities, we have been able to come up with interesting initiatives for protection of goods.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we have noticed that it is important to strengthen cooperation with law enforcement authorities to combat cargo crime.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we have noted that cooperation with law enforcement agency has improved our ability to prevent and recover after security incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

In these hypotheses it is possible to discern four constructs: the willingness to pay for security, the influence of JIT operations, the length of distribution networks and the impact of security on organizational performance. To measure the willingness to pay it has been decided to use a continuous ratio variable (Table 18) as well as a set of questions based on a five-point Likert scale (1, *Strongly Disagree* to 5, *Strongly Agree*). The continuous ratio variable is primarily used in the descriptive statistics and asks for the average price increase accepted by transport customers regarding security improvements (Table 18).

Table 18: Continuous variable measuring the average increment accepted by transport buyers.

When you improve security, what is the average price increase accepted by your customers (please refer to the	le
average price increase that you have agreed upon in 2009)?	

(0% - 100%)

- [1] Average price per shipment:
- [2] Do not know.
- [3] Do not want to answer.

The difficulty experienced by transport sellers when trying to raise the freight rates in view of security enhancements is measured with the set of questions reported in Table 19. These difficulties are measured both in terms of the opposition of customers to increase freight rates as well as the fear of operators to lose competitive advantage.

To measure the perception that companies have concerning the influence of JIT on security incidents a set of 6 questions based on a five-point Likert scale has been used (1, *Strongly Disagree* to 5, *Strongly Agree*). The questions are oriented to understand whether the organization has experienced the problem of worsening JIT efficiency when security was introduced, or vice versa (Table 20).

Table 19: Set of questions to measure customers' willingness to pay.

In 2009	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Can't answer
we asked our customers often for higher security but they did not want to pay for it.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we noticed that it is difficult to provide security because we could not afford it.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we found that we could not raise our prices because customers were not willing to pay for security.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we realized that the small marginal revenues typical of our business make it difficult to invest in security.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
\ldots our organization has continued to be competitive in the market although we do not invest in security.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
the proportion of customers willing to pay for secured transports is very low.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

Table 20: Set of questions to measure perception of JIT influence on security incidents.

In 2009	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Can't answer
We have had difficulty controlling security because our organization has a high degree of Just In Time (JIT).	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
it often happened that the vehicles were attacked while they were waiting to unload at a terminal.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
the application of JIT principles has increased the risk of criminal attacks.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we have had to balance security against JIT effectiveness.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we have learned that JIT principles increase the flow of goods on the roads and thereafter the number of security incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
the great dilemma of our organization was whether we should prioritize JIT principles or security.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

To measure the length of the network of which the distribution firm is part, a single categorical variable has been chosen (Table 21). The choices included urban, regional, national, continental and worldwide. In addition, three alternatives were added to check whether respondents didn't know, they didn't want to answer or if the question was not applicable (Table 21). This scale is the one used by Voss et al. (2009b).

Table 21: Length of distribution network.

Plea	Please choose below the option that best characterizes the average distance that your vehicle fleet is running:								
[1]	Urban	[5]	Worldwide						
[2]	Regional	[6]	Don't know						
[3]	National	[7]	Don't want to answer						
[4]	Continental	[8]	Not applicable						

The final hypothesis concerns the implementation of security and its effect on the efficiency of distribution chains. In this case more variables are needed as predictors of performance and efficiency. Those chosen for this study are the following: Customer Satisfaction, On-time Deliveries, Labor Costs and Administrative Costs. Other variables are used to measure the costs related to the additional mandatory work for terminal, manufacturing or transport operators, whose personnel are forced to learn and apply new procedures on top of their duties. In addition, the questionnaire aims to measure the cost of learning security routines and technologies and also

the increased complexity and resources needed by organizations. All the variables are measured on a five-point Likert scale from 1, *Strongly Disagree* to 5, *Strongly Agree* (Table 23). To facilitate the answer to this set of questions an introductory question was used to let the respondents first choose a security solution and thereafter evaluate the impact on efficiency (Table 22).

Table 22: Question to select a security solution.

Choose one of the following security measures (response linked to subsequent terms):									
[1]	GPS Track and Trace	[5]	Employees background screening	[9]	Vehicle-/Container alarm				
[2]	Mechanical Lock	[6]	E-seal	[10]	Fuel cap lock				
[3]	Rigid curtains	[7]	VHF tracer	[11]	Other:				
[4]	Sound Barrier	[8]	Vehicle Immobilizer						

Table 23: Set of questions to measure influence on performance of security measures.

The introduction of the security solution chosen above will	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Can't answer
adversely affect customer satisfaction.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
have a negative impact on on-time deliveries (delivery precision).	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
increase our labor costs.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
increase our administrative costs.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
make our work to satisfy customers more difficult.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
inevitably increase delivery delays.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
inevitably increase the number of procedures that operators must follow.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
make the transport operators' working environment too complex and resource intensive.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
inevitably increase the amount of technology that operators must learn and use every day.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

Business Security Certifications

H3. Companies complying with business certifications have higher security.

In this case a non-metric categorical variable is used to check if the organization is a member of a voluntary certification (i.e. TAPA, ISO28000, etc.). An open option is also available to

respondents to allow the indication of other certifications not mentioned in the question (Table 24).

Table 24: Question to determine the compliance to security certifications.

Indicate which of the following certifications / guidelines you comply with to improve security (more than one answer is possible):							
[1]	TAPA EMEA.	[4]	None of them.				
[2]	ISO28000.	[5]	Don't know.				
[3]	Other:	[6]	Don't want to answer.				

Insurance Companies

H4a. Companies that make use of insurances to cover the economical losses of security incidents are less interested in improving security.

H4b. Companies benefiting from premium discounts don't work actively with enacting security.

To measure the first construct, concerning how firms work with insurances, four ratio variables and six questions based on five-point Likert scales are used (1, *Strongly Disagree* to 5, *Strongly Agree*).

The first ratio variable measures the proportion of shipments that are fully insured against security incidents. The next two variables seek to determine whether the insurance purchased will only cover the weight costs (in accordance to NSAB 2000) or the real value of the goods plus other indirect costs. The last question asks for the proportion of captive insurances used by the organization (Table 25).

The set of questions in Table 26 is used to measure how companies are using insurances to cover economic losses related to security incidents. Basically the questions are oriented to determine whether companies have a tendency to trade off the costs of insurance premiums and excesses with the costs of implementing security solutions.

Table 25: Set of questions to measure the degree of insurances used by operators.

Please indicate the proportion of shipments (in percent) that were fully insured against security incidents in 2000 (mercent) and the insurement)
2009 (regardless of who paid the insurance).
[1] Specify here: (0% - 100%)
[2] Don't know.
[3] Don't want to answer.
What proportion of your shipments is not insured by goods owners (according to NSAB2000)?
[1] Specify here: (0% - 100%)
[2] Don't know.
[3] Don't want to answer.
What proportion of your shipments had an increased liability compared to NSAB2000 requirements?
[1] Specify here: (0% - 100%)
[2] Don't know.
[3] Don't want to answer.
If your company has a captive of its insurance program, what proportion of losses related to security incidents were covered in 2009 by the captive company?
[1] Specify here: (0% - 100%)
[2] Don't know.
[3] Don't want to answer.
Table 26: Set of questions to measure degree of insurance usage.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Can't answer
Insurances are the best solution to cover the economic losses from security incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Our organization makes extensive use of commercial insurance to cover losses related to security incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
In order to cover losses associated with security incidents, our organization has a captive company for its insurance program.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Our organization makes use of insurance to cover direct and indirect losses caused by security incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
All the financial losses caused by security incidents are covered by our insurances.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
By purchasing insurances, we will never lose money in the event of incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

Another group of questions is used to determine how distribution operators perceive the efforts of insurance companies to lower premium rates in case security measures are efficiently implemented. The first question is a ratio variable to determine the maximum percentage discount received by transport companies in 2009 (Table 27).

Table 27: Question to measure the maximum discount offered by insurance companies.

Enter the maximum discount (%) that you received in 2009 from your insurance company after installing or implementing a security measure:

Specify what security measure:

[1] Specify here:

(0% - 100%)

[2] Don't know.

[3] Don't want to answer.

The following set of questions is instead used to measure whether the companies are being denied premium discounts and are retaining risks by purchasing security measures (Table 28). The questions are based on five-point Likert scales from 1, *Strongly Disagree* to 5, *Strongly Agree*.

Table 28: Questions to measure the adoption of premium discounts.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Can't answer
Our organization earns premium discounts from insurance companies when protective measures are implemented.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
It is easy to agree on premium discounts with insurance companies.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Agreements on premium discounts with our insurance company are never a loss of time and resource.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Installing security technologies will help the organization to save money on insurance premium.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
The implementation of security procedures saves money on insurance premium.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Premium Discounts are always offered to organizations that actively work with security.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

Security Providers

H5a. Companies believing that security solutions are in a development stage and difficult to integrate do not improve security.

H5b. Companies believing that security solutions are too expensive compared to the value provided do not improve security.

The variables used are concentrated to measure the perception that distribution companies have concerning security solutions both from a technological maturity and cost perspective. The first set of questions is meant to verify the maturity of security prototypes, the payback, how well these will turn into products, how well the prototypes may be integrated with the organizations (Table 29). These concepts are measured by means of six five-point Likert scales from 1, *Strongly Disagree* to 5, *Strongly Agree*.

Table 29: Set of questions to measure perception of security prototypes implementation.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Can't answer
Security prototypes that seem to have the shortest payback period are not ready for industrial use yet.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
It will take too much time and effort before an advanced security solution is implemented in our organization.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Security prototypes often fail to improve security and will never turn into reliable products.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Most of the existing security technology is too difficult to integrate within our organization.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Most of the existing security technology is too difficult to integrate with our business processes.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

The next set of questions is instead oriented to measure the expensiveness of security solutions. The questions ask first directly the opinion about the expensiveness of security measures and then try to put into relation costs with efficiency on cargo crime, security budget, payback period and dimension of the vehicles' fleet (Table 30). The questions are measured with a five-point Likert scale from 1, *Strongly Disagree* to 5, *Strongly Agree*.

Table 30: Set of questions to measure the expensiveness of security solutions.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Can't answer
The most effective and advanced security solutions are too expensive.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
The security solutions that we can afford cannot effectively prevent the cargo crime.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Our security budget is not high enough to buy the most effective security solutions.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
The payback period for the most effective security solutions is too long.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Security costs increase considerably when purchasing devices to be installed on the whole fleet of vehicles of our organization.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

Cargo Criminals

H6. Companies perceiving the opportunistic behavior of criminals do not improve security.

The variables chosen to measure this construct are all based on ordinal five-point Likert scales from 1, *Strongly Disagree* to 5, *Strongly Agree*. The variables are oriented to measure the belief that companies have about the opportunistic behavior of criminals in terms of learning capabilities, access to technical resources and insiders (Table 31).

Contract Regulatory Associations

H7a. Companies that experience difficulties in agreeing on security requirements are not encouraged to improve security.

H7b. Companies that perceive the contract agreements as too complex are not encouraged to improve security.

H7c. Companies that don't share risks by means of contract agreements are not encouraged to improve security.

H7d. Companies that do not specify security requirements are not encouraged to improve security.

Table 31: Set of questions to measure the	e perception of the or	portunistic behavior of	cargo criminals
Tuble 51. Bet of questions to measure a	ie perception of the of	portunistic benavior or	cargo criminais.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Can't answer
No matter how much protection we establish on our assets, criminals will always find ways to strike us.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Our organization has experience of criminals that quickly learn how to outsmart the new security measures.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
The criminal groups are too advanced to be fought only with the implementation of security measures (both technical and non technical).	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
The majority of the security incidents are perpetrated with the support of insiders that know what security measures we use and how to deceive them.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Today, there is no silver bullet technology or method to effectively prevent cargo crime.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

In the above hypotheses it is possible to identify four main constructs that have to be measured by means of summated scales. These are risk sharing, perception of complexity of contract agreements, specification of security requirements in contract agreements and finally difficulties experienced in specifying security requirements in contract agreements.

Risk-sharing has been measured by means of 1) a ratio variable indicating the proportion of stipulated contract agreements in which liabilities are shared (Table 32) and 2) five questions based on a five-point Likert scale from 1, *Strongly Disagree* to 5, *Strongly Agree* (Table 33). The questions aim to measure whether standard agreements are used as well as whether the organizations put a high priority on these agreements.

Table 32: ratio variable to measure the proportion of contracts in which liabilities are shared.

Enter invol	r the percentage (%) of contracts signed by your company in 2009, where liabilities are shared among the ved parties:
[1]	Specify here: (0% - 100%).
[2]	Don't know.
[3]	Don't want to answer.

Table 33: Set of questions to measure the importance to share liabilities with contracts.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Can't answer
In 2009, our organization has made use of written agreements to specify risk-sharing between the parties involved in the distribution/storage of goods.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
It is important that all parties involved in distribution and storage of goods share the responsibility in case of incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Contracts must clearly indicate what standard agreements must be followed and who is responsible for what.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
It is important to avoid the use of unclear agreements where the liability between the parties is not specified.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
In our contracts established in 2009, the sharing of liabilities is defined in accordance with NSAB 2000.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

The construct to measure the perception of firms of the complexity of contract agreements has also been measured by means of a ratio variable and five questions based on a five-point Likert scale (1, *Strongly Disagree* to 5, *Strongly Agree*). The ratio variable measures the proportion of verbal agreements performed by the organization in 2009 (Table 34).

Table 34: Variable measuring the proportion of verbal agreements.

Enter the proportion of verbal agreements performed by your organization with your customers in 2009:							
[1]	Specify here: (0% - 100%).						
[2]	Don't know.						
[3]	Don't want to answer.						

A set of five questions has been prepared to measure the complexity perceived by companies when stipulating contract agreements (Table 35). The questions ask whether the contracts are believed to be complex or if the organization prefers verbal agreements. Complexity is measured in terms of time and resources needed by the organization to set up the contracts, as well as the ability of companies to understand the usefulness of the agreements and how to use them in case of a security incident (Table 35).

Table 35: Set of questions to measure the complexity of standard agreements.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Can't answer
Agreements with our customers are too complex to define and agree on.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Since the contract agreements with our customers are too complex to define and agree on, we prefer verbal agreements.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
It takes too much time and too many resources to draw up and underwrite contracts.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Even if we use written agreements we do not understand their true meaning and benefit for our organization.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
We have used written contracts but we do not really know how to use them in case a security incident occurs.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

The construct about the specification of security requirements in contracts follows the structure of the two preceding constructs. Thus, it is measured by means of a ratio variable and five questions based on a five-point Likert scale (1, *Strongly Disagree* to 5, *Strongly Agree*). The ratio variable asks for the proportion of contract agreements signed in which security requirements are specified (Table 36).

Table 36: Variable measuring the proportion of contracts in which security is specified.

Please indicate the proportion of contract agreements (in percent) that your organization stipulated with its							
customers in 2009, in which security requirements are specified in the text:							
[1]	Specify here:	(0% - 100%).					
[2]	Don't know						

[3] Don't want to answer.

The construct concerning how firms perceive the complexity of specifying security requirements in contract agreements is measured by a set of five questions based on a five-point scale. In particular, the set of questions to measure the adoption of security requirements in transport contracts aim to understand whether the organization or its customers strive to specify security in contracts. In addition, the questions try to capture the importance given by companies as well as the easiness to perform this process (Table 37).

Table 37: Variables measuring the exploitation of security requirements in contracts.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Can't answer
In 2009, our customers have always specified in contract agreements which security requirements should be applied.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
It is important to specify security requirements in order to clarify the protection that is required for distribution/storage of goods.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
In 2009, most of our customers asked to specify the security requirements in contract agreements.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
In 2009, our organization has always proposed detailed descriptions of security requirements in contracts.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
In 2009, both our organization and our customers have easily agreed on how to specify security requirements in contracts.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

The questions ask directly about the difficulties encountered to agree on security requirements, but also the time and resources needed to accomplish this task. In addition, 1) the degree of diverging opinions about security requirements, 2) the avoidance of this process because of its complexity as well as 3) the difficulty to estimate the impacts of security measures are asked in the questionnaire (Table 38).

Table 38: Set of questions to measure difficulties to agree on security requirements.

	Strongl Disagre	Disagre	Neither Agre nor Disagre	Agre	Strongly Agre	Can't answe
In 2009, we had difficulty getting along with our partners on the security requirements that should be specified in the agreement.	و ح [1]	e [2]	[3]	e [4]	e [5]	[6]
Agreement processes on the security requirements to be specified in contracts takes too much time and resources from our organization.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
We prefer to avoid the specification of security requirements in contract agreements because it is too complicated.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
We do not really know how to specify security requirements because it is difficult to estimate the impact on security of the measures selected.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
In 2009, we and our customers often had different opinions about the performance of security solutions on cargo threats.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Authority

H8a. Transportation companies complying with the AEO certification have higher security.

H8b. Transportation companies that have a negative perception about the impact of AEO regulations on security and efficiency are discouraged from enhancing security.

In the hypotheses formulated for the authority it is possible to extract two main constructs: compliance to the AEO certifications, perception of the AEO regulations and finally perception of the impact of AEO compliance. The first construct is measured by a categorical variable to determine whether the company is member of one of the three available AEO certifications (AEO-C, AEO-S or AEO-F) (Table 39).

Table 39: Categorical variable to determine AEO compliance.

Our organization complies with or is planning to comply with the following certifications:					
[1]	AEO-C.	[5]	Don't know		
[2]	AEO-S.	[6]	Don't want to answer.		
[3]	AEO-F.				
[4]	None of them.				

The second construct concerns the perception of the benefits of AEO compliance. This topic is measured by means of a set of 5 questions based on a five-point Likert scale from 1, *Strongly Disagree* to 5, *Strongly Agree* (Table 40).

The questions ask whether the AEO certification may impact the organization from a security and efficiency viewpoint. In particular, the questions aim to measure the degree of confusion about AEO requirements, the perception about the impact of the certification on security, costs in terms of time and resources allocated, and finally impact on competitive advantage and organizational efficiency (Table 40).

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Can't answer
Our organization perceives the AEO's requirements as confusing	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
our organization perceives the ALO's requirements as confusing.	[1]	[2]	[2]	ניין	[2]	[0]
The AEO certification will not increase the security of our organization.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Complying with the AEO certification will cost us too much time and resources in relation to the benefits.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
It is not necessary to be AEO certified from a competitive advantage perspective.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
The requirements of the AEO guidelines reduce the efficiency of our operations.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

Table 40: Set of questions to measure the perception of the AEO impact on the organization.

5.4.3 Stage 4 - Data Collection

The data collection was performed between April and June 2010. The security, risk, transportation and logistics managers of the selected companies were posted questionnaires together with a two page cover letter and a prepaid postage return envelope (see Appendixes 3 and 4). To respect the anonymity of the answers, a unique code was generated, assigned to the respondents and printed on the return envelopes. This was also necessary to keep track of the responses and limit the mailing of reminders.

To increase the response rate, the cover letter 1) included the logo of the Swedish law enforcement agency, with which we collaborated for this study, 2) included a detailed description about how to compile the questionnaire 3) ensured the confidentiality of the answers and 4) promised an executive summary of the results. In the middle of May about 85 questionnaires corresponding to a response rate of 14.7% were received. Reminder letters, together with a copy of the questionnaire and a prepaid postage return envelope were sent to non-respondents two weeks after the deadline. In addition, it was decided to put in the reminder letter the link to a website where it was possible to respond to the survey. This was done to stimulate respondents that were more familiar with web surveys and thereafter increase the response rate. Finally, follow-up telephone calls were made 1) to enhance the quality of the answers, 2) to obtain additional responses and 3) to understand the motivations for not answering. At the end of

the data collection a total of 210 questionnaires had been collected which corresponds to a response rate of about 36.4%.

In some cases, the companies' owners called on their own initiative to ask if the questionnaire was compulsory and thereby to explain that they preferred to not answer because of confidentiality issues. In addition to that, a total of 47 companies were contacted by phone. The reasons for not answering the questionnaire were in order, lack of time, internal policy, difficult to find the right competence, not relevant for the organization (this was especially true for recycling and low value goods companies). In only one case could a manager not access data from 2009 because she had been recently employed. Finally, in other cases the company had bankrupted or had been sold.

By performing a missing value analysis it was decided to keep only the questionnaires with less than 17 missing answers. This implies that 34 questionnaires were removed from the sample for subsequent data analysis.

5.4.4 Stage 5 - Data Analysis

The statistical methods used in this investigation are based on multivariate analysis techniques. According to Hair et al. (2009) multivariate analysis "*simultaneously analyzes multiple measurements on individuals or objects under investigation*". The general structure of the statistical analysis to be performed includes the following steps: descriptive statistics, Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis, cluster analysis, MANOVA to test the hypotheses, discriminant analysis and finally an analysis to ensure the validity and reliability of the survey.

Before running the analysis, the presence of common method bias was checked by performing an un-rotated factor analysis using Kaiser criterion (eigen value > 1). This analysis revealed the existence of 18 distinct factors that accounted for 75.3% of the variance. In particular, it was noticed that the first factor accounted for only 27.9% of the variance. Hence, since a single factor didn't appear in the analysis and the first factor didn't account for the most of the variance, the absence of common method bias may be assumed (Paulray et al., 2008).

Finally, the results of the analysis carried out are presented in the form of mean values, proportions, p-values, and correlations computed with 95% confidence intervals. In addition, in

this investigation one-tailed tests are used and the level of significance has been set to < 0.05. All the statistical analyses have been carried out with SPSS v. 15.0. and LISREL 8.80.

Descriptive Statistics

This analysis is carried out to summarize and describe important features of the data. An important part of this step is the analysis of missing values that is fundamental to generate a filter variable and select the cases to be used in the analysis. In addition, the missing values of the remaining questionnaires have been replaced with values' means. Afterwards, calculation of numerical summary measures as means and standard deviations has been performed. The normality degree of the outcome variables has been checked with Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. In addition, graphic tools such as bar charts, histograms, and scatter-plots are used to support quick visual comparisons of frequency distributions, normality degree of the variables, and correlations in bivariate data. Computation of correlation coefficients with non-parametric tests has been performed to determine the relationship between the outcome variables. In addition, by log-transforming the outcome variables a linear regression was performed to verify the results of the non-parametric tests. Also, ANOVA have been used to determine the influence of the sample size on the outcome variables.

Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis

By performing an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) the questions in the survey have been put together in summated scales. The EFA is a statistical technique that supports analysts in the reduction of the number of variables while retaining as much original information as possible. The EFA performed within this investigation is based on a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with orthogonal rotation (Varimax). If data are not properly reduced, biases due to the multicollinearity of the variables could appear. Therefore, the correlation coefficients as well as the determinant of the correlation matrix have been screened to detect multicollinearity problems and avoid biases in the reduced data (Hair et al., 2009). The adequacy of the sample size as well as the magnitude of correlations between the items (necessary conditions for PCA) are assessed respectively with the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure and the Bartlett's test of sphericity (*ibid*). The factor variables were saved by using the regression method. Finally, the reliability degree of the related constructs has been checked by performing a reliability analysis and by consequently examining the values of the Chronbach's alpha (Hair et al., 2009).

A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) has been run to determine how well the measured variables represented the constructs. This technique is different from the EFA since the number of constructs, as well as the relationships between the items and the constructs are established by the researcher (Hair et al., 2009). The analysis of the model fit indices was exploited to establish construct validity and unidimensionality. Convergent validity was assessed by examining the value of standardized coefficients, t-values for the individual paths, Construct Reliability (CR) and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) (*ibid*). Discriminant validity was estimated by developing additional measurement models in which the correlation of any two constructs under examination was set to 1.0. Thereafter, differences of the χ^2 values for the fixed and free solutions were examined to assess the distinctiveness of the two constructs (*ibid*).

Cluster Analysis

The factors identified in the previous step have been successively used to classify the respondents into groups according to a hierarchical cluster analysis. In this study clusters have been constructed with the Wards method based on the squared Euclidean distance, which is known to guarantee a better distribution of the groups (Hair et al., 2009). The joint analysis of the agglomeration schedule and the dendogram graph generated by SPSS, supported the decision concerning the optimal number of groups to be taken for further investigation. After the initial assessment of the number of clusters, the iterative K-means cluster approach was used to determine the cluster membership of the data (Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984; Paulraj, 2008). The clusters were saved in variables generated in SPSS. To enhance the profiling of these groups, a discriminant analysis with a Wilks' lambda stepwise method and a Varimax rotation was computed. In addition, groups' means in relation to the identified factors are exploited to enhance the profiling of the identified groups. Finally, the reliability of the cluster analysis was demonstrated by means of cross-validation (Sherman and Sheth, 1977; Paulraj, 2008). Hence, the sample was divided randomly in two equal sub-samples and cluster analysis was performed on each half. The examination and comparison of the descriptive statistics of the two sets of clusters was exploited to establish the reliability of the cluster solution (Paulraj, 2008).

MANOVA

The groups created in the previous step will be finally used to run a Multivariate ANalysis Of VAriance (MANOVA). The main peculiarity of the MANOVA instrument is its particular

suitability to look at the relationship between predictors and several outcome variables simultaneously (Hair et al., 2009). While it could be possible to run ANOVAs for each outcome variable, MANOVA is usually preferred because of its capability to reduce the chance to commit a Type I error. Hence, its application to this investigation is fundamental to determine how different groups of firms invest in security and at the same time how much they are affected by security incidents. MANOVA assumptions like multivariate normality as well as the homogeneity of covariance matrices have been checked with Levene's and Box's tests. Whenever problems with the homogeneity of covariance matrices were detected, the outcome variables were log-transformed. Several ANOVAs as well as further discriminant analyses have been performed to follow up and strengthen the comprehension of possible relationships between the dependent variables used in the MANOVA. Finally, bar charts with error bars (95% confidence intervals) are used to visualize the differences of the groups in terms of security budget allocated and number of incidents suffered.

5.4.5 Survey Validity and Reliability

Survey instruments often produce discrepancies or measurement errors between what they are measuring and the actual value of the variables to be measured. A way to keep the measurement errors at a minimum level is to enhance the validity and reliability of the survey instrument. Validity is *"the degree to which a measure accurately represents what it is supposed to"* (Hair et al., 2009). As a consequence, to enhance the validity of a questionnaire it is important to improve its design by acting on the wording and format of the questions (Iarossi, 2006). According to Iarossi (2006) there are two basic rules to accomplish this: relevance and accuracy. Relevance concerns the familiarity of the researcher with the topic and the objectives of the study. A question is accurate if information is collected in a reliable and valid manner. Hence, to improve the accuracy of the answers, it is important to avoid asking questions that are hard to understand or that refer to events or data too far in the past to be correctly remembered (*ibid*). In addition, a questionnaire has to be sent to the people that are able to provide the more accurate answers (Moser and Kalton, 1971). Finally pre-tests have to be conducted to enhance wording, format, comprehension and thereafter the overall accuracy of the survey (Czaja and Blair, 2005; Iarossi, 2006).

In this investigation, to ensure the validity of the questionnaire, the survey has been directly developed from the research hypotheses. The hypotheses breakdown into constructs and related summated scales is clearly illustrated in this document and it has been scrutinized by academic experts. The data collected refer to 2009, which is believed not to be too far in the past and therefore easily accessible by respondents. Moreover, the survey has been addressed to logistics or transportation or security managers in the firms extracted from the Swedish Business Register. These individuals are believed to possess the right competence and experience to provide credible and accurate answers. Finally, to enhance the validity of this investigation, the developed survey instrument has been thoroughly pretested first with academic professionals (supervisors and other colleagues), 1 language expert, 1 administration officer and 10 professional experts working in the field of transportation and logistics security. Comments and feedbacks from these two reviews have been used to enhance the accuracy of the questions.

Reliability is the degree to which observed variables measure true values (Hair et al., 2009). Diverse methods may be used to ensure the reliability of a questionnaire. Some of the most popular include test-retests, alternate forms, split-half, internal consistency and non-response bias (Litwin, 1995; Hair et al., 2005; Armstrong and Overton, 1977):

Because of the time and money constraints allocated for this investigation, double administration of surveys has been avoided (i.e. test-retests). At the same time, approaches like split-half or alternate forms were not feasible due to the length of the questionnaire. Hence, reliability has been assessed by measuring internal consistency (factor analysis and Cronbach's alpha to systematically assess the validity of the scales), and non-response bias. Internal consistency consists to check if individual variables (or sets of variables) produce results that are consistent with the constructs generated in the questionnaire (Hair et al., 2009). In this investigation internal consistency has been checked by means of a factor analysis (ibid) as well as by calculating the Cronbach's alpha α as shown in the equation below (Litwin, 1995).

$$\alpha = \frac{N^2 \overline{COV}}{\sum s_{item}^2 + \sum COV_{item}}$$

Where

 $\overline{\text{COV}}$ = Average Covariance between items

N = number of items

 $s_{item}^2 = item variance$

COV_{item} = item covariance

Usually a value of alpha of 0.7/0.8 indicates that the scale is reliable. The results of the factor analysis as well as the values of the Cronbach's alpha, measuring the reliability of the scales used in the questionnaire, are reported within the factor analysis illustrated in the next chapter.

The reliability of a survey may be measured by analyzing non-response bias. Armstrong and Overton (1977) suggest that the comparison of early respondents with late responses obtained after follow-up calls or emails may provide indications about the presence (or not) of non-response bias (if there are not statistical differences between these two groups, then response bias may be estimated to be absent). This approach, also called extrapolation method, is built upon the assumption that respondents answering less readily are more like non-respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). In this investigation, to check for non-response bias, early and late responses of the survey were compared. No significant differences were found, either in terms of the outcome variables or of the demographic characteristics, which indicates the absence of non-response bias (Armstrong and Overton, 1977).

6 Analysis

This chapter presents the analysis of the data collected with the survey. First of all, descriptive statistics of outcome and predictor variables are expounded. Next, the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4 are tested. To enhance the clarity of the analysis and tests of the hypotheses, this chapter follows the same structure used in the Frame of Reference section (Chapter 4).

6.1 Descriptive Statistics

Of the respondents, 39% stated that they don't make any investments in security. Hence, the average investment made on security, by Swedish transportation companies in 2009, is about \notin 4,874 (SD= \notin 9,392) while the maximum investment is \notin 50,000 (N=171).



Figure 28: Distribution of Security Budget variable (N=171).

About 18% of the respondents stated that they are not affected by any security incidents. The companies that instead claimed to be affected by security incidents had on average suffered 6.4 attacks (SD=7.4, Max=44). Examining the graphical distributions of the dependent variables it was deduced that these were differing from normal distributions (Figure 28 and Figure 29). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also confirmed that both the dependent variables significantly differ

from normal distributions, p < 0.001.¹⁰ Many companies don't make investments in security or are not affected by security incidents, resulting in a build-up of scores around the left tail of the distributions.



Figure 29: Distribution of security incidents variable (N=172).

A regression analysis run with the security incidents as the dependent variable and the security budget as the independent didn't show any significant relationships (p>0.05). However, examining the P-P plots of the standardized residuals as well as the scatter plot of standardized residuals against standardized predicted values, heteroscedasticity was detected. By using non-parametric tests with Spearman's test statistics it was found instead that the security budget is significantly inversely correlated with the number of security incidents, $\rho = -0.311$, p < 0.01. Hence, higher investments correspond to moderately lower number of security incidents. The scatter diagram in Figure 30, representing the relationship between security budget and security incidents in relation to the size of the company, may enhance the understanding of these controversial results. The total fitting line (black line) shows a very modest inverse relationship

¹⁰ Security budget, D(185)=0.30, p<0.001; Security Incidents, D(185)=0.19, p<0.001.

between the outcome variables. Hence, the findings of the Spearman's test are confirmed. The figure also reveals that such a trend is much more accentuated for small and medium companies (respectively blue and green lines). On the contrary, large companies show a more flattened relationship between the outcome variables (red line). This suggests that there are significant differences between the companies according to the size of the organizations.



Figure 30: Scatter diagram of relationship between security budget and incidents according to company size.

The diagrams in Figure 31 depict the relationships among the dependent variables and the size of the companies. By log-transforming the dependent variables and by running separate ANOVAs, we found that there was a significant influence of the size of the company on the security budget, F(1, 165) = 11.32, p < 0.01, as well as on the number of security incidents, F(1, 166) = 11.22, p < 0.01.



Figure 31: Average security budget (left) and average number of security incidents (right) in relation to the size of the company.

Planned contrasts revealed that there are significant differences only between small and medium companies or between small and large companies, hence not between medium and large companies. In terms of security budget, small companies significantly differ from medium, t(165) = -2.83, p < 0.05, and large sized companies, t(165) = -2.13, p < 0.05. In terms of number of security incidents, small companies also significantly differ from medium, t(165) = -2.67, p < 0.05, and large companies, t(165) = -2.33, p < 0.05.

Patterns of the variables used to measure the factors influencing security were also inspected. Examining the values of the variables in the area of questions concerning the law enforcement agency, it may be observed that the scores range between 2, *Disagree* and about 3 (3.27), *Neither Agree nor Disagree* (Table 41). However, 16 of the 18 variables used are below 3. The variables that score lowest are those concerning the frequency to join security activities (M=2.5; SD=1.15) and the severity of criminal punishment (M=2.56, SD=1.09). The variables with the highest scores are instead the frequency to report security incidents (M=3.27, SD=1.11) as well as the high priority given by organizations to report security incidents (M=3.18, SD=1.10). All the standard deviations are very close to 1, which indicates a consistent dispersion of the scores. By calculating the arithmetic average of the values of the variables shown in Table 41 (M=2.82, SD=1.1), it may be stated that the respondents have a tendency 1) to not properly be satisfied about the efforts to prosecute criminals 2) to not be convinced of the resources allocated to fight cargo crime and 3) to not properly collaborate in activities to enhance security.

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Effort of Prosecutor to punish criminals	2.63	0.95
Penalty sentence	2.74	1.08
Quick arrest and process in court	2.64	1.14
Increased confidence for law enforcement's efforts	2.94	1.06
Criminals' return to target	2.79	1.05
Rigid criminal punishment	2.56	1.09
High security reporting frequency	3.27	1.11
Efforts to arrest criminals	2.84	1.05
Law enforcement resource allocation	2.72	1.13
Confidence in prosecution after reporting	2.98	1.07
Security reporting highest priority	3.18	1.10
Reporting incidents increases police resource allocation	2.94	1.05
Always joined security activities	2.50	1.15
Security activities enhance security	2.66	1.19
Security knowledge is improved by joining security activities	2.82	1.24
Security activities improve collaboration among stakeholders	2.75	1.20
Importance of collaboration with law enforcement agency	2.91	1.26
Collaboration with law enforcement agency improves security	2.79	1.17

Table 41: Summary of variables measuring the influence of law enforcement agency (N=175).

Moving to the areas of questions concerning the behaviors of distribution and transport operators we found that the acceptance of freight rate increments of transport buyers is quite low (M=1.3%, SD=3.17%, N=71).



Figure 32: Freight Rate Increments (%) accepted by transportation buyers (N=71; the remaining 59.4% didn't know or didn't want to answer).

About 31% respondents state that their customers are not willing to accept any freight rate increments when enhancing security. 4% of the respondents have managed to increase by 5%. Increments of 2%, 3% and even 10% are also common among respondents. On a few occasions freight rate increments scored 10% (1.1% of respondents) and 20% (0.6% of respondents) (Figure 32).

Examining the summary of the scores given to the variables measuring the acceptance of freight rates increments the respondents seem to agree that it is difficult to justify price increments because of security enhancements (Table 42). All the scores range between 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree* and 4, *Agree* with a mean value of M=3.45 and SD=1.18.

Table 42: Summary of variables to measure acceptance of freight rates increments (N=175).

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Security at low price	3.42	1.15
Security budget lack	3.16	1.06
Freight rates increment acceptance	3.64	1.23
Marginal revenues too low to allow security investments	3.53	1.25
Competitive advantage not compromised by higher security	3.34	1.20
Magnitude of customers willing to pay for higher security	3.63	1.17

Table 43 depicts the perception of the conflict between JIT and security. All the values are very close to 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree* and have a very small tendency towards 2, *Disagree*. However, examining the mean value of this group of questions it is possible to state that the respondents were almost neutral to this problem (M=2.9, SD=1.02).

Table 43: Summary of variables measuring JIT vs. Security problem (N=175).

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Security compromised by high degree of JIT	3.28	1.01
Security compromised by waiting time at terminals	2.45	1.12
Applications of JIT principles increase risk for security incidents	2.92	0.99
JIT and security have to be traded off	2.92	1.03
JIT increases goods flows on the network as well as security	2.96	0.98
Doubts about increasing JIT or security	2.82	1.01

Of the respondents, about 44% move goods on a regional scale, followed by national (34%), urban (10.3%), continental (8%) and worldwide (2%) (Figure 33).



Figure 33: Distribution length of respondent companies (N=175).

Table 44 depicts the mean and standard deviations of the variables used to measure the impact on performance of security measures. All the variables range between 1, *Strongly disagree* and 3 (2.60), *Neither agree nor disagree*. It seems that generally the introduction of security measures does not affect organizational performance (M=2.18, SD=1.17). However it is possible to depict two groups of variables, one with higher scores and one with lower. The variables that score higher are labor costs, administrative costs, increased number of routines, working environment too complex and increased number of technologies to be learned. Hence, it appears that respondents perceive some influence of the security measures more on direct costs rather than on logistical efficiency (i.e. time delays, customer satisfaction, delivery precision etc.).

Table 44 [.] Summary	v of variables	measuring the impact of	on performance of	of security	(N=175)
ruore i i. Summu	y or variables	measuring the impact of	on periornance	or became,	(1, 1,5).

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Worsening of customer service	1.69	0.87
Worsening of time deliveries precision	1.71	0.91
Labor costs increase	2.29	1.37
Increased administrative costs	2.58	1.43
Customer satisfaction more difficult	1.87	1.05
Time deliveries delays	1.88	1.04
Increased number of routines to be followed	2.60	1.33
Working environment too complex	2.48	1.22
Increased number of technologies to be learned	2.54	1.33

Technological security measures (i.e. GPS track and trace, rigid curtains, mechanical locks and fuel cap locks) have in general a very low effect on performance (M=1.98, SD=0.92), with the exception of the variables measuring the working complexity of operators (M=2.12, SD=0.96), number of routines to be followed (M=2.13, SD=0.99) and learning processes (M=2.31, SD=1.00). The screening of employees' background has instead more negative impacts on labor costs (M=3.73, SD=1.37), administrative costs (M=3.80, SD=1.47), number of routines to be learned by operators (M=3.58, SD=1.28) and working complexity (M=2.67, SD=1.24). In other words, this shows that respondents feel that security technologies imply lower losses of efficiency compared to routines, despite some negative impacts related to learning and working complexity.

The variable measuring the compliance with business certifications indicates that the majority of the companies don't have any certification 49.1%, while only 1.7% comply with TAPA EMEA, and 8.6% with ISO28000. 18.3% of the respondents don't know what their organizations comply with and 6.3% don't want to answer.

The variables measuring the adoption of insurances to cover security losses indicate that on average in 2009 1) the respondents have fully insured 75.6% of their shipments against security incidents (N=91, SD=41.8%), 2) in 23.8% of the shipments the goods owner lack insurance (N=63, SD=39.5%), 3) 13.8% of the shipments have higher liability than what is stated in national standard regulations (N=52, SD=27.4%), and 4) 3.7% of security losses are covered with captive insurances (N=48, SD=18.2%). In addition, a substantial increment of missing values was discovered for these variables (N=48 to N=91), especially for the variables measuring the proportion of captive insurances (N=48) and the adoption of different liability conditions than those specified in national standards (N=52).

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Insurances cover security losses	3.27	1.05
Comprehensive usage of insurance	3.07	1.04
Usage of captive insurances	2.67	1.13
Insurances cover direct and indirect security losses	3.31	1.14
Insurances cover all economic losses	3.08	1.20
Security incidents are always fully covered by insurances	2.81	2.50

Table 45: Summary of variables used to measure coverage of security losses (N=175).

On average, the respondents are neutral when asked to judge if they believe that security insurances are the best way to cover security losses (M=3.04, SD=1.34). All the variables except two, usage of captive insurances and full coverage of security incidents, are greater than 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*. Also in this case standard deviations show a consistent variance, especially for the last variable "*Security incidents are always fully covered by insurances*", M=2.81 and SD=2.5 (Table 45).

Finally, the respondents moderately complain about premium discounts that seem not being offered when enhancing security (M=2.73, SD=1.16). This may also be observed in Table 46 where all the variables' scores are between 2.53, easiness to agree on premium discounts, and 2.88, premium discounts in relation to the installation of security technologies.

Table 46: Summary of variables measuring the premium discounts acceptance (N=175).

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Our organization gets premium discounts	2.77	1.15
Easiness to agree on premium discounts	2.53	1.12
Premium discounts agreements are never a loss of time	2.78	1.23
Installation of security technologies gives premium discounts	2.88	1.16
Application of security routines gives premium discounts	2.87	1.20
Premium discounts always offered if working actively with security	2.78	1.13

Almost 60 respondents report that they are not receiving premium discount when implementing security measures. Among the companies that are receiving premium discounts, 8% and 10% reductions are the most popular. In addition, the premium discounts offered by insurance companies are on average around 3% with a standard deviation of 4.3% (N=93) (Figure 34).



Figure 34: Frequency distribution of magnitude of premium discounts (N=92).

Table 47 shows that the first five variables used to measure the respondents' opinions about the integration in their organization of security devices are slightly greater than 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*. Hence, it is possible to affirm that the issue concerning the impact of the security devices on security as well as the integration in the organization is perceived as a problem. The last five variables measuring the expensiveness of the security solutions are closer to 4 (*Agree*) which implies that the respondents have a more pronounced tendency to agree with the fact that in general security devices are too expensive.

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Security devices with short pay off are not ready for industrial usage	3.22	0.80
Too long time and work to integrate advanced security solutions	3.35	0.97
Security prototypes don't succeed to enhance security and don't become products	3.24	0.93
Existing security measures are difficult to integrate	3.12	1.02
Security devices are difficult to integrate with our processes	3.21	0.99
Most effective security is too expensive	3.54	1.09
Security solutions we can afford cannot stop criminals	3.48	1.10
Security budget not enough to buy most effective devices	3.44	1.13
Payoff of the most efficient security devices is too long	3.45	1.02
Security costs become too high when installing on the whole fleet of vehicles	3.70	1.14

Table 47: Summary of data used to measure the influence of security solution providers (N=175).

The variable that scored higher is the one measuring the costs impact of security solutions when installed on the whole fleet of vehicles owned by the company (M= 3.70, SD=1.14). The standard deviations of the variables that are close to 1 also indicate a consistent dispersion of the scores.

Respondents had a slight tendency to agree that criminals are difficult to stop (M=3.72, SD=1.00) because their technical skills make security useless (M=3.56, SD=1.07), and easily deceived (M=3.56, SD=1.07). Besides, respondents believe that the exploitation of insiders may make most existing protections ineffective (M=3.50, SD=1.09) (Table 48).

Table 48: Summary of data measuring the behavior of criminals (N=175).

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Criminals can't be stopped by security measures	3.72	1.00
Security solutions are easily deceived by criminals	3.56	1.07
Skilled criminal groups make security useless	3.57	1.10
Use of insiders makes security useless	3.50	1.09
No technologies or routines may efficiently stop cargo crime	3.55	1.06

The majority of the variables used to measure the usage of contract agreements including liabilities sharing between buyers and sellers indicate that respondents have a moderate tendency to believe that it is important to share liabilities, to avoid unclear contracts, use standard agreements etc. (Table 49).

Some lower scores may be detected for the variables measuring the difficulty to agree on security requirements in contract agreements, especially the question asking whether customers require the specification of security in contracts (M=2.59, SD=1.09). All the variables show consistently high standard deviations (all are slightly greater than 1).

The majority of the companies has not complied with any of the AEO certifications (60.6%), while about 5.7% of the respondents didn't want to answer and 28.6% didn't know whether they have joined the certification or not. The AEO-C (Customs Simplification) is the most popular certification for the companies (2.3%), followed by AEO-F (Full) (1.7%) and finally AEO-S (Safety and Security) (0.6%) (Figure 35).

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Written contracts with liabilities sharing usage	2.90	1.07
Importance to share liabilities	3.43	1.02
Contracts clarity about risk sharing standards	3.56	1.07
Avoidance of unclear contracts with no risk sharing	3.61	1.08
Usage of NSAB2000 to share risks	3.21	1.04
Contracts with customers are too complex	2.86	0.97
Prefer Verbal Agreements (due to contract complexity)	2.85	1.07
Contract agreements demand too much time and resources	2.94	1.11
Don't understand the importance of written agreements	2.84	1.09
Don't know how to use contracts in case of security incidents	2.88	1.06
Always specify security requirements in contracts	2.74	1.11
It is important to specify security requirements in contracts	3.30	1.12
Our customers require the specification of security in contracts	2.59	1.09
Our organization always proposes detailed descriptions of security in contracts	2.67	1.04
We have easily agreed with our customers on specifying security requirements in contracts	2.76	1.05
It has been difficult to agree on what security requirements to choose	2.94	1.04
Contract agreement about security requirements takes too much time and resources	3.05	1.08
We avoid specifying security requirements since it is too complex	2.90	1.02
It is difficult to determine the effect of security and thereafter agree on contracts	3.06	1.00
Different opinions about security requirements in contracts	2.88	1.04





Figure 35: Respondents' compliance to AEO certification (N=175).

Finally, the respondents are neutral in relation to the statement that AEO reduces the efficiency of transport companies (M=3.09, SD=0.35) (Table 50). The respondents have a slight tendency to agree that the AEO is confusing (M=3.31, SD=0.42), is not effective on security (M=3.30,

SD=0.42) and is too costly (M=3.32, SD=0.44). At the same time, the respondents have a moderate inclination to perceive the AEO as a means to improve their competitive advantage (M=2.83, SD=0.56) (Table 50). An important issue that was noticed is that this set of questions had missing values between 120 and 126, giving the overall impression that respondents have very scarce knowledge of the AEO certifications and couldn't answer the questions. This was also confirmed by the fact that some respondents wrote with a pen on the side of the questionnaire that they couldn't answer since they didn't know what AEO is.

Table 50: Perception of AEO impacts on security and efficiency of transport companies (N=175).

	Mean	Std. Deviation
AEO is confusing	3.31	0.42
AEO doesn't enhance security	3.30	0.42
AEO compliance costs too much	3.32	0.44
AEO is not giving any competitive advantage	2.83	0.56
AEO reduces our organization's efficiency	3.09	0.35

6.2 Law Enforcement Agency

6.2.1 Factor and Reliability Analysis

A Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation was performed to identify different dimensions in the variables used to measure the influence of the law enforcement agency. Examining the correlation coefficients as well as the determinant of the correlation matrix no multicollinearity problems were detected. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO=0.90, marvelous according to Kaiser, 1974) indicates the suitability of the sample size for the factor analysis.

The Bartlett's test of sphericity is significantly large ($\chi^2(153)=2581.3$, p<0.01), which implies that the correlation matrix is not an identity matrix (the correlations between items were sufficiently large). Examining the scree plot, and following the Kaiser's criterion, a total of three factors explaining 72.3% of the variance were extracted. The interpretation of the variables clustered in the rotated component matrix (Table 51), results in the following factors:

- Component 1. Criminal Prosecution.
- Component 2. Involvement in Collaborative Activities.
- Component 3. Resource Allocation.

Table 51: Summary of Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis for law enforcement agency (N=175).

	(Componer	nt	Measurement Model		
Item	1.	2	3	Communality	Std. Coefficient	t-Value
Effort of Prosecutor to punish criminals	0.87	0.16	0.13	0.79	0.8	13.49
Quick arrest and process in court	0.81	0.13	0.22	0.73	0.77	10.61
Rigid criminal punishment	0.81	0.12	0.29	0.75	0.94	13.1
Slow criminal return to target	0.78	0.15	0.24	0.69	0.83	11.97
Penalty sentence	0.73	0.15	0.17	0.58	0.84	12.57
Increased confidence for law enforcement efforts	0.71	0.19	0.35	0.66	0.93	13.88
Law enforcement resource allocation	0.64	0.17	0.48	0.68	0.84	11.95
Efforts of law enforcement agency to arrest criminals	0.58	0.19	0.56	0.69	0.78	10.34
Security knowledge is improved by joining security activities	0.13	0.91	0.16	0.88	0.62	7.64
Security activities enhance security	0.12	0.90	0.15	0.84	0.87	13.13
Security activities improve collaboration among stakeholders	0.25	0.85	0.09	0.79	0.92	12.89
Importance of collaboration with law enforcement agency	0.00	0.85	0.17	0.75	0.84	12.26
Always joined security activities	0.20	0.84	0.03	0.75	0.97	13.62
Collaboration with law enforcement agency improves security	0.22	0.82	0.10	0.74	1.09	15.79
Security reporting highest priority	0.29	0.15	0.77	0.70	1.17	16.49
High security reporting frequency	0.17	0.02	0.77	0.62	1.03	14.11
Confidence in proper prosecution after reporting	0.41	0.18	0.71	0.71	1.00	12.43
Reporting incidents increases police resource allocation	0.43	0.38	0.59	0.67	0.93	12.48
Eigenvalues	5.10	4.86	3.04			
% of Variance	28.37	27.03	16.9			
α	0.93	0.94	0.83			
CR	0.92	0.83	0.85			
AVE	0.71	0.67	1.07			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Model Fit Indices: normed $\chi^2[NC] = 3.44$, Goodness of Fit Index = 0.82<(0.90), adjusted goodness of fit = 0.72 (<0.80), non-normed fit index = 0.94 (≥ 0.90), root mean square residual = 0.08 (≤ 0.10), root mean square error of approximation = 0.1 (≤ 0.10). All *t*-values are significant at p < 0.05 level.

Table 51 also shows the items' communalities after extraction, as does the Cronbach's alpha of the three components. The majority of the items have communalities greater than 0.7. In addition, the average communality is 0.72, which confirms the correct adoption of the Kaiser's criterion. The Cronbach's alphas of the three factors were all above 0.8, which verifies the high reliability of the scales identified with the factor analysis.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was run to further establish unidimensionality and construct validity. The values for the fit indices show that the model fits the data sufficiently well (Goodness of Fit [GFI]=0.82, adjusted goodness of fit [AGFI]=0.72, NNFI=0.94, CFI=0.96, root mean square residual [RMSR]=0.08, root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA]=0.1 and $\chi^2[NC] = 3.44$) (Table 51).

CFA was also used to assess discriminant validity. Significant differences of the χ^2 values for the fixed and free solutions testify to the distinctiveness of the two constructs (Table 52). In addition, the examination of the confidence intervals set to be equal to plus or minus two standard errors of the correlation coefficient of the pair of constructs, does not include the value of 1. Hence, discriminant validity was ensured.

Component 1	Component 2	Component 3
-		
162.32		
0.79-0.90	-	
1144.17	499.38	
0.26-0.51	0.36-0.59	-
	Component 1 - 162.32 0.79-0.90 1144.17 0.26-0.51	Component 1 Component 2 - - 162.32 - 0.79-0.90 - 1144.17 499.38 0.26-0.51 0.36-0.59

Table 52: Assessment of discriminant validity.

First Row: χ^2 differences between the fixed and free solution (significant at p<0.01 [1 df]). Second Row: confidence interval (none of them include 1.00)

6.2.2 H1a – Criminal Prosecution

The first cluster analysis was run to diversify respondents in terms of the perception of the efforts made by the law enforcement agency to prosecute criminals (component 1). The output of the hierarchical analysis identifies two clusters with a cutoff level of 20. Thereafter, cluster membership was assigned with the iterative K-means cluster approach and cross validation was performed. By dividing the sample into two random subsamples and performing a cluster analysis on each set, no differences were found between the patterns of the descriptive statistics.

Only one discriminant function ($R^2 = 0.79$) significantly distinguishes the two groups, $\Lambda = 0.37$, $\chi^2(8) = 167.27$, p < 0.001. Classification results show that overall 90.9% of the cross-validated grouped cases were correctly classified. More specifically, 91.7% of the cluster 1 cases and 90.1% of cluster 2 were correctly classified. The scores of the functions at group centroids unveil that the first cluster has a positive perception of the efforts made by the law enforcement agency to prosecute criminals, while the second has a negative perception. Table 53 reports the average scores of the two groups in relation to the variables aggregated in this factor. According to the table, the first group has scores between 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree* and 4, *Agree*, while the second group scores between 1, *Strongly Disagree* and 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*.

To check whether there were significant differences between the clusters, in terms of security budget and attacks borne, a MANOVA was performed. In addition, univariate analysis and discriminant analysis were performed to follow up the results of the MANOVA (Table 54). According to Pillai's trace, the groups' means significantly differ, V = 0.07, F(2, 168) = 6.63, p < 0.01 (Box's test not significant, p>0.05). In other words, the perception of the efforts made by the law enforcement agency has a significant effect on the security budget and number of security incidents suffered by transportation companies.

	Group	Ν	Mean	Std. Deviation
Effort of Programter to pupich ariminals	1	84	3.34	0.66
Enort of Prosecutor to pullish chillings	2	91	1.98	0.68
Quick arrest and process in court	1	84	3.44	0.86
	2	91	1.90	0.83
Divid animinal munichment	1	84	3.37	0.78
Rigid criminal punishment	2	91	1.81	0.74
Slave entropy and material to tanget	1	84	3.49	0.76
Slow criminal feturit to target	2	91	2.13	0.83
Denalty contance	1	84	3.38	0.75
Penany sentence	2	91	2.16	1.00
Increased confidence for law enforcement	1	84	3.56	0.83
efforts	2	91	2.36	0.92
Low onforcement recourse allocation	1	84	3.43	0.94
Law emolecement resource anocation	2	91	2.07	0.85
Efforts of law enforcement agency to arrest	1	84	3.41	0.88
criminals	2	91	2.31	0.90

Table 53: Summary of groups' scores on the factor variables used in Component 1.

Test	Value	F(2, 168)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Pillai's Trace	0.07	6.63	0.00	0.91
Wilks' Lambda	0.92	6.63	0.00	0.91
Hotelling's Trace	6.13	6.63	0.00	0.91
Roy's Largest Root	6.13	6.63	0.00	0.91
Between Subjects Effect	Mean Square	F(1,169)	Significance	Observed Power
Security Budget	15.79	4.87	0.03	0.59
Security Incidents	2.20	12.32	0.00	0.93

Table 54: MANOVA results H1a.

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

Moreover, separate univariate ANOVAs on the outcome variables revealed that the effort of the law enforcement agency has significant effects both on the security budget, F(1, 169) = 4.87, p < 0.05 and the security incidents separately, F(1, 169) = 12.32, p < 0.01 (Table 54).

The discriminant analysis identifies one discriminant function that significantly differentiates the groups of companies, $\Lambda = 0.94$, $\chi^2(2) = 9.52$, p < 0.01. The function correlates negatively with the security budget (r = -0.46) and negatively with the number of security incidents (r = 0.88). Hence, the position of the groups' centroids in relation to the discriminant function shows that the first group invests more on security and is affected by fewer security incidents.



Figure 36: Clusters means of security budget (left) and security incidents (right).

On the contrary, the second group, which had a negative perception of the efforts made by the law enforcement agency, invest less in security and is more affected by security incidents. This may also be depicted in Figure 36 where the means of the clusters are reported in relation to the magnitude of security budget and security incidents. The first group invests on average $M=\varepsilon 6,383$ (SD= $\varepsilon 9,687$) and has an average number of security incidents of M=4.69 (SD= $\varepsilon 6.85$).

The second group has an average security budget of M=0.250 (SD=0.581) while it is subject to a higher number of security incidents, M=7.81 (SD=7.53). Hence, the hypothesis is not rejected.

6.2.3 H1b - Resource Allocation

The second cluster analysis was run on the component related to the efforts made to allocate resources to combat cargo crime (third component of factor analysis). The output of the hierarchical analysis identifies two clusters with a cutoff level of 15. Cluster membership was assigned with the iterative K-means cluster approach and cross validation was performed. By dividing the sample into two random subsamples and performing a cluster analysis on each set, no differences were found between the patterns of the descriptive statistics. The discriminant analysis identified only one function that significantly distinguishes the groups, $\Lambda =$ $0.43, \chi^2(4) = 143.26, p < 0.001$. Classification results show that overall 89.7% of the crossvalidated grouped cases were correctly classified. More specifically, 93.6% of the cluster 1 cases and 85.2% of cluster 2 were correctly classified. Examining the groups' centroids in relation to this function it is possible to state that the first cluster has a negative perception about the impact of reporting activities on the resources allocated by the law enforcement agency. The second cluster is positively convinced that the correct amount of resources is allocated if organizations report security incidents. In Table 55, the means of the second group score between 3.45 (3, Neither Agree nor Disagree) and 4.04 (4, Agree and 5, Strongly Agree), while the first group has all the variables scoring below 3, Neither Agree nor Disagree.

	Group	Ν	Mean	Std. Deviation
Committy non-optime frequency	1	94	2.61	0.96
Security reporting frequency	2	81	4.04	0.71
	1	94	2.52	0.87
Security reporting priority in organization	2	81	3.94	0.82
	1	94	2.39	0.82
Confidence for prosecution after reporting	2	81	3.65	0.92
Deletionship and an end an end and the estimate	1	94	2.50	0.89
Relationship reporting and resource allocation	2	81	3.45	1.00

Table 55: Summary of groups' scores in relation to the factor variables used in component 3 (N=175).

By performing a MANOVA it was discovered that the factor concerning the perception of the resource allocation of the law enforcement agency has significant effects on the security budget

as well as on the number of incidents, Pillai's trace V = 0.11, F(2, 168) = 10.89, p < 0.01(Box's M test not significant, p>0.05). Separate univariate ANOVAs also showed significant relationships with the security budget (p<0.01) as well as with the amount of security incidents (p<0.01). The discriminant analysis unveiled that one function significantly distinguishes the two groups, $\Lambda = 0.92, \chi^2(2) = 14.44, p < 0.01$. This function correlates negatively with the number of incidents variable (r = -0.61) and shows at the same time a positive correlation with the security budget (r = 0.81).

Table 56:	MANOVA	Results H1b
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	Value	F (2,168)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Pillai's Trace	0.11	10.89	0.00	0.99
Wilks' Lambda	0.88	10.89	0.00	0.99
Hotelling's Trace	0.13	10.89	0.00	0.99
Roy's Largest Root	0.13	10.89	0.00	0.99
Between Subjects Effect	Mean Square	F(1,169)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Security Budget	55.60	18.49	0.00	0.99
Security Incidents	1.85	10.22	0.00	0.89

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

Hence, examining the position of the groups' centroids in relation to this function it was possible to deduce that the first cluster had lower security budget and higher number of incidents (Security Budget, M=€3,236, SD=€8,103; Security Incidents, M=7.43, SD=7.35). On the contrary, the second cluster had higher security budget and suffered fewer security incidents (Security Budget, M=€7,702, SD=€10,802; Security Incidents, M=4.95, SD=7.18) (Figure 37). Hence, the second hypothesis, H1b is not rejected.



Figure 37: Clusters means of security budget (left) and security incidents (right).

6.2.4 H1c - Involvement in Collaborative Activities

The final cluster analysis is conducted on the factor measuring the degree of involvement in collaborative activities and seminars organized by the law enforcement agency. The output of the hierarchical analysis identifies two clusters with a cutoff level of 12. Cluster membership was assigned with the iterative K-means cluster approach and cross validation was successfully verified. Two clusters are identified and the discriminant analysis identifies one function that significantly distinguishes the two groups, $\Lambda = 0.26$, $\chi^2(6) = 226.26$, p < 0.001. The scores of the groups' centroids reveal that, contrarily to the first group, the second is not convinced of the beneficial effects of collaborative activities organized by the law enforcement agency. Classification results show that overall 95.4% of the cross-validated grouped cases were correctly classified. More specifically, 97.1% of the cluster 1 cases and 92.9% of cluster 2 were correctly classified. Likewise, the groups' means in terms of the factor variables put into evidence show consistent differences between the groups (Table 57). All the variables scored by the first group are greater than 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*; the second group has scores very close to 1, Strongly Disagree. In addition, it may be observed that many respondents belong to the first group (N=105).

	Group	Ν	Mean	Std. Deviation
Effect of security activities		105	3.43	0.78
		70	1.51	0.65
Security knowledge improvement by joining security activities		105	3.63	0.78
		70	1.60	0.69
Security activities' influence on collaboration among stakeholders		105	3.53	0.79
		70	1.58	0.62
Turnerstance of colleboration with low or forecast comments	1	105	3.63	0.88
Importance of collaboration with law enforcement agency	2	70	1.84	0.95
Presence frequency at security activities		105	3.19	0.89
		70	1.47	0.61
Influence of collaboration with law enforcement agency		105	3.45	0.78
		70	1.81	0.94

Table 57: Summary of factor variables' scores of the two clusters.

The MANOVA confirms that the involvement in collaborative activities has a significant effect on the magnitude of security budget as well as on the number of security incidents, Pillai's trace V = 0.09, F(2, 168) = 8.49, p < 0.01 (Box's M test not significant, p>0.05). Separate univariate ANOVAs show significant relationships only with the variable measuring the security budget (p<0.01). The subsequent discriminant analysis reveals that one function significantly distinguishes the two groups, $\Lambda = 0.96$, $\chi^2(2) = 6.71$, p < 0.001. This function correlates positively with the security budget (r = 0.98) and negatively with the number of security incidents (r = -0.26). Examining the position of the groups' centroids in relation to the discriminant function, it is possible to conclude that the first group of companies, which was not involved in collaborative activities, invests more in security and is less affected by security incidents.

Table 58: MANOVA Results H1c.

Test	Value	F (2,168)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Pillai's Trace	0.09	8.49	0.00	0.96
Wilks' Lambda	0.90	8.49	0.00	0.96
Hotelling's Trace	0.10	8.49	0.00	0.96
Roy's Largest Root	0.10	8.49	0.00	0.96
Between Subjects Effect	Mean Square	F(1,169)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Security Budget	50.83	16.74	0.00	0.98
Security Incidents	0.20	1.05	0.30	0.17

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

The second group shows a negative correlation with the discriminant function. Hence this group that is not impressed by the collaborative activities organized by the police has invested less on security and is very affected by security incidents. This may also be noticed in Figure 38 where the groups' means in terms of security budget (Group 1, M=€6,860, SD=€10,943; Group 2, M=€2,982, SD=€6,889) and number of security incidents (Group 1, M=6.25, SD=7.87; Group 2, M=6.39, SD=6.60) are depicted. Hence, the hypothesis is not rejected.



Figure 38: Means of clusters in terms of security budget (left) and security incidents (right).

6.3 Distribution and Transport Operators

6.3.1 Factor and Reliability Analysis

Factor and reliability analysis is performed for the hypotheses formulated for this stakeholder but with the exception of the third hypothesis, where only one question is used to measure the length of the transportation chain.

A Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation was performed to discover underlying dimensions in the variables used in the questionnaire. Neither the correlation coefficients nor the determinant of the correlation matrix showed signs of multicollinearity problems. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure indicates the suitability of the sample size for the factor analysis, KMO=0.84, which is meritorious according to Kaiser (1974). In addition, the Bartlett's test of sphericity is significantly large ($\chi^2(210)=2468.42$, p<0.01) which implies that the correlation matrix is not an identity matrix (the correlations between items were sufficiently large). Examining the scree plot, and following Kaiser's criterion, a total of five factors explaining 74.3% of the variance were extracted. The interpretation of the variables clustered in the rotated component matrix (Table 59), results in the following factors:

- 1. Component 1. Willingness To Pay.
- 2. Component 2. Just In Time.
- 3. Component 3. On time deliveries and customer satisfaction worsening.
- 4. Component 4. Administrative costs of security routines.
- 5. Component 5. Working environment complexity due to security technologies.

Table 59 also shows the items' communalities after extraction as well as the Cronbach's alpha of the three components. According to the table, all except two items have communalities greater than 0.7. In addition, the average communality is 0.74, which confirms the correct adoption of the Kaiser's criterion. The Cronbach's alphas of the first four factors were all above 0.8, which verifies the high reliability of the scales identified with the factor analysis. Only the last item has a lower alpha coefficient suggesting the removal of the component.

	Component						Measureme	nt Model
	1	2	3	4	5	Communality	Std. Coefficient	t-Value
Freight rates increment acceptance	0.84	0.11	0.07	0.04	0.00	0.73	0.87	11.35
Marginal revenues too low to permit security investments	0.84	0.14	0.07	0.11	0.04	0.75	0.78	10.92
Magnitude of customers willing to pay for higher security	0.84	0.05	0.01	0.10	-0.01	0.72	1.04	13.49
Competitive advantage not compromised by higher security	0.76	0.10	0.03	0.10	-0.18	0.63	1.04	13.16
Security budget lack	0.72	0.23	0.22	-0.15	0.13	0.66	0.82	9.96
Security at low price	0.71	0.23	0.20	-0.10	0.19	0.64	0.91	11.87
Applications of JIT principles increase risk of security incidents	0.13	0.88	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.79	0.49	6.58
JIT and security have to be traded off	0.19	0.87	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.80	0.58	7.01
JIT increases goods flows on the network as well as security	0.22	0.84	-0.06	0.11	0.05	0.76	0.84	13.75
Doubts about increasing JIT or security	0.22	0.83	0.04	0.00	0.07	0.75	0.91	14.62
Security compromised by waiting time at terminals	-0.06	0.66	0.23	-0.14	-0.09	0.52	0.83	13.54
Security compromised by high degree of JIT	0.41	0.46	-0.10	0.05	0.23	0.44	0.84	13.22
On time deliveries worsened	0.06	0.02	0.92	0.15	0.07	0.87	0.75	14
Customer Service worsened	0.11	-0.06	0.84	0.23	0.09	0.79	0.83	15.35
Increased delivery delays	0.18	0.14	0.82	0.15	0.26	0.82	0.83	8.56
Customer satisfaction more resource and time demanding	0.11	0.09	0.81	0.30	0.12	0.78	0.68	6.47
Administrative costs increased	0.13	-0.03	0.27	0.85	0.00	0.82	0.89	13.67
Labor costs increased	0.04	-0.02	0.42	0.83	-0.01	0.87	0.91	14.28
Increased number of routines to be followed by operators	-0.01	0.07	0.19	0.72	0.54	0.85	0.87	11.35
Increased number of technologies to be learned	0.13	0.02	0.23	-0.06	0.87	0.82	0.78	10.92
Working environment too complex and resource demanding	-0.11	0.11	0.23	0.49	0.71	0.82	1.04	13.49
Eigen Values	4.19	3.74	3.41	2.45	1.79			
% of Variance	19.98	17.81	16.24	11.68	8.56			
α	0.89	0.87	0.92	0.85	0.68			
CR	0.90	0.87	0.75	0.85				
AVE	0.83	0.58	0.60	0.81				

Table 59: Summary of Exploratory Factor Analysis for distribution and transportation actors (N=175).

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Model Fit Indices: normed $\chi^2[NC] = 3.44$, Goodness of Fit Index = 0.82<(0.90), adjusted goodness of fit = 0.77 (<0.80), non-normed fit index = 0.93 (≥ 0.90), root mean square residual = 0.09 (≤ 0.10), root mean square error of approximation = 0.09 (≤ 0.10). All *t*-values are significant at p < 0.05 level.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was run to further establish unidimensionality and construct validity. The examination of modification indices suggested removing all the items of component 5 and also the last item of component 4. The final values for the fit indices show that the model fits the data sufficiently well (Goodness of Fit [GFI]=0.82, adjusted goodness of fit [AGFI]=0.77, NNFI=0.93, CFI=0.94, root mean square residual [RMSR]=0.09, root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA]=0.09 and χ^2 [*NC*] = 2.58).

CFA was also used to assess discriminant validity. Significant differences of the χ^2 values for the fixed and free solutions to testify the distinctiveness of the two constructs was detected only for the first three components: willingness to pay (WTP), Just In Time (JIT) and on time deliveries and customer satisfaction worsening (Component 3) (Table 60). Contrarily the last component does not show significant differences in terms of χ^2 values. In addition, the examination of the confidence intervals set to be equal to plus or minus two standard errors of the correlation coefficient of the pair of constructs, revealed the value of 1 only for the fourth construct (Component 4). Hence, discriminant validity could be ensured only for the first three constructs and consequently it was decided to remove the fourth component.

	Component 1	Component 2	Component 3	Component 4
Component 1	-			
Component 2	700.09 0.25-0.53	-		
Component 3	336.89 0.09-0.41	466.5 0.05-0.27	-	
Component 4	6.9 0.21-055	8.64 0.07-0.42	2.36 0.93-1.13	-

Table 60: Assessment of Discriminant Validity.

First Row: χ^2 differences between the fixed and free solution (significant at p<0.01 [1 df]). Second Row: confidence interval (only one of them include 1.00)

6.3.2 H2a. Willingness to Pay

The first cluster analysis was run to distinguish respondents in terms of their opinions about transport buyers' willingness to pay for security. The output of the analysis suggests that two clusters, with a cut off level of 22, should be selected. Cluster membership of the data was assigned with the iterative K-means cluster approach and cross-validation verified the reliability of the results.

The clusters are significantly distinguished by only one discriminant function, $\Lambda = 0.31, \chi^2(1) = 202.33, p < 0.001$. Classification results show that overall 98.3% of the cross-validated grouped cases were correctly classified. More specifically, 95.7% of the cluster 1 cases and 98% of cluster 2 were correctly classified. The scores of the functions at group centroids reveal that the first cluster is made of transportation companies whose customers are used to accept freight rate increments. On the contrary, the second cluster has experience with customers that are not willing to pay higher freight rates when security is enhanced. This is also depicted in Table 61, where the scores on the factor variables of the first group range between 2, *Disagree* and 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*. On the contrary, the second group has a much more considerable perception that customers are not interested in paying for higher security (scores between 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree* and 5, *Strongly Agree*).

	Group	Ν	Mean	Std. Deviation
Freight rate increment refusal	1	69	2.55	0.92
	2	106	4.35	0.82
Marginal revenues too low to permit security investments	1	69	2.43	0.96
	2	106	4.25	0.82
Low amount of customers willing to pay for higher security	1	69	2.55	0.98
	2	106	4.32	0.64
Competitive advantage not compromised by higher security	1	69	2.46	1.01
	2	106	3.92	0.93
Security budget lack	1	69	2.44	0.68
	2	106	3.63	0.99
Security at low price	1	69	2.55	0.93
	2	106	3.98	0.91

Table 61: Scores of the two groups in relation to the factor's variables.

To check whether there were significant differences between these two clusters, in terms of security budget and number of security incidents, a MANOVA was performed. None of the multivariate tests gave signs of significant relationship between the dependent variables and the willingness to pay factor used to differentiate the respondents, Pillai's trace V = 0.02, F(2, 168), p > 0.05 (Table 62). Despite this, the separate univariate ANOVAs are not significant for both the dependent variables (Table 62). Hence, the hypothesis, concerning the willingness to pay of transport buyers as a factor diversifying transport operators in relation to their security budgets and number of incidents, is rejected.

Test	Value	F (2,168)	Sig.	Observed Power(a)
Pillai's Trace	0.02	83.13	0.11	0.45
Wilks' Lambda	0.97	83.13	0.11	0.45
Hotelling's Trace	0.02	83.13	0.11	0.45
Roy's Largest Root	0.02	83.13	0.11	0.45
Between Subjects Effect	Mean Square	F(1,169)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Security Budget	173707321.1	1.87	0.17	0.27
Security Incidents	140.72	2.61	0.10	0.36

Table 62: MANOVA Results H2a.

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

6.3.3 H2b – Just In Time

The hierarchical cluster analysis identified two clusters with a cut off level of 18. The subsequent iterative K-means cluster determined the final cluster membership of the data. Moreover, the reliability of the cluster analysis was confirmed by applying cross-validation techniques.

The two clusters are significantly distinguished by only one discriminant function, $\Lambda = 0.35, \chi^2(1) = 177.49, p < 0.001$. The coefficient of the canonical function together with the scores of the functions at group centroids reveal that the group of companies belonging to the first cluster don't experience the trade-off between security and JIT as a problem. On the contrary, the second cluster has experience that the generic application of JIT principles may compromise security. Classification results show that overall 97.8% of the cross-validated grouped cases were correctly classified. More specifically, 96.4% of the cluster 1 cases and 98.3% of cluster 2 were correctly classified.

Table 63 illustrates the difference of the scores of the two groups in terms of the variables aggregated in the factor. As can be seen, the first group has lower scores than the second. In addition, the majority of respondents belong to the second group, which gives the impression that often customers are not willing to pay for higher security.

The MANOVA analysis (Table 64) discovered that two groups identified significantly differ, Pillai's trace V = 0.11, F(2, 168) = 10.36, p < 0.001 (Box's M test not significant, p>0.05). The separate univariate ANOVAs were also significant (p<0.05) (Table 64). By following up the MANOVA with a discriminant analysis, one discriminant function was found to significantly distinguish the clusters, $\Lambda = 0.95, \chi^2(2) = 8.34, p < 0.05$. Table 63: Summary of factor variables' scores of the two clusters.

	Group	Ν	Mean	Std. Deviation
	1	76	2.17	0.79
Applications of J11 principles increase fisk for security incidents	2	99	3.50	0.69
	1	76	2.13	0.75
JIT and security have to be traded off	2	99	3.52	0.76
UT increases goods flows on the nativally as well as security	1	76	2.17	0.68
JTT increases goods nows on the network as wen as security	2	99	3.57	0.70
Doubte about increasing UT or converts.	1	76	2.07	0.80
Double about increasing J11 of security	2	99	3.40	0.74
Security communication time of terminals	1	76	1.76	0.81
Security compromised by waiting time at terminals	$\begin{array}{c c} 1 & 7 \\ \hline 1 & 7 \\ 2 & 9 \\ \hline 1 & 7 \\ 1 &$	99	2.98	1.05
Construction of her bight design of HT	1	76	2.87	1.10
Security compromised by high degree of J11	2	99	3.59	0.80

Table 64: MANOVA R	Results H2b.
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Test	Value	F(2,168)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Pillai's Trace	0.11	10.36	0.00	0.98
Wilks' Lambda	0.89	10.36	0.00	0.98
Hotelling's Trace	0.12	10.36	0.00	0.98
Roy's Largest Root	0.12	10.36	0.00	0.98
Between Subjects Effect	Mean Square	F(1,169)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Security Budget	46.52	15.19	0.00	0.97
Security Incidents	2.24	12.79	0.00	0.94

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

The correlations between the outcomes and the discriminant functions revealed that the security budget positively correlated with the discriminant function (r = 0.49). Contrarily the number of security incidents correlates in a negative manner (r = -0.86). The position of the groups' centroids in relation to this discriminant function shows that the first cluster invests more in security and is less affected by security incidents. The second cluster, experiencing that the application of security jeopardizes their JIT efficiency, invests less and is more affected by security incidents. The differences in terms of security budgets and security incidents of the two groups may also be observed in Figure 39 where the first group shows a higher budget allocated for security (Group 1, M=€6,498, SD=€10,020; Group 2, M=€4,338, SD=€9,324) and is affected by fewer security incidents (Group 1, M=4.72, SD=7.21; Group 2, M=7.49, SD=7.28). Hence, the hypothesis is tenable.



Figure 39: Means of clusters in relation to security budget (left) and number of security incidents (right).

6.3.4 H2c – Length of Distribution Network

To test this hypothesis, only one variable was used to determine the length of the distribution chain. Hence, no factor, reliability and cluster analysis was run. A MANOVA analysis, using Pillai's trace, unveiled that the length of the distribution network has significant effects on the budget placed by industries to secure their assets as well as on the number of security incidents, V = 0.14, F(2, 163) = 3.16, p < 0.01.

Test	Value	F (2,163)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Pillai's Trace	0.14	3.16	0.00	0.97
Wilks' Lambda	0.86	3.21	0.00	0.97
Hotelling's Trace	0.16	3.27	0.00	0.97
Roy's Largest Root	0.14	5.93	0.00	0.98
Between Subjects Effect	Mean Square	F (4,164)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Security Budget	16.01	5.30	0.00	0.97
Security Incidents	0.14	0.71	0.58	0.23

Table 65: MANOVA Results H2c.

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

Separate univariate analysis, confirms the significance of distribution network length only on the security budget, p < 0.01, but not on the security incidents, p > 0.05. Post-hoc tests reveal, from the viewpoint of the magnitude of security budget, that:

- Urban distribution networks significantly differ from national (p<0.05), continental (0.01) and worldwide (0.05).
- 2. Regional distribution networks significantly differ from worldwide networks (p<0.05).
3. National transportation networks significantly differ only from worldwide networks (p<0.001)

Post-hoc tests, examining the relationship with the number of security incidents, don't show any significant differences among the groups. By running a discriminant analysis, two discriminant functions significantly differentiate the length of distribution networks, $\Lambda = 0.86$, $\chi^2(8) =$ 24.96, p < 0.01. The correlations between outcomes and the discriminant functions indicate that the security budget variable loads highly on the first function (r = 0.93), and the security incidents on the second (r = 0.99). The consequent discriminant function plot shows that the first function distinguishes urban, continental and worldwide from regional and national transportation networks. The second function discriminates urban and regional from national, continental and worldwide networks. The investments of the companies put into relation with the distribution length variable may be observed also in Figure 40. According to the left diagram of the figure it is possible to depict a positive relationship between the security budget and the length of the distribution network. Also in the left diagram it is possible to distinguish regional and national networks from the remaining three: urban, continental and worldwide. However, according to this figure urban operators working in continental and worldwide contexts experience on average more security incidents than those working in regional and national areas. This implies that the higher investments in security don't correspond to proportionate decrements of security incidents. Hence, the hypothesis is not tenable.



Figure 40: Distribution lenght variable in relation to security budget (left) and number of incidents (right).

6.3.5 H2d – Performance

The hierarchical cluster analysis was run to diversify respondents in terms of the performanceworsening factor (components 4 and 5 were removed in view of the CFA results). The output of this analysis identifies two groups and cluster membership is assigned by means of the iterative K-means approach. Moreover, cross-validation confirms the reliability of the cluster analysis. One discriminant function significantly distinguishes the groups, $\Lambda = 0.68$, $\chi^2(1) = 65.55$, p < 0.01. The scores of the groups' centroids reveal that, the first group strongly disagree that the introduction of security may worsen efficiency. The second group also disagrees, but not as strongly as the first. This may also be noticed when examining the groups' scores on the variables used in the performance-worsening factor (Table 66). The first group has average scores between 1, *Strongly Disagree* and 2, *Disagree*. On the contrary, the second group believes that customer service and on time deliveries will worsen (mean scores below 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*), while labor and administrative costs will increase (mean scores above 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*).

	Group	Ν	Mean	Std. Deviation
Customer Service worsened	1	101	1.21	0.47
	2	74	2.35	0.86
On time deliveries worsened	1	101	1.23	0.49
	2	74	2.36	0.95
Labor costs increased	1	101	1.33	0.63
	2	74	3.59	0.96
Administrative costs increased	1	101	1.70	1.05
	2	74	3.79	0.88

Table 66: Summary of groups' means in relation to the performance factors.

To check whether there were significant differences, in terms of security budget and attacks borne, among these four clusters, a MANOVA was performed. This test didn't reveal any significant effect of performance losses perceptions on the security budget and number of security incidents (p>0.05) (Table 64). The subsequent separate univariate ANOVAs confirmed the results of the MANOVA. Hence, the perception of performance worsening doesn't seem to influence the investments in security or the number of security incidents. Consequently, this hypothesis is rejected (Table 67).

Test	Value	F(2,168)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Pillai's Trace	0.01	0.07	0.92	0.06
Wilks' Lambda	0.99	0.07	0.92	0.06
Hotelling's Trace	0.00	0.07	0.92	0.06
Roy's Largest Root	0.00	0.07	0.92	0.06
Between Subjects Effect	Mean Square	F(1,169)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Security Budget	0.08	0.02	0.87	0.05
Security Incidents	0.01	0.07	0.78	0.05

Table 67: MANOVA Results H2d.

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

6.4 Business Security Certifications

To test this hypothesis, only one binary variable was used to determine whether companies make use of business security certifications (0= the company doesn't comply with any business security certifications, 1= the company complies with a business security certification). By running a MANOVA, none of the multivariate tests show that the compliance with security business certifications has significant effects on the security budget or on the number of security incidents (p>0.05). Similarly, the separate univariate analyses, were not significant and therefore confirm the results of the MANOVA. By examining the average scores of the security budget and incidents related to the two groups, we found that the group complying with some security certifications shows higher budgets that do not however significantly differ from the group of companies without security certifications. Despite the higher investments, the first group shows also shows a slightly higher number of security incidents suffered. Hence this hypothesis is rejected.

6.5 Insurance Companies

6.5.1 Factor and Reliability Analysis

A Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation was performed to identify different dimensions in the variables used in the remaining two areas of questions in the questionnaire. Examining the correlation coefficients as well as the determinant of the correlation matrix no multicollinearity problems were detected. In addition, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO=0.85, excellent according to Kaiser (1974)) indicates the suitability of the sample size for the factor analysis. In addition, the Bartlett's test of sphericity is significantly large

 $(\chi^2(66)=1181.81, p<0.01)$, which implies that the correlation matrix is not an identity matrix (the correlations between items were sufficiently large).

Examining the scree plot, and following Kaiser's criterion, a total of two factors explaining about 61.7% of the variance were extracted. The interpretation of the variables clustered in the rotated component matrix (Table 68), results in the following factors:

- Component 1. Premium Discounts.
- Component 2. Insurance Coverage.

Table 68 shows also the items' communalities after extraction as well as the Cronbach's alpha of the three components. The majority of the items have communalities greater than 0.7. In addition, the average communality is 0.62.

The Cronbach's alpha of the second component was lower than 0.7, which could be considered acceptable (Hair et al., 2009). However, the examination of the Item-Total statistics table revealed that the alpha could be increased to 0.81 by removing the last variable used in the construct. Despite this, the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) that was run to further establish unidimensionality and construct validity, indicates that the model fits the data very well (Goodness of Fit [GFI]=0.88, adjusted goodness of fit [AGFI]=0.83, NNFI=0.94, CFI=0.95, root mean square residual [RMSR]=0.08, root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA]=0.09 and $\chi^2[NC] = 2.59$). So the last item of the second component was not removed.

CFA was also used to assess discriminant validity. Significant differences of the χ^2 values for the fixed and free solutions testify the distinctiveness of the two constructs (Table 72). In addition, the examination of the confidence intervals that were set to be equal to plus or minus two standard errors of the correlation coefficient of the pair of constructs does not include the value of 1. Hence, discriminant validity was ensured.

	Component			Measurement Model		
	1	2	Communality	Std. Coefficient	t-Value	
Premium discounts agreements are never a loss of time	0.88	-0.14	0.80	0.69	9.09	
Application of security routines gives premium discounts	0.86	-0.11	0.76	0.74	10.02	
Premium discounts always offered if working actively with security	0.85	-0.18	0.77	0.63	7.37	
Installation of security technologies gives premium discounts	0.83	-0.17	0.72	0.79	9.62	
Easiness to agree on premium discounts	0.83	-0.16	0.72	0.96	11.7	
Our organization gets premium discounts	0.80	-0.19	0.69	0.65	3.19	
Insurances cover all economic losses	-0.24	0.80	0.70	0.89	11.91	
Comprehensive usage of insurance	-0.23	0.74	0.60	0.91	12.84	
Insurances cover security losses	-0.15	0.73	0.55	1.07	14.29	
Insurances cover direct and indirect security losses	-0.24	0.70	0.55	0.94	12.76	
Usage of captive insurances	-0.13	0.65	0.42	1.01	13.47	
Security incidents are always fully covered by insurances	0.05	0.39	0.15	0.97	13.8	
Eigen Values	4.47	2.93				
% of Variance	37.31	24.42				
Alpha	0.92	0.68				
CR	0.92	0.68				
AVE	0.93	0.67				

Table 68: Summary of exploratory Factor Analysis for insurance companies actor (N=175).

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Model Fit Indices: normed $\chi^2[NC] = 2.59$, Goodness of Fit Index = 0.88<(0.90), adjusted goodness of fit = 0.83 (>0.80), non-normed fit index = 0.94 (≥ 0.90), root mean square residual = 0.08 (≤ 0.10), root mean square error of approximation = 0.09 (≤ 0.10). All *t*-values are significant at p < 0.05 level.

Table 69: Assessment of Discriminant Validity.

Component 1 Component 2

Component 1

Component 2 279.3 (-0.62)-(-0.35)

First Row: χ^2 differences between the fixed and free solution (significant at p < 0.01 [1 df]). Second Row: confidence interval (only one of them include 1.00)

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6.5.2 H4a – Insurance Coverage

A hierarchical cluster analysis was run to diversify respondents in terms of the factor concerning the exclusive usage of insurance to cover economic losses generated by security incidents. The output of the analysis identifies two clusters, with a cut off level of 12. Cluster membership of the data was assigned with the iterative K-means cluster approach and cross-validation verified the reliability of the results.

The clusters are significantly distinguished by only one discriminant function, $\Lambda = 0.37, \chi^2(1) = 169.18, p < 0.001$. Classification results show that overall 97.1% of the cross-validated grouped cases were correctly classified. More specifically, 92.8% of the cluster 1 cases and 99.3% of cluster 2 were correctly classified. The scores of the functions at group centroids reveal that the first cluster is made of transportation companies that don't believe that insurances premiums and excesses are the optimal way to cover security losses (instead of security solutions). On the contrary, the second cluster believes that insurances may in general be used to cover losses related to security incidents. This may also be depicted in Table 70 where the scores of the first group are between 1, *Strongly Disagree* and 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*. The scores of the second group are instead between 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree* and 4, *Agree*.

	Group	Ν	Mean	Std. Deviation
	1	69	2.54	0.90
insurances cover security losses	2	106	3.75	0.84
Commentaria and a finance	1	69	2.29	0.77
Comprenensive usage of insurance	2	106	3.58	0.86
	1	69	1.93	0.85
Usage of captive insurances	2	106	3.15	1.04
The second second in the description of the second	1	69	2.49	1.16
insurances cover direct and indirect security losses	2	106	3.84	0.74
Insurances server all seconomic lasses	1	69	2.07	0.77
insurances cover an economic losses	2	106	3.74	0.95
	1	69	1.91	0.82
Security incluents are always fully covered by insurances	2	106	3.39	3.01

Table 70: Summary of factor variables scores for the two groups.

To check whether there were significant differences, in terms of security budget and attacks borne, between these two clusters, a MANOVA was performed. None of the multivariate tests was significant, indicating no significant effects of the usage of insurances on security budget and security incidents (p>0.05). Separate univariate ANOVAs were also not significant. Hence, the hypothesis is rejected (Table 71).

Test	Value	F (2,168)	Sig.	Observed Power(a)
Pillai's Trace	0.03	2.60	0.07	0.51
Wilks' Lambda	0.97	2.60	0.07	0.51
Hotelling's Trace	0.31	2.60	0.07	0.51
Roy's Largest Root	0.31	2.60	0.07	0.51
Between Subjects Effect	Mean Square	F(1,169)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Security Budget	141210389.5	1.51	0.22	0.23
Security Incidents	198.57	3.71	0.05	0.48

Table 71: MANOVA Results H4a.

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

6.5.3 H4b – Premium Discounts

The cluster analysis was run to diversify respondents in terms of the factor concerning premium discounts agreements between transportation and insurance companies. The output of the analysis identifies two clusters with a cut off level of 22. Cluster membership of the data was assigned with the iterative K-means cluster approach and cross-validation verified the reliability of the results. A discriminant analysis was run to enhance the profile description of these two clusters in terms of the premium discounts factor. Only one discriminant function significantly distinguishes the two groups, $\Lambda = 0.31$, $\chi^2(1) = 201.95$, p < 0.01. Classification results show that overall 99.4% of the cross-validated grouped cases were correctly classified. More specifically, 97.6% of the cluster 1 cases and 100% of cluster 2 were correctly classified. The scores of the functions at group centroids reveal that the second cluster is made of transportation companies that easily obtain premium discounts when enhancing security. On the contrary, the first cluster experiences their business relation with insurance companies as an unprofitable activity that is not leading to premium discounts. According to Table 72 the second group scores higher on the variables used in the premium discount factor. All the variables are above 3, Neither Agree nor Disagree. On the contrary, the first group that has a tendency to not benefit from premium discounts has scores between 2, Disagree and 3, Neither Agree nor Disagree. Finally, it is also possible to notice that first group is smaller than the second.

Table 72: Summary of factor's variables for the two clusters.

	Group	Ν	Mean	Std. Deviation
		84	1.97	0.91
Our organization gets premium discounts	2	91	3.50	0.80
Essings to same an promium discounts	1	84	1.73	0.65
Easiness to agree on premium discounts	2	91	3.26	0.94
Denvis and the second	1	84	1.86	0.85
Premium discounts agreements are never a loss of time	2	91	3.62	0.87
Installation of consistent of the lastice sizes around the surface	1	84	2.02	0.85
instantion of security technologies gives premium discounts	2	91	3.68	0.79
Amplication of accurity routings sives promium discounts	1	84	1.94	0.87
Application of security routines gives premium discounts	2	91	3.73	0.73
Premium discounts always offered if working actively with security		84	1.93	0.82
		91	3.56	0.76

To check whether there were significant differences, in terms of security budget and attacks borne, between these two clusters, a MANOVA was performed. According to the Pillai's trace, the groups' means significantly differ, V = 0.21, F(2, 168) = 23.07, p < 0.001 (Box's M test not significant, p>0.05).

Table 73: MANOVA Results H4	ŀb.
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Test	Value	F (2,168)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Pillai's Trace	0.21	23.07	0.00	0.99
Wilks' Lambda	0.78	23.07	0.00	0.99
Hotelling's Trace	0.27	23.07	0.00	0.99
Roy's Largest Root	0.27	23.07	0.00	0.99
Between Subjects Effect	Mean Square	F(1,169)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Security Budget	119.33	45.36	0.00	0.99
Security Incidents	1.81	10.24	0.00	0.88

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

Hence, the factor differentiating respondents in terms of premium discounts agreements has a significant effect on the security budget and number of security incidents experienced by transportation companies. Separate univariate ANOVAs on the outcome variables revealed that the premium discount factor has significant effects both on the security budget, F(1, 169) = 119.33, p < 0.001 and on the security incidents, F(1, 169) = 10.24, p < 0.001. The MANOVA was followed up with a discriminant analysis, which revealed one discriminant function, $\Lambda = 0.89, \chi^2(2) = 19.14, p < 0.001$. This function correlates positively with the security budget (r=0.88) and negatively with the number of security incidents (r=-0.43). Hence,

the position of the groups' centroids in relation to the discriminant function shows that the second group invests more on security and manages to keep the number of security incidents low. On the contrary, the first group, which experiences more difficulties in obtaining premium discounts on insurances, invests less in security and is more affected by security incidents. These conclusions may also be drawn from the examination of Figure 41, where the average security budgets and incidents are reported for the two groups identified in this section. The first group has an average investment higher than the second group (Group 1, M=€2,395, SD=€6,143; Group 2, M=€8,052, SD=€11,499). At the same time, the first group suffers fewer security incidents than the second (Group 1, M=7.46, SD=7.36; Group 2, M=5.19, SD=7.22) (Figure 41). Hence, the hypothesis is not rejected.



Figure 41: Means of security budget (left) and security incidents (right).

6.6 Security Providers

6.6.1 Factor and Reliability Analysis

A Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation was performed to identify different dimensions in the variables used to determine how security solutions providers influence the insecurity of distribution networks. Examining the correlation coefficients as well as the determinant of the correlation matrix, no multicollinearity problems were detected. The same results were also confirmed by examining the anti-image matrices. In addition, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO=0.91, marvelous according to Kaiser, 1974) indicates the suitability of the sample size for the factor analysis. In addition, the Bartlett's test of sphericity is

significantly large ($\chi^2(45)=1122.24$, p<0.01) which implies that the correlation matrix is not an identity matrix (the correlations between items were sufficiently large).

Examining the scree plot, and following Kaiser's criterion, a total of three factors explaining 70.73% of the variance were extracted. The interpretation of the variables clustered in the rotated component matrix (Table 74), results in the following factors:

- Component 1. Uncertainty of Security Prototypes.
- Component 2. Security Expensiveness.

Table 74 shows the items' communalities after extraction as well as the Cronbach's alpha of the three components. Of the 10 items used in the factor analysis, 6 had communalities equal or greater than 0.7. The remaining 4 items were below 0.7 but not lower than 0.64. In addition, the average communality is 0.71, which confirms the correct adoption of the Kaiser's criterion. The Cronbach's alphas of the three factors were all around 0.9, which verifies the high reliability of the scales identified with the factor analysis.

A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was run to further establish unidimensionality and construct validity. The fit indices indicate that the model fits the data very well (Goodness of Fit [GFI]=0.93, adjusted goodness of fit [AGFI]=0.88, NNFI=0.98, CFI=0.98, root mean square residual [RMSR]=0.03, root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA]=0.07 and $\chi^2[NC] = 1.96$) (Table 74).

CFA was also used to assess discriminant validity. Significant differences of the χ^2 values for the fixed and free solutions testify to the distinctiveness of the two constructs (Table 75). In addition, the examination of the confidence intervals that was set to be equal to plus or minus two standard errors of the correlation coefficient of the pair of constructs, does not include the value of 1. Hence, discriminant validity was ensured.

Table 74: Summary of exploratory factor analysis for Security Solutions Providers (N=175).

	Component			Measureme	nt Model
Item	1	2	Communality	Std. Coefficient	t-Values
Existing security measures are difficult to integrate	0.83	0.25	0.75	0.6	11.25
Security devices are difficult to integrate with our processes	0.81	0.31	0.75	0.81	13.25
Too much time and work to integrate advanced security solutions	0.79	0.36	0.75	0.73	12.15
Security prototypes don't enhance security and don't become products	0.76	0.33	0.69	0.83	12.66
Security short pay off is not ready for industrial usage	0.73	0.32	0.64	0.81	12.85
Security costs become too high when installing on the whole fleet of vehicles	0.26	0.79	0.70	0.83	11.46
Payoff of the most efficient security devices is too long	0.27	0.78	0.69	0.92	13.24
Security solutions we can afford cannot stop criminals	0.35	0.78	0.73	0.94	13.08
Most effective security is too expensive	0.30	0.76	0.68	0.77	11.39
Security budget not enough to buy most effective devices	0.39	0.75	0.71	0.86	11.31
Eigenvalues	3.58	3.5			
% of Variance	35.82	34.91			
α	0.89	0.89			
CR	0.90	0.89			
AVE	0.64	0.75			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Model Fit Indices: normed $\chi^2[NC] = 1.96$, Goodness of Fit Index = 0.93>(0.90), adjusted goodness of fit = 0.88 (>0.80), non-normed fit index = 0.98 (≥ 0.90), root mean square residual = 0.03 (≤ 0.10), root mean square error of approximation = 0.07 (≤ 0.10). All *t*-values are significant at p < 0.05 level.

Table 75: Assessment of Discriminant Validity.

Component 1 Component 2

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Component 1

Component 2 187.25 0.69-0.85

First Row: χ^2 differences between the fixed and free solution (significant at p < 0.01 [1 df]). Second Row: confidence interval (only one of them include 1.00)

6.6.2 H5a. Uncertainty of Security Prototypes

The initial hierarchical cluster analysis was run to diversify respondents in terms of their perception about the impact of security prototypes on security as well as the problems experienced concerning the integration of the systems within the organization. The output of the analysis identifies two clusters with a cut off level of 10. The membership of the data with the two clusters was assigned with the iterative K-means cluster approach. In addition, the reliability of the cluster analysis was verified by means of cross-validation. The clusters are significantly distinguished by one discriminant function, $\Lambda = 0.46$, $\chi^2(5) = 133.30$, p < 0.001. Classification results show that overall 98.3% of the cross-validated grouped cases were correctly classified. 98.2% of the cases assigned to cluster 1 and 95.8% of cases to cluster 2 were correctly classified. The scores of the functions at group centroids indicated that the first group of companies agree with the fact that, in general, security prototypes are not effective against transport crime and are difficult to integrate. On the contrary, the second group of companies seems not to have experienced this issue.

	Group	Ν	Mean	Std. Deviation
Security short pay off is not ready for industrial usage	1	103	3.54	0.72
	2	72	2.77	0.70
Too much time and work to integrate advanced security solutions	1	103	3.77	0.79
	2	72	2.75	0.89
Security prototypes don't enhance security and don't become	1	103	3.65	0.83
products	2	72	2.65	0.73
Existing accurity managing and difficult to integrate	1	103	3.67	0.78
Existing security measures are difficult to integrate	2	72	2.33	0.77
	1	103	3.71	0.86
Security devices are difficult to integrate with our processes	2	72	2.49	0.68

Table 76: Scores of the two clusters on the variables used to measure the uncertainty of security prototypes.

In Table 76, the means and standard deviations of the variables used for the first factor are reported for each of the two groups. The first cluster is more pessimistic and has a pronounced tendency to agree with the statements in the questionnaire (all the means are between 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*, and 4, *Agree*). The second group of respondents has a moderate tendency to disagree with the fact that security is not effective on crime and it may not likely be integrated in their organization (means are between 2, *Disagree* and 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*).

To check whether there were significant differences between the clusters, in terms of security budget and attacks borne, a MANOVA was performed. All of the multivariate tests available in SPSS show that there is a significant difference between the groups (Table 77). In particular, according to Pillai's trace, the groups' means significantly differ, V = 0.11, F(2, 168) = 10.23, p < 0.001. By running separate univariate ANOVAs, it was found that the groups significantly differ only in terms of amount of security budget (p<0.01), but not in terms of security incidents (Table 77). A discriminant analysis identified two discriminant functions that significantly differentiated the two groups of companies, $\Lambda = 0.92$, $\chi^2(2) = 16.60$, p < 0.001. The discriminant function strongly correlates in a positive manner with the security budget variable (r = 0.95) and negatively with the variable measuring the security incidents (r = -0.22). Examining the position of the groups' centroids in relation to the discriminant functions makes it possible to draw the conclusion that the first group of companies invests less in security and is more affected by security incidents.

Test	Value	F(2,168)	Significance	Observed Power (a)
Pillai's Trace	0.11	10.29	0.00	0.98
Wilks' Lambda	0.89	10.29	0.00	0.98
Hotelling's Trace	0.12	10.29	0.00	0.98
Roy's Largest Root	0.12	10.29	0.00	0.98
Between Subjects effect	Mean square	F(1, 169)	Significance	Observed Power (a)
Security Budget	57.07	19.03	0.00	0.99
Security Incidents	0.06	0.32	0.56	0.08

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

Figure 42 illustrates the mean security budget (left diagram) and number of incidents (right diagram) of the two clusters identified. Hence, the interpretation of the diagrams enhances the results of the analysis by clearly depicting that the first group of companies invests less (M=€3,036, SD=€7,416) than the second (M=€8,500, SD=€11,508). The same figure also shows that the first group is slightly more affected by security incidents; however differences between the groups are not significant (Group 1: M=6.83, SD=6.33; Group 2: M=6.26, SD=8.12). Despite this, in view of the MANOVA results, the hypothesis is considered to be tenable.



Figure 42: Mean of Security Budget (left) and number of security incidents (right).

6.6.3 H5b. Security Expensiveness

The hierarchical cluster analysis was run to diversify respondents in terms of their perception about the expensiveness of security measures. The output of the analysis identifies two clusters with a cut off level of 26. Cluster membership was assigned by means of an iterative K-Means cluster analysis. In addition, cross-validation confirmed the reliability of the cluster analysis. The two clusters are significantly distinguished by one discriminant function, $\Lambda = 0.35$, $\chi^2(5) =$ 181.68, p < 0.001. Examining the scores of the functions at group centroids it was found that the first group of companies doesn't believe that existing security devices are too expensive, while the second cluster has the opposite opinion.

	Group	Ν	Mean	Std. Deviation
Most offective security is too expansive	1	91	2.86	0.90
Nost effective security is too expensive	2	84	4.29	0.72
Security solutions we can afford cannot stop criminals		91	2.86	0.99
Security solutions we can arrord cannot stop criminals	2	84	4.15	0.77
Security budget not enough to buy most effective devices	1	91	2.84	1.01
	2	84	4.08	0.88
Payoff of the most efficient security devices is too long	1	91	2.86	0.85
Payon of the most enficient security devices is too long	2	84	4.10	0.77
Security costs become too high when installing on the whole	1	91	2.96	0.98
fleet of vehicles	2	84	4.51	0.63

Table 78: Scores of the two clusters on the variable measuring security expensiveness.

The first cluster has a more positive perception of costs and efficaciousness of security devices (means between 2, *Disagree* and 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*). On the contrary, the second

cluster is strongly convinced that existing security solutions are too expensive and not effective against cargo crime (means are between 4, *Agree* and 5, *Strongly Agree*).

A MANOVA was run to determine whether there were significant differences between the clusters, in terms of security budget and attacks suffered. Despite the differences of the groups' means shown in Table 78, none of the multivariate tests showed significant differences between the groups (p>0.05). In addition, the separate univariate ANOVAs were non-significant both in terms of the security budget and of the number of security incidents, p>0.05.

Test	Value	F(2,168)	Significance	Observed Power (a)
Pillai's Trace	0.02	1.75	0.17	0.36
Wilks' Lambda	0.98	1.75	0.17	0.36
Hotelling's Trace	0.21	1.75	0.17	0.36
Roy's Largest Root	0.21	1.75	0.17	0.36
Between Subjects effect	Mean square	F(1, 169)	Significance	Observed Power (a)
Security Budget	268604123.6	2.90	0.09	0.39
Security Incidents	34.169	0.62	0.42	0.12

Table 79: MANOVA results H5b.

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

6.7 Criminals

6.7.1 Factor and Reliability Analysis

A Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation was performed to identify different dimensions in the variables used to determine how the opportunistic behaviors of criminals may influence the insecurity of transport networks. Examining the anti-image matrices, as well as the correlation coefficients and the determinant of the correlation matrix no multicollinearity problems were detected. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO=0.89, meritorious according to Kaiser, 1974) indicates the suitability of the sample size for the factor analysis. In addition, the Bartlett's test of sphericity is significantly large (χ^2 (10)=505.12, p<0.01). Hence, the correlations between items were sufficiently large indicating that the correlation matrix is not an identity matrix. The scree plot, in accordance with the Kaiser's criterion, revealed that only one factor explaining about 71.6% of the variance could be extracted. This factor may be interpreted as the perception of the companies about the opportunistic behavior of criminals. In other words this factor explains the inefficacy of security against the skills of criminals who may quickly learn and deceive devices as well as take advantage of insiders to penetrate a target and

perpetrate their attacks. The majority of the items had communality greater than 0.7 (Table 80). In addition, the average communality is 0.71, which confirms the correct adoption of the Kaiser's criterion. The Cronbach's alpha of the factor was 0.9, which indicated the high reliability of the scale identified with the factor analysis (Table 80).

A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was run to further establish unidimensionality and construct validity. The fit indices indicate that the model fits the data optimally (Goodness of Fit [GFI]=0.99, adjusted goodness of fit [AGFI]=0.98, NNFI=1.01, CFI=1, root mean square residual [RMSR]=0.01, root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA]=0.00 and $\chi^2[NC] = 0.44$) (Table 80).

6.7.2 H6. Perception of Opportunistic Behavior

A hierarchical cluster analysis was run to diversify respondents in terms of the perception about the inefficiency of security against criminals' skills in deceiving the security solutions (both devices and routines). The output of the analysis identified two clusters with a cut off level of 16. By means of the iterative K-means cluster analysis, group membership was assigned to the data. In addition, cross-validation techniques ensured the reliability of the results. One discriminant function, $\Lambda = 0.35$, $\chi^2(1) = 180.57$, p < 0.001. 97.3% of the cases belonging to cluster 1 and 94.5% of cases in cluster 2 were correctly classified by the discriminant function. Examining the scores of the functions at group centroids it was found that the first group of companies, contrarily to the second, doesn't perceive the opportunistic behavior of criminals as an unsolvable issue. The same conclusions may be achieved by examining the groups' scores of the variables used in the factor (Table 81). Table 80: Summary of exploratory factor analysis for Criminals.

	Component 1 Communality		Measureme	nt Model
	Component 1	Communanty	Std. Coefficient	t-Values
Security protection doesn't stop criminals	0.89	0.78	0.87	13.95
No technologies or routines may efficiently stop cargo crime	0.87	0.75	0.84	11.89
Skilled criminal groups make security useless	0.84	0.71	0.88	12.2
Security solution is easily deceived by criminals	0.83	0.69	0.81	11.01
Use of insiders makes security useless	0.80	0.64	0.89	13.14
Eigenvalues	3.58			
% of Variance	71.6			
α	0.9			
CR	0.89			
AVE	0.73			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Model Fit Indices: normed $\chi^2[NC] = 0.44$, Goodness of Fit Index = 0.99>(0.90), adjusted goodness of fit = 0.98 (>0.80), non-normed fit index = 1.01 (≥ 0.90), root mean square residual = 0.01 (≤ 0.10), root mean square error of approximation = 0.00 (≤ 0.10). All *t*-values are significant at p < 0.05 level.

Table 81: Scores of the two clusters on t	he variables measuring criminals' behaviors.
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	Group	Ν	Mean	Std. Deviation
Security Protection description ariminals	1	76	2.92	0.88
Security Protection doesn't stop criminals	2	96	4.35	0.56
Converte solution is again descined by priminals	1	74	2.69	0.81
Security solution is easily deceived by criminals	2	96	4.23	0.75
	1	74	2.73	0.93
Skilled criminal groups make security useless	2	93	4.25	0.78
Use of invidence makes as write england	1	76	2.70	0.94
Use of insiders makes security useless	2	91	4.18	0.77
	1	73	2.64	0.82
No technologies of routines may efficiently stop cargo crime	2	93	4.27	0.68

A MANOVA was run to determine whether there were significant differences between these two clusters, in terms of security budget and attacks borne (Table 82). According to Pillai's trace, the groups' means significantly differ, V = 0.10, F(2, 168) = 9.85, p < 0.001 (Box's M test not significant, p>0.05). The separate univariate ANOVAs confirm that the factor differentiating the two groups has a significant effect on the magnitude of investments made by the companies (p<0.001) but not on the number of incidents experienced (p>0.05). The following discriminant analysis unveiled one discriminant function that significantly differentiated the three groups of companies, $\Lambda = 0.91$, $\chi^2(2) = 14.56$, p < 0.001.

Test	Value	F(2,168)	Significance	Observed Power (a)
Pillai's Trace	0.10	9.85	0.00	0.98
Wilks' Lambda	0.89	9.85	0.00	0.98
Hotelling's Trace	0.11	9.85	0.00	0.98
Roy's Largest Root	0.11	9.85	0.00	0.98
Between Subjects Effect	Mean square	F(1,169)	Significance	Observed Power (a)
Security Budget	58.97	19.73	0.00	0.99
Security Incidents	0.38	2.07	0.15	0.30

Table 82: MANOVA results H6.

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

The discriminant function moderately correlates in a negative manner with the security incidents variable (r = -0.27) and strongly correlates in a positive manner with the variable measuring the security budget (r = 0.96). Hence, according to the position of the groups' centroids in relation to the discriminant functions it is possible to state that: the first cluster invests more in

security and is less affected by security incidents. The second cluster invests slightly less in security and is more affected by security incidents.



Figure 43: Mean of security budget (left) and amount of security incidents (right).

In Figure 43, the mean of security budget and number of security incidents are put in relation to the two clusters identified in this analysis. The first cluster of companies has greater investments in security (M=€8,261, SD=€11,347) than the second (M= €2,882, SD=€7,288) and consequently, it is less affected by security incidents (Cluster 1: M=5.60, SD=7.57; Cluster 2: M = 6.87, SD = 7.17) (Figure 43).Hence, given these assumptions the hypothesis is not rejected.

6.8 Contract Regulatory Associations

6.8.1 Factor and Reliability Analysis

A Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation was performed on the variables used to measure how contract legislation complexity may influence the insecurity of distribution networks. The absence of multicollinearity was verified by examining the determinant of the correlation matrix as well as the anti-image matrices. To check the suitability of the sample size the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin was used, KMO=0.89, corresponding to meritorious (Kaiser, 1974). Also the Bartlett's test of sphericity confirmed that the correlation matrix was not an identity matrix, $\chi^2(190)=3107.07$, p<0.001.

A total of four factors explaining the 73.31% of the variance were extracted by following Kaiser's criterion. The interpretation of the variables clustered in the rotated component matrix (Table 83), results in the following factors:

1. Component 1. Security Requirements Agreements.

- 2. Component 2. Contract Complexity.
- 3. Component 3. Risk Sharing.
- 4. Component 4. Security Requirements Specification.

All the items except three have communality greater than 0.7 (Table 83). In addition, the average communality is 0.73, which confirms the correct adoption of Kaiser's criterion. The Cronbach's alphas of the four factors were close to 0.9, which confirms the high reliability of the scales identified with the factor analysis (Table 83).

An initial Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) showed that the model was not fitting the data well. Hence, by examining the modification indices it was decided to remove five items (). The final CFA shows that the model fits the data sufficiently well (Goodness of Fit [GFI]=0.86, adjusted goodness of fit [AGFI]=0.80, NNFI=0.96, CFI=0.97, root mean square residual [RMSR]=0.08, root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA]=0.09 and $\chi^2[NC] = 2.45$) (Table 83).

CFA was also used to assess discriminant validity. Significant differences of the χ^2 values for the fixed and free solutions testify to the distinctiveness of the two constructs (Table 84). In addition, the examination of the confidence interval that was set to be equal to plus or minus two standard errors of the correlation coefficient of the pair of constructs, does not include the value of 1. Hence, discriminant validity was ensured.

	Component					Measurement Model	
	1	2	3	4	Communality	Std. Coefficient	t-Values
Our organization and our customers have always had different opinions about security requirements in contracts	0.83	0.26	-0.13	-0.05	0.77	0.94	13.18
It has been difficult to agree on what security requirements to choose	0.81	0.29	-0.21	-0.12	0.76	1.06	15.31
Contract agreement about security requirements takes too much time and resources	0.81	0.23	-0.18	-0.13	0.80	0.95	13.93
It is difficult to determine the effect of security and thereafter agree in contracts	0.80	0.22	-0.05	-0.14	0.71	0.79	10.81
We avoid specifying security requirements since it is too complex	0.77	0.24	-0.28	-0.17	0.76		
Contracts agreements demand too much time and resource	0.16	0.82	-0.19	-0.12	0.75	0.85	12.33
Prefer Verbal Agreements (due to contract complexity)	0.18	0.80	-0.34	0.00	0.79	1	13.66
Don't understand the importance of written agreements	0.32	0.79	-0.15	-0.15	0.78	0.97	12.49
Don't know how to use contracts in case of security incidents	0.37	0.78	-0.10	-0.09	0.77	0.96	
Contracts with customers are too complex	0.35	0.72	-0.24	0.00	0.70		12.41
Contract clarity about risk sharing standards	-0.13	-0.23	0.87	0.12	0.85	0.63	7.49
Avoidance of unclear contracts with no risk sharing	-0.15	-0.21	0.86	0.04	0.81	0.94	13.62
Importance pf sharing liabilities	-0.17	-0.16	0.86	0.13	0.81	1.09	16.05
It is important to specify security requirements in contracts	-0.09	-0.22	0.59	0.52	0.69	1.01	14.04
Usage of NSAB2000 to share risks	-0.37	-0.21	0.56	0.35	0.63		
Written contracts with liabilities sharing usage	-0.26	-0.18	0.48	0.37	0.47		
Our customers require the specification of security in contracts	-0.05	-0.04	0.04	0.87	0.75	0.8	9.16
Our organization always proposes detailed descriptions of security in contracts	-0.07	-0.06	0.11	0.87	0.77	1.1	13.2
We have easily agreed with our customers on specifying security requirements in contracts	-0.13	-0.05	0.11	0.83	0.72	0.67	7.53
Always specify security requirements in contracts	-0.19	-0.06	0.24	0.70	0.59		
Eigenvalues	3.99	3.64	3.63	3.38			
% of Variance	19.9	18.2	18.2	16.9			
α	0.92	0.91	0.89	0.86			
CR	0.90	0.88	0.88	0.76			
AVE	0.88	0.89	0.87	0.76			

Table 83: Summary of Exploratory Factor Analysis for Contract Regulatory Associations.

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Model Fit Indices: normed $\chi^2[NC] = 2.45$, Goodness of Fit Index = 0.86<(0.90), adjusted goodness of fit = 0.80 (>0.80), non-normed fit index = 0.96 (≥ 0.90), root mean square residual = 0.08 (≤ 0.10), root mean square error of approximation = 0.09 (≤ 0.10). All *t*-values are significant at p < 0.05 level.

Table 84: Assessment of Discriminant Validity.

	Component 1	Component 2	Component 3	Component 4
Component 1	-			
Component 2	285.81 0.56-076	-		
Component 3	503.56 (-0.61)-(-0.35)	373.44 (-0.67)-(-0.44)	-	
Component 4	159 (-0.61)-(-0.34)	199.51 (-0.60)-(-0.32)	67.63 0.59-0.79	-

First Row: χ^2 differences between the fixed and free solution (significant at p < 0.01 [1 df]). Second Row: confidence interval (only one of them include 1.00)

6.8.2 H7a. Security Requirements Agreements

A hierarchical cluster analysis was run to split the respondents into distinct homogeneous groups in terms of the first component concerning the perceived complexity of specifying transport security requirements in contracts. The results of the analysis identify two main clusters with a cut off level of 13. An iterative K-means cluster analysis was run to assign cluster membership to the data. In addition, cross-validation was exploited to ensure the reliability of the cluster analysis. To enhance understanding of the profiles of these two clusters a discriminant analysis was performed. This brought to light one discriminant function, $\Lambda = 0.41$, $\chi^2(1) = 152.00$, p < 0.001. Examining the scores of the functions at group centroids it was found that the first group of companies has not experienced any difficulties in specifying and agreeing on security requirements in transport contract agreements. On the contrary, the second group reports having more difficulties to perform this process. The scores on the factor variables of the first group are between 1, *Strongly Disagree* and 2, *Disagree*, while the scores of the second group are between 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree* and 4, *Agree* (Table 85).

Table 85: Summary of factor variables scores for the two groups.

	Group	Ν	Mean	Std. Deviation
It has been difficult to agree on what security requirements to choose		44	1.66	0.64
		124	3.40	0.93
Contract agreement about security requirements takes too much time and resources		44	1.82	0.76
		124	3.51	0.98
We avoid specifying security requirements since it is too complex		44	1.77	0.74
		129	3.29	0.95
It is difficult to determine the effect of security and thereafter agree in		43	1.74	0.62
contracts	2	125	3.54	0.83

A MANOVA was run to determine whether there were significant differences between these two clusters, in terms of security budget and security incidents suffered. Although the outcome variables were log-transformed, homogeneity of the covariance matrix was detected, Box's M test p<0.05. However, given the unequal sample sizes, it was decided to adopt a more conservative level of significance, p<0.03 (Hair et al., 2009). All the multivariate tests confirm that there are significant differences between the two groups (Table 86). In particular using Pillai's trace, we can deduce that the groups' means significantly differ, V = 0.14, F(2, 168) = 13.77, p < 0.001. The separate univariate ANOVAs confirm that the factor differentiating the two groups has a significant effect both on the magnitude of investments made by the companies (p<0.01) and the number of incidents suffered (p>0.05) (Table 86).

Test	Value	F (2,168)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Pillai's Trace	0.14	13.77	0.00	0.99
Wilks' Lambda	0.85	13.77	0.00	0.99
Hotelling's Trace	0.16	13.77	0.00	0.99
Roy's Largest Root	0.16	13.77	0.00	0.99
Between Subjects Effect	Mean Square	F(1,169)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Security Budget	78.01	27.13	0.00	0.99
Security Incidents	1.17	6.36	0.01	0.70

Table 86: MANOVA Results H7a.

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

A new discriminant analysis, using the cluster membership variable as the grouping factor and the outcome variables (security budget and security incidents) as independent variables, was run to follow up the results of the MANOVA. This analysis unveiled one discriminant functions that significantly differentiated the two groups of companies, $\Lambda = 0.87$, $\chi^2(2) = 22.75$, p < 0.001. The discriminant function correlates positively with the security budget variable (r = 0.88) and moderately correlates in a negative manner with the variable measuring the security incidents (r = -0.42). Hence, considering the position of the groups' centroids in relation to the discriminant functions it is possible to state that the first cluster invests more in security and is less affected by security incidents. The second cluster invests less in security and is more affected by security incidents. The same conclusions may be drawn by examining the diagrams in Figure 44. The first has an average security investment of about M=€10,586 (SD=€12,162) and an average number of incidents M=4.30 (SD=7.32). The second group has a significantly lower security budget (M= \in 3,488, SD= \in 7,956) and a slightly higher number of incidents (M=6.97, SD=7.27). Hence, the hypothesis is tenable.



Figure 44: Mean of Security budget (left) and security incidents (right) for H7a.

6.8.3 H7b. Contract Complexity

A hierarchical cluster analysis was run to separate the companies in terms of the factor measuring the complexity experienced by companies to exploit transport agreements contracts. Two clusters were identified with a cut off level of 10. Cluster membership was assigned by running an iterative K-means cluster analysis, and cross-validation ensured the reliability of the analysis. A discriminant analysis was run using the clusters membership as the grouping factor and the factor of contract complexity as the independent variable; one discriminant function significantly distinguishes the respondents, $\Lambda = 0.42$, $\chi^2(1) = 150.50$, p < 0.001. Examining the scores of the functions at group centroids, it was found that the first group of companies has not experienced the existing transport contract agreements as complex. The second group seems to have more difficulties. This is also depicted in Table 87 where the scores of the two groups on the variables used in the factor are reported. The first group has scores between 2, *Disagree* and 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree* while the second group's scores range between 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*. It is also relevant to notice in the table that a larger number of respondents belong to the second group.

Table 87: Summary of factor variables scores.

	Group	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Contract agreements demand too much time and	1	115	2.30	0.90
resource	2	60	4.15	0.71
Prefer Verbal Agreements (due to contract complexity)	1	115	2.33	0.93
	2	60	3.81	0.95
	1	115	2.27	0.90
Don't understand the importance of written agreements	2	60	3.91	0.92
Don't know how to use contracts in case of security	1	115	2.50	0.94
incidents	2	60	3.54	0.93
	1	115	2.30	0.90
Contracts with customers are too complex	2	60	4.15	0.71

A MANOVA was run to determine whether there were significant differences between these two clusters, in terms of security budget and security incidents suffered (Box's M test not significant, p>0.05). All the multivariate tests confirm that there are significant differences between the two groups (p<0.001). In particular using Pillai's trace, we can deduce that the groups' means significantly differ in terms of magnitude of investments and number of security incidents, V = 0.08, F(2, 182) = 7.27, p < 0.001. Separate univariate ANOVAs show that the group means differ significantly in term of the magnitude of security investments, p<0.001, but not in terms of number of security incidents, p>0.05.

Test	Value	F (2,182)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Pillai's Trace	0.08	7.27	0.00	0.93
Wilks' Lambda	0.92	7.27	0.00	0.93
Hotelling's Trace	0.08	7.27	0.00	0.93
Roy's Largest Root	0.08	7.27	0.00	0.93
Between Subjects Effect	Mean Square	F(1,169)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Security Budget	38.29	12.31	0.00	0.93
Security Incidents	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.05

Table 88: MANOVA Results H7b.

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

A final discriminant analysis was run to follow up the results from the MANOVA. One discriminant function significantly distinguishes the groups, $\Lambda = 0.94$, $\chi^2(2) = 8.89$, p < 0.05. This function correlates positively with the security budget (r = 0.99) and negatively with the number of security incidents (r = -0.10). Examining the groups' centroids scores in relation to the discriminant function, it is possible to confirm that the first cluster invests more in security and is less affected by security incidents. On the contrary the second group of companies, which

experiences the contract agreements as complex, invests less in security and is consequently more affected by security incidents.



Figure 45: Mean Security budget (left) and security incidents (right), H3b.

Figure 45 leads to the same conclusions: the first group has higher security budgets (Group 1 M=€6,853, SD=€10,536; Group 2, M=€2,273, SD=€6,873) and somewhat lower number of security incidents (Group 1 M=6.15, SD=7.33; Group 2, M=6.59, SD=7.46). The hypothesis is considered tenable.

6.8.4 H7c. Risk Sharing

A hierarchical cluster analysis was run to separate the companies in terms of the factor measuring the exploitation of contract agreements to share cargo liabilities between transport operators and their customers. Also for this hypothesis two distinct clusters were identified but with a cut off level of 18. An iterative K-means cluster analysis was used to assign cluster membership to the data. In addition, cross-validation ensured the reliability of the analysis. According to a discriminant analysis that was run using the clusters membership as the grouping factor and the factor of risk sharing as the independent variable, one discriminant function significantly differentiate the respondents, $\Lambda = 0.36$, $\chi^2(1) = 175.39$, p < 0.001. 97.1% of the cross-validated group cases were correctly classified. More specifically, 94.1% of cluster 1 cases and 99% of cluster 2 cases were correctly classified. Examining the scores of the functions at group centroids, it was found that the first group of companies doesn't understand the importance of contract agreements to share liabilities and therefore they prefer to avoid their usage. On the contrary, the second group of companies makes extended use of contracts to share

cargo liabilities. This may be noticed also in Table 89 where the first group shows lower scores (close to 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*) than the second (between 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree* and 5, *Strongly Agree*).

	Group	Ν	Mean	Std. Deviation
Contract clouity shout risk showing stondards	1	85	2.77	1.06
Contract charity about fisk sharing standards	2	90	4.37	0.54
A seciel and a foundation of the seciel and side at a side	1	85	2.87	1.14
Avoidance of unclear contracts with no risk sharing	2	90	4.36	0.61
Lunartana af daning lightliking	1	85	2.62	0.90
Importance of sharing habilities	2	90	4.23	0.62
14 in inner stand de ser sife, ser suite ser suite ser set in ser stand t	1	85	2.69	1.18
it is important to specify security requirements in contracts	2	90	3.89	0.95

A MANOVA was run to determine whether there were significant differences between these two clusters, in terms of security budget and security incidents suffered. The multivariate tests confirm that significant differences between these two groups exist (p<0.001). For instance, according to Pillai's trace, we can deduce that the groups' means significantly differ in terms of magnitude of investments and number of security incidents, V = 0.10, F(2, 168) = 9.71, p < 0.001 (Box's M test not significant, p>0.05) (Table 90). Separate univariate ANOVAs show that the group means differ significantly in terms of the magnitude of security investments but not in terms of number of security incidents (Table 90). A discriminant analysis was run to follow up the results from the MANOVA. One discriminant function significantly distinguishes the groups, $\Lambda = 0.94$, $\chi^2(2) = 10.12$, p < 0.001. This function correlates positively with the security budget (r = 0.94) and negatively with the number of security incidents (r = -0.32).

Table 90: MANOVA Results H7c.

Test	Value	F (2,182)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Pillai's Trace	0.10	9.71	0.00	0.98
Wilks' Lambda	0.89	9.71	0.00	0.98
Hotelling's Trace	0.11	9.71	0.00	0.98
Roy's Largest Root	0.11	9.71	0.00	0.98
Between Subjects Effect	Mean Square	F (1,169)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Security Budget	57.64	19.24	0.00	0.99
Security Incidents	0.19	1.33	0.24	0.21

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

Examining the scores of the two groups' centroids in relation to the discriminant function it is possible to confirm that the first cluster, which doesn't make use of special contract agreements to share risks, invests less in security and is more affected by security incidents. On the contrary the second group of companies, which instead has a pronounced tendency to share cargo liabilities, invests more in security and is consequently less affected by security incidents. The same conclusions may be drawn by examining Figure 46. The second group has an average investment higher than the first (Group 1 M=€3,027, SD=€6,657; Group 2, M=€7,441, SD=€11,494) and is consequently affected by fewer security incidents (Group 1 M=6.86, SD=7.19; Group 2, M=5.76, SD=7.52). The hypothesis is considered tenable.



Figure 46: Mean Security budget (left) and security incidents (right), H3c.

6.8.5 H7d. Security Requirements Specification

Two clusters were identified by running the hierarchical cluster analysis in terms of the factor measuring the exploitation of security requirements specifications in contract agreements (cut off level 17). Cluster membership was assigned by means of an iterative K-means cluster analysis. Moreover, cross-validation ensured the reliability of the cluster analysis. According to a discriminant analysis that was run using the clusters membership as the grouping factor and the last factor (usage of security requirements in contract agreements) as the independent variable, one discriminant function significantly distinguishes the respondents, $\Lambda = 0.33$, $\chi^2(1) = 186.75$, p < 0.001. overall, 97.7% of cross-validated grouped cases were correctly classified; 94.7% of cluster 1 cases and 98.1% of cluster 2 cases were correctly classified. Examining the scores of the functions at group centroids it was found that the first group of companies is not

making use of specific contract agreements to agree and specify security requirements to be used in transport assignments (Table 91).

	Group	Ν	Mean	Std. Deviation
Our outomore require the analitication of accurity in contracts	1	76	1.62	0.64
Our customers require the specification of security in contracts	2	99	3.33	0.93
Our organization always proposes detailed descriptions of security in	1	76	1.75	0.70
contracts		99	3.37	0.85
We have easily agreed with our customers on specifying security requirements in contracts		76	1.84	0.78
		99	3.46	0.82

Table 91: Summary of factor variables scores in relation to the two groups.

On the contrary, the second group of respondents is currently specifying security requirements in contracts and most of all acknowledges their utility. Examining the distribution of the scores of the factor variables (Table 91), it is possible to notice that the first group scores between 1, *Strongly Disagree* and 2, *Disagree*, while the second group has scores higher than 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*.

Table 92: MANOVA Results H7c

Test	Value	F (2,182)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Pillai's Trace	0.02	1.98	0.14	0.40
Wilks' Lambda	0.97	1.98	0.14	0.40
Hotelling's Trace	0.02	1.98	0.14	0.40
Roy's Largest Root	0.02	1.98	0.14	0.40
Between Subjects Effect	Mean Square	F(1,169)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Security Budget	92226581.78	3.11	0.07	0.42
Security Incidents	54.29	0.88	0.34	0.15

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

A MANOVA was run to determine whether there were significant differences between these two clusters, in terms of security budget and security incidents suffered (Table 92) (Box's M test not significant, p>0.05). None of the multivariate tests show a significant impact of this factor. Separate univariate ANOVAs show that the group means don't differ significantly, either in terms of the magnitude of security investments or in terms of number of security incidents (Table 92). Hence, the hypothesis is rejected.

6.9 Authority

6.9.1 Factor and Reliability Analysis

A Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation was performed on the variables used for the hypothesis related to the manner the authority influence the security of physical distribution networks (second hypothesis of Authority actor). More specifically, the set of variables concerns the companies' perception of the impact of AEO on both security and the efficiency of the organization. The examination of the determinant of the correlation matrix as well as of the antiimage matrices confirmed the absence of multicollinearity between the items. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure raises some concerns about the suitability of the sample size, KMO=0.64, corresponding to mediocre (Kaiser, 1974). The Bartlett's test of sphericity confirmed that the correlation matrix was not an identity matrix, $\chi^2(10)=216.8$, p<0.001.

Two factors explaining the 71.10% of the variance were extracted by examining the scree plot and thereafter following the Kaiser's criterion. The interpretation of the variables clustered in the rotated component matrix (Table 93), results in the following factors:

- 1. Component 1. AEO impact on security and efficiency.
- 2. Component 2. AEO impact on competitive advantage.

	Con	nponent	Measureme	nt Model	
	1	2	Communality	Std. Coefficients	t-Values
AEO doesn't enhance security	0.86	-0.23	0.79	0.28	8.46
AEO is confusing	0.75	0.16	0.58	0.26	7.51
AEO reduces our organizational efficiency	0.75	0.15	0.58	0.31	9.30
AEO compliance costs too much	0.61	0.58	0.71	0.34	8.57
AEO is not giving any competitive advantage	-0.04	0.93	0.87		
Eigenvalues	2.24	1.31			
% of Variance	44.8	26.3			
α	0.75				
CR	0.94				
AVE	0.58				

Table 93: Summary of exploratory factor analysis for Authority stakeholder.

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Model Fit Indices: normed $\chi^2[NC] = 7.09$, Goodness of Fit Index = 0.96>(0.90), adjusted goodness of fit = 0.80 (=0.80), non-normed fit index = 0.80 (<0.90), root mean square residual = 0.00 (≤ 0.10), root mean square error of approximation = 0.19 (>0.10). All *t*-values are significant at p < 0.05 level.

All of the items except two have communalities greater than 0.7 (Table 93). In addition, the average communality is 0.7, which confirms the correct adoption of the Kaiser's criterion.

Finally, the Cronbach's alpha of the first factor was 0.75 and confirms the sufficient reliability of the identified scales for social research (Hair et al., 2009) (Table 93).

Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was run to further establish unidimensionality and construct validity. Initial results suggested removing the second component. Despite this, the remaining four items fit the model sufficiently well (Goodness of Fit [GFI]=0.96, adjusted goodness of fit [AGFI]=0.80, NNFI=0.80, CFI=0.93, root mean square residual [RMSR]=0.008, root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA]=0.19 and $\chi^2[NC] = 7.09$).

6.9.2 H8a. AEO Compliance

To examine the relationship between the compliance to the AEO certification and the magnitude of investments as well as the number of security incidents, the respondents were grouped in 2 clusters. The first cluster was composed of the respondents that had complied with one of the three AEO certifications (AEO-C, AEO-S or AEO-F), while the second cluster consisted of respondents that explicitly stated that they were not compliant with AEO certifications. All the remaining cases were excluded from the analysis.

Thereafter, a MANOVA was run to determine whether there were significant differences between these two clusters. The Box's M test to check the equality of covariance matrices was not significant, p>0.05. The variable containing the two clusters was used as the fixed factor and the security budget and amount of security incidents were used as the dependent variables. As shown in Table 94, all the multivariate tests were significant (p<0.05). In particular, using Pillai's trace, the means of the two groups are found to significantly differ, V = 0.08, F(2, 106) = 4.53, p < 0.05.

Table 94: MANOVA Results H8a.

Test	Value	F (2,109)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Pillai's Trace	0.08	4.53	0.01	0.76
Wilks' Lambda	0.92	4.53	0.01	0.76
Hotelling's Trace	0.08	4.53	0.01	0.76
Roy's Largest Root	0.08	4.53	0.01	0.76
Between Subjects Effect	Mean Square	F (1,110)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Security Budget	15.33	4.81	0.03	0.58
Security Incidents	0.10	0.56	0.46	0.11

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

Separate univariate ANOVAs show that the group means differ significantly in terms of the magnitude of security investments (p<0.05) but not in terms of number of security incidents, p>0.05. The results of the MANOVA were followed up with a discriminant analysis. One discriminant function significantly differentiate the groups, $\Lambda = 0.84, \chi^2(2) = 19.63, p < 100$ 0.001. This function correlates positively with the security budget and still positively, but not strongly, with the number of security incidents. Hence, examining the scores of the two groups' centroids in relation to the discriminant function it is possible to deduce that the first cluster, which is made of companies not complying with the AEO, makes moderately lower security investments. On the contrary, the second group of companies, which is compliant to one of the three AEO certifications, invests considerably more in security. This is also illustrated in Figure 47 where the respondents are grouped according to their AEO compliance and related to the average security investment and average number of security incidents (Figure 47). Companies that are AEO compliant have considerable investments in security (M=€18,242, SD=€10,655) compared to those companies that are not AEO certified (M=€4,236, SD=€8,448). Surprisingly, AEO compliant companies are also slightly more affected by security incidents (M=8.29, SD=9.35) than other companies not certified (M=6.32, SD=6.16). So the hypothesis is tenable only partially since companies complying with the AEO have significantly higher security budgets. However, the same companies are significantly more affected by security incidents. Hence the hypothesis is rejected.



Figure 47: Mean of security investments (left) and number of incidents for companies complying or not with AEO.

6.9.3 H8b. AEO Security and Efficiency Impacts

A hierarchical cluster analysis was run to identify distinct and homogeneous groups in terms of the first component identified in the factor analysis: AEO impacts on security and efficiency. Two groups were identified with a cut off level of 15. An iterative K-means cluster analysis was used to assign cluster membership to the data. Finally, the cross-validation technique confirmed the reliability of the cluster analysis. The groups were significantly distinguished by one discriminant function, $\Lambda = 0.44$, $\chi^2(1) = 139.38$, p < 0.001. Overall, 99.4% of cross-validated grouped cases were correctly classified by the discriminant function. More specifically, 83.3% of cluster 1 cases and 100% of cluster 2 cases were correctly classified. The first group has a tendency to agree with the statements that AEO is confusing (M=4.38, SD=0.72) and doesn't enhance security (M=4.83, SD=0.41). This cluster has also a tendency to agree ct that AEO costs too much (M=4.50, SD=0.55) and reduces organizational efficiency (M=4.00, SD=0.63) (Table 95). The second group is more or less neutral with some slight tendency to agree that AEO doesn't enhance security (M=3.25, SD=0.31) and costs too much (M=3.28, SD=0.37) (Table 95).

	Group	Ν	Mean	Std. Deviation
AEQ is confusing	1	6	4.38	0.72
AEO is confusing	2	169	3.27	0.36
	1	6	4.83	0.41
AEO doesn't ennance security	2	169	3.25	0.31
	1	6	4.50	0.55
AEO compliance costs too much	2	169	3.28	0.37
	1	6	4.00	0.63
AEO reduces our organization's efficiency	2	169	3.06	0.29

Table 95: Scores of the two clusters on the AEO set of variables (N=175).

A MANOVA was performed to determine if there were any significant differences between these two groups in terms of the outcome variables considered in this study (security budget and number of security incidents). To check for the assumption of multivariate normality of the dependent variables, the Box's M test was used, p>0.05. None of the multivariate tests is significant (Table 96). Separate univariate ANOVAs show that the group means don't differ significantly either in terms of the magnitude of the security budget or in terms of the number of security incidents (Table 96). Hence, the hypothesis is not tenable.

Table 96: MANOVA Results H8b.

Test	Value	F(2,168)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Pillai's Trace	0.00	0.41	0.66	0.11
Wilks' Lambda	0.99	0.41	0.66	0.11
Hotelling's Trace	0.00	0.41	0.66	0.11
Roy's Largest Root	0.00	0.41	0.66	0.11
Between Subjects Effect	Mean Square	F(1,169)	Significance	Observed Power(a)
Security Budget	1.79	0.53	0.46	0.11
Security Incidents	0.00	0.04	0.83	0.05

a) Computed using alpha=0.05.

7 Discussion

This chapter summarizes the survey's findings that are technically described in the previous chapter (Chapter 5). The findings are discussed for each of the actors considered in the physical distribution security system (PDSS) presented in Chapter 3.

7.1 Research Results

The purpose of this study is to enhance our understanding of the factors that influence physical distribution security. More specifically, this investigation aims to understand what factors affect the magnitude of security investments made by transportation firms as well as the number of security incidents suffered. To accomplish this task an explorative investigation followed by a survey study are performed.

The explorative study brought to light 19 hypotheses explaining how eight stakeholders influence the security of physical distribution networks (Table 97). To test these hypotheses, a questionnaire was developed and sent to 577 physical distribution carriers based in Sweden. The survey had a final response rate of 36.4% (210 questionnaires). Findings demonstrate that today many companies, about 39% of the respondents, are not investing in security although only a minority, 18% of the respondents, is not affected by security incidents. This means that some companies affected by security incidents don't invest in security. In 2009, the average investment made by the respondents was about M=€4,874. The variable gathering the number of security incidents suffered by Swedish carriers shows that on average the respondents were affected by 6.4 attacks in 2009.

Differences were found in terms of the average budget allocated and number of incidents suffered by small, medium and large companies. Large companies invest, on average, more than medium and small companies. At the same time, despite the greater investments, larger companies are also more affected by security incidents than are medium and small companies (Figure 31). By comparing the means of these groups, significant differences, in terms of security budget and number of incidents, were found only between small and medium enterprises or between small and large companies.

Table 97: stakeholders and hypotheses.

Actor	Hypothesis
Law Enforcement Agency	 H1a. Companies that perceive that criminals are not prosecuted are discouraged from improving security. H1b. Companies that perceive that the Swedish law enforcement agency is not allocating enough resources are discouraged from enhancing security. H1c. Companies that perceive as beneficial the collaboration in activities organized by the Swedish law enforcement agency are stimulated to improve security.
Distribution and Transport Operators	 H2a. Companies that encounter difficulties in raising freight rates are discouraged from improving security. H2b. Companies applying JIT principles are discouraged from improving security. H2c. Companies that are part of international distribution networks are more interested in improving security. H2d. Companies believing that security measures may negatively affect their performance level don't improve security.
Business Security Certifications	H3. Companies complying with business certifications have higher security.
Insurance Companies	H4a. Companies that make use of insurances to cover the economical losses of security incidents are less interested in improving security. H4b. Companies benefiting from premium discounts don't work actively with enacting security.
Security Providers	H5a. Companies believing that security solutions are in a development stage and difficult to integrate do not improve security. H5b. Companies believing that security solutions are too expensive compared to the value provided do not improve security.
Criminals	<i>H6. Companies perceiving the opportunistic behavior of criminals do not improve security.</i>
Contract Regulatory Associations	 H7a. Companies that experience difficulties in agreeing on security requirements are not encouraged to improve security. H7b. Companies that perceive the contract agreements as too complex are not encouraged to improve security. H7c. Companies that don't share risks by means of contract agreements are not encouraged to improve security. H7d. Companies that do not specify security requirements are not encouraged to improve security.
Authority	H8a. Transportation companies complying with the AEO certification have higher security. H8b. Transportation companies that have a negative perception about the impact of AEO regulations on security and efficiency are discouraged from enhancing security.

According to non-parametric tests, a significant inverse relationship between the dependent variables, the security budget and the security incidents (p<0.01) was found. In other words, the higher the investments made by transport operators the fewer incidents suffered. Moreover, the
scatter diagram in Figure 30, representing the relationship between security budget and security incidents in relation to the size of the company, demonstrates that this trend is much more prevalent for small and medium companies (blue and green lines respectively). On the contrary, large companies show a more flattened relationship between the variables (red line). In view of these findings, it is possible to come to the conclusion that there are differences between small, medium and large companies, not only in terms of average security investments and incidents suffered (Figure 31) but also in terms of the linear relationship between security budget and number of security incidents.

7.2 Law Enforcement Agency

Three hypotheses related to the law enforcement agency were formulated in this study. These are the following:

H1a. Companies that perceive that criminals are not prosecuted are discouraged from improving security.

H1b. Companies that perceive that the Swedish law enforcement agency is not allocating enough resources are discouraged from enhancing security.

H1c. Companies that perceive as beneficial the collaboration in activities organized by the Swedish law enforcement agency are stimulated to improve security.

Examining the variables used to measure the perception of the work done by the law enforcement agency, it is possible to depict a generic dissatisfaction. Hence, in general the respondents believe that cargo criminals are not prosecuted and that the law enforcement agency is not allocating enough resources to combat the problem. In addition, the majority of respondents is not participating in collaborative activities and, most of all, is not convinced of the beneficial effects of these initiatives.

The respondents were grouped into clusters built upon the positive or negative perception of three factors: the perception of criminal prosecution, the perception of resource allocation and finally the beneficial effect of collaborative activities. By checking the simultaneous relationship between these groups and the two outcome variables, the security budget and the number of security incidents, the three hypotheses were confirmed. The groups of respondents that were convinced that 1) criminals are prosecuted (H1a), 2) the law enforcement agency is allocating

resources (H1b) and 3) are joining collaborative activities (H1c) are investing significantly more on security and are consequently less affected by security incidents. Hence, it appears that although there is an overall low appreciation of the efforts made by the law enforcement agency, some companies have had positive experiences and their security investments are higher. In addition, the increased magnitude of investments corresponds to a reduction of security incidents.

In conclusion *H1a*, *H1b* and *H1c* are demonstrated to be tenable.

7.3 Distribution and Transport Operators

The hypotheses formulated for these actors are four:

H2a. Companies that encounter difficulties in raising freight rates are discouraged from improving security.

H2b. Companies applying JIT principles are discouraged from improving security.

H2c. Companies that are part of international distribution networks are more interested in improving security.

H2d. Companies believing that security measures may negatively affect their performance level don't improve security.

Examining the descriptive statistics of the variables used for these stakeholders, it may be noticed that the average acceptance of freight rate increments of transport buyers is very low, about 1.3%. In addition, about 31% of the respondents declare that their customers are not willing to accept any freight rate increment in exchange for improved security. The collected responses show also that on very few occasions respondents have been able to obtain increments of 10% and 20% when enhancing the protection of the cargo transported. In general the respondents are neutral to the dilemma of trading off JIT with security and are consistently convinced that efficiency won't be significantly affected when enhancing security. Finally, of the respondents about 44% move goods on a regional scale, followed by national (34.3%), urban (10.3%), continental (8%) and worldwide (2.3%).

The mean and standard deviations of the variables used to measure the impact on performance of security solutions range between 1, *Strongly disagree* and 3 (2.60), *Neither Agree nor Disagree*. Hence, the respondents on average don't agree that the introduction of security measures doesn't

affect organizational performance. In addition, it appears that respondents perceive that the security measures will have more impact on direct costs (administrative costs, labor costs etc.) rather than on logistical efficiency (i.e. time delays, customer satisfaction, delivery precision etc.). Finally, technological security measures (e.g. GPS track and trace, rigid curtains, mechanical locks and fuel cap locks) have in general a very low effect on performance with the exception of the variables measuring the working complexity of operators, number of routines to be followed and learning processes. The screening of employees' backgrounds has more negative impacts on labor costs, administrative costs , number of routines to be learned by operators and working complexity. In other words, this shows that respondents feel that security technologies imply lower losses of efficiency compared to routines, even though some negative impacts related to learning and working complexity were scored as relevant.

The hypotheses concerning the customers' willingness to pay (H2a), the impact of distribution length (H2c) as well as conflicts with the performance of transport operations (H2d), show no significant relationships with the security investments and the number of security incidents. Customers that managed to agree on freight rate increments did not show higher security investments and lower security incidents in comparison with those who couldn't raise their prices (H2a). Results from the statistical analysis show that that the length of distribution chains impacts the security budget and the number of security incidents. Higher security investments have been made for longer distribution chains. However, while the increments of security budget mitigate the number of incidents from urban to national distribution, the same doesn't happen for security incidents for continental and worldwide networks, which instead increase. Hence, this hypothesis is rejected (H2c). Finally, the impact of security on performance doesn't significantly differentiate respondents in terms of security budget and security incidents, and this hypothesis is also rejected (H2d).

The factor concerning the dilemma about the trade-off between JIT and security is strongly related to the budget allocated and the security incidents suffered. In other words, the group of respondents experiencing that the application of security jeopardizes their JIT efficiency invests less and are more affected by security incidents. Hence, this hypothesis is supported (H2b).

In conclusion, H2a, H2c and H2d are rejected, while H2b is supported by the data.

7.4 Business Security Certifications

Only one hypothesis has been formulated for this stakeholder: H3. Companies complying with business certifications have higher security.

The compliance with business security certifications among Swedish physical distribution carriers that answered the survey appears to be very low. More specifically, we discovered that the majority of the companies don't have any certification (49.1%), don't know what they comply with (17%) and finally preferred not to answer to this question (5.3%). Of the remaining companies only 1.7% comply with TAPA EMEA, and 8.6% with ISO28000.

The results of the MANOVA analysis didn't show any significant relationship between the compliance with security certifications and the two outcome variables, security budget and security incidents, and therefore hypothesis H3 is rejected.

7.5 Insurance Companies

Two hypotheses have been formulated for insurance companies. These were the following:

H4a. Companies that make use of insurances to cover the economical losses of security incidents are less interested in improving security.

H4b. Companies benefiting from premium discounts don't work actively with enacting security.

The variables measuring the adoption of insurances to cover security losses indicate that on average in 2009 1) the respondents have fully insured 75% of their shipments against security incidents, 2) in 23.8% of the shipments the goods owners lack insurance, 3) 13% of the shipments have higher liability than what is stated in national standard regulations, and 4) 3.7% of security losses are covered with captive insurances. Finally, on average, the respondents are neutral when asked to judge if they believe that security insurances are the best way to cover security losses (average scores are around 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*).

When it comes to the impact of premium discount, respondents complain moderately about premium discounts that do not seem to be offered when enhancing security. On average, the respondents have been offered premium discounts at around 3%; however almost 60 respondents report that they are not receiving premium discount when implementing security measures. Yet a good proportion of respondents affirm receiving premium discounts of 8% and 10%.

The MANOVA results show no significant effects concerning the impact of the usage of insurance on the security investments and number of incidents. This implies that, contrarily to what was hypothesized in H4a, companies are not using insurances in place of security enhancements. Hence, this hypothesis is rejected. On the contrary, premium discounts seem to have a positive effect on security investments. More specifically, the companies that receive premium discounts have a marked tendency to invest more on security and thereafter to be less affected by security incidents. This hypothesis is tenable (H4b).

In conclusion, H4a is rejected and H4b is tenable.

7.6 Security Providers

The providers of security solutions are believed to affect the security of physical distribution networks in two ways:

H5a. Companies believing that security solutions are in a development stage and difficult to integrate do not improve security.

H5b. Companies believing that security solutions are too expensive compared to the value provided do not improve security.

According to the analysis, the issue concerning the impact of the security devices on security as well as the integration in the organization seems to be perceived as a problem. The variables measuring the perception of the expensiveness of security devices have higher scores, indicating a more pronounced tendency of respondents to perceive security solutions as too expensive. In particular, the costs of installing security devices on the whole fleet of vehicles scores highest.

According to the MANOVA, only the first hypothesis was not rejected (H5a). More specifically, the group of respondents that doesn't agree with the fact that, in general, security prototypes are still in a development stage, invests more on security and is less affected by security incidents. On the contrary, no significant differences were found between groups of companies clustered in terms of the perception of the expensiveness of security solutions. The MANOVA couldn't demonstrate that the companies not perceiving security devices as too expensive invest less on security and are more affected by security incidents. Therefore the hypothesis had to be rejected (H5b).

In conclusion, *H5a* is tenable and *H5b* is rejected.

7.7 Cargo Criminals

The following hypothesis was formulated for this stakeholder:

H6. Companies perceiving the opportunistic behavior of criminals do not improve security.

Respondents have a slight tendency to agree that criminals have enhanced technical skills at their disposal, and most of all have access to insiders in organizations to deceive security measures. By clustering the respondents in accordance to the perception of this factor, it was possible to find significant differences in terms of security budget and amount of incidents. Companies that fear the opportunistic behavior of criminals invest less in security and are more subject to security incidents. Hence, hypothesis *H6* is supported.

7.8 Contract Regulatory Associations

Four hypotheses related to contract regulatory associations, were formulated within this investigation. These are the following:

H7a. Companies that experience difficulties in agreeing on security requirements are not encouraged to improve security.

H7b. Companies that perceive the contract agreements as too complex are not encouraged to improve security.

H7c. Companies that don't share risks by means of contract agreements are not encouraged to improve security.

H7d. Companies that do not specify security requirements are not encouraged to improve security.

The importance to share liabilities, to avoid unclear contracts, use standard agreements etc. is testified by the scores of the majority of the variables used to measure the usage of contract agreements including liability sharing between buyers and sellers (Table 49). The scores of the most of these variables are slightly above 3, *Neither Agree nor Disagree*. On the contrary, lower scores are detected for the variables measuring the difficulty to agree on security requirements in contract agreements. In particular, it seems that customers are not very often requiring the specification of security in transportation contracts.

Multivariate techniques unveil that three of the four hypotheses formulated for this actor are tenable. This implies that the factors related to 1) the usage of security requirements in contract

agreements (H7a), 2) the contract complexity (H7b) and 3) risk-sharing (H7c) had an impact on the security investments allocated by companies as well as on the number of incidents suffered. More specifically, the companies that perceive contracts as complex or are not sharing risks or are not specifying security requirements in contracts invest less in security and are more affected by security incidents. Contrarily, the process to agree and specify security requirements doesn't significantly affect security, either in terms of security budget or in terms of security incidents suffered. Hence, this last hypothesis H7d is rejected.

In conclusion, H7a, H7b, H7c are tenable and H7d is rejected.

7.9 Authority

Two hypotheses were formulated for the last stakeholder:

H8a. Transportation companies complying with the AEO certification have higher security.

H8b. Transportation companies that have a negative perception about the impact of AEO regulations on security and efficiency are discouraged from enhancing security.

Descriptive statistics reveal that at the present there are still many companies that don't have knowledge of the AEO certification. The few companies AEO certified prefer to apply to AEO-C (Customs Simplification), followed by AEO-F (Full) and AEO-S (Safety and Security). Respondents believe that AEO may improve competitive advantage; on the other hand, they tend to agree on the fact that the certification is still confusing, too costly and not effective in enhancing security. The application of multivariate techniques reveals that AEO compliance seems to have an impact on the security budget but not on the number of security incidents. By examining the simultaneous relationship between this factor and the security budget and amount of security incidents significant relationships were found. Despite this, the analysis of the mean values of the outcome variables in relation to the two groups revealed that contrarily to the hypothesis, the group of respondents that is AEO certified and that invests more on security is also more affected by security incidents. Hence, it seems that the nature of the relationship between AEO compliance and the security variables is not clear and there could be other underlying dimensions influencing the results. Therefore the first hypothesis *H8a* was rejected.

To understand the reasons for such controversial results, the two clusters are grouped in terms of the size variable (small, medium or large) (Figure 48). The second group that is composed of only 8 companies has a more balanced amount of small, medium and large enterprises. The first

group, composed of 106 organizations, is instead dominated by small companies. Hence, due to the positive relationship between the size of the company on the security budget and incidents it may be hypothesized that the high number of small companies in the first group may have tempered the average values of both security budget and number of incidents (Figure 48).



Figure 48: AEO compliant groups in relation to size of company.

The second hypothesis was tested by clustering the respondents in terms of their perception of the AEO impact on security and efficiency and by measuring the simultaneous relationships of these groups with the security budget and number of security incidents (H8b). The results of the MANOVA didn't show any significant differences between the groups. Hence, this hypothesis was rejected (H8b).

In conclusion, both H8a and H8b are rejected.

8 Conclusion

This section concludes the report by first briefly summarizing the results and next by highlighting the scientific and practical contribution of the research performed. Findings and contributions of the licentiate thesis are also included in this section. At the end of the chapter, proposals for future research are expounded to readers.

8.1 Findings Summary

Statistics indicate that today physical distribution networks are highly exposed to antagonistic threats, turning them into high-revenue targets. Every day cargo is stolen, hijacked, and counterfeited, and personnel working in transportation companies are exposed to the risk of being seriously injured. Less often, we also witness episodes of terror attacks or food and pharmaceuticals contamination that have horrendous consequences on our communities. Logistics, transportation as well as security managers have wide access to handbooks, certification programs (AEO, ISPS, ISO 28001), advanced security technologies etc., to enhance the protection of their assets. Nevertheless, for various reasons, consistent actions are not being properly taken by companies, resulting in an escalation of security incidents that today we may observe in available statistics. Since this situation is not believed to be sustainable from either an economic or a social responsibility viewpoint, this study wonders how companies are coping with the protection of their assets. More specifically, this study has the ambition to enhance our understanding of 1) what factors influence the security of physical distribution networks, 2) how security in physical distribution networks may be enhanced and 3) how existing investmend and risk models may be exploited to estimate the profitability of security solutions.

Doctoral Findings

What factors impact physical distribution security?

By performing an explorative study involving a literature review, observations, unstructured and semi-structured interviews, eight actors interacting in an integrated Physical Distribution Security System (PDSS) are brought to light (Table 98):

- 1. The Law Enforcement Agency.
- 2. Distribution and transport operators.
- 3. Business Security Certifications.

- 4. Insurance Companies.
- 5. Security Providers.
- 6. Criminals.
- 7. Contract Regulatory Associations.
- 8. Authority.

The mechanisms explaining how each actor influences security in physical distribution networks, measured in terms of magnitude of security investments as well as number of security incidents, are depicted in 19 hypotheses and tested with a survey study (Table 98).

The results of the survey study lead to the rejection of 9 hypotheses of the 19 formulated (Table 98). All the hypotheses related to the law enforcement agency are tenable. Three factors, the prosecution of criminals (H1a), the resources allocated by the law enforcement agency (H1b) as well as the collaborative activities (H1c), are significantly affecting the magnitude of investments as well as the number of security incidents borne by industries (Table 98). Transportation companies that have a positive perception of these factors show larger investments in security and are less affected by security incidents. Companies with a negative perception invest less in security and are more affected by security incidents.

Only one of the four hypotheses related to the distribution and transport operators is not rejected: the JIT and security trade-off (H2b). Companies that perceive that JIT has to be traded off with security invest less in security and are more often attacked by criminals (Table 98). A MANOVA unveiled significant differences among groups of respondents clustered in accordance to the length of distribution networks. However, it was found that longer distribution networks correspond to higher security investments. Despite this, the analysis of average security incidents revealed that urban operators working in continental and worldwide contexts experience on average more security incidents than those working in regional and national areas. This implies that the higher investments in security don't correspond to proportionate reductions of security incidents. Therefore the hypothesis H2c had to be rejected (Table 98). Finally, the customers' willingness to pay (H2a) as well as the performance conflicts (H2d) factors do not significantly impact the security investments and security incidents of companies.

The hypothesis related to the impact of compliance with security business certifications on the outcome variables (security budget and security incidents) was rejected (H3). Hence, the

compliance to security certifications doesn't impact the magnitude of security investments and the number of security incidents. Separate univariate analysis confirmed the results of the MANOVA.

Table 98: Summary of the results from the survey study (ANOVA column reports security budget and security incidents significance).

Actor	Hypothesis	ANOVA	MANOVA	Rejected/ Tenable
Law Enforcement Agency	H1a – Criminal Prosecution	(p<0.03; p<0.001)	p<0.001	Tenable
	H1b – Resource Allocation	(p<0.001; p<0.001)	p<0.001	Tenable
	H1c – Involvement in Collaborative Activities	(p<0.001; p>0.05)	p<0.001	Tenable
Distribution and Transport	H2a – Willingness to Pay	(p>0.05; p>0.05)	p>0.05	Rejected
Operators	H2b – Just In Time	(p<0.001; p<0.001)	p<0.001	Tenable
	H2c –Length of Distribution Network	(p<0.001; p>0.05)	p<0.001	Rejected
	H2d – Performance	(p>0.05; p>0.05)	p>0.05	Rejected
Business Security Certifications	H3 – Business Security Certifications	(p>0.05; p>0.05)	p>0.05	Rejected
Insurance Companies	H4a – Insurance Coverage	(p>0.05; p>0.05)	p>0.05	Rejected
	H4b – Premium Discounts	(p<0.001; p<0.001)	p<0.001	Tenable
Security Providers	H5a – Uncertainty of Security Prototypes	(p<0.001; p>0.05)	p<0.001	Tenable
	H5b – Security Expensiveness	(p>0.05; p>0.05)	p>0.05	Rejected
Criminals	H6 – Perception of Opportunistic Behavior	(p<0.001; p>0.05)	p<0.001	Tenable
Contract Regulatory	H7a – Security Requirements Agreements	(p<0.001; p<0.05)	p<0.001	Tenable
Associations	H7b – Contract Complexity	(p<0.001; p>0.05)	p<0.001	Tenable
	H7c – Risk Sharing	(p<0.001; p>0.05)	p<0.001	Tenable
	H7d – Security Requirements Specification	(p>0.05; p>0.05)	p>0.05	Rejected
Authority	H8a – AEO Compliance	(p<0.05; p>0.05)	p<0.05	Rejected
	H8b – AEO impacts on security and efficiency Impacts	(p>0.05; p>0.05)	p>0.05	Rejected

The hypothesis concerning the replacement of security measures with insurances to cover the economic losses of security incidents is rejected (H4a). The cluster analysis enables the identification of a minor group of companies that seem to believe that insurances may fully cover

the losses from security incidents. However, the investments made by these companies, as well as the number of security incidents borne, don't significantly differ from those who are aware of insurance excesses or increments of the premium. Premium discounts impact significantly the investments in security made by companies and the number of incidents suffered. The companies that receive premium discounts invest more in security and are less affected by security incidents. On the contrary, the companies that complain about the lack of premium discounts invest less in security and are subject to a higher number of incidents. Thus, the hypothesis is supported by the data (H4b).

The problem related to the difficulty to integrate and pay back advanced security prototypes has an impact on security. According to the results from the survey, the companies that perceived that the most effective security solutions were not ready yet for market implementation show lower investments in security and are more affected by security incidents (H5a). On the contrary, on average the respondents believe that most available security device are too expensive. Despite this, the perception of the expensiveness of security solutions seems not to be determinant in the allocation of security budget and the consequent number of security incidents suffered. Hence, the hypothesis is rejected (H5b).

The hypothesis related to the opportunistic behavior of criminals is tenable (*H6*). The factor concerning the fear of operators about criminals' learning capabilities, access to technical and economic resources and exploitation of insiders to perpetrate their attacks, may have an impact on the security budget allocated by company and consequently on the number of security incidents suffered. The operators that manifest discouragement about the criminals' capacity to deceive security solutions invest less in security and are more affected by security incidents. Companies that don't feel that criminals are unbeatable invest more in security and manage to decrease the number of incidents.

Three of the four hypotheses formulated for the contract regulatory associations were confirmed by the survey study. Hence, companies that 1) don't specify security requirements in contracts (H7a), 2) view transportation contracts as too complex (H7b), 3) don't use risk sharing in transport contract agreements (H7c) invest less in security and are more affected by security incidents. On the contrary, the factor concerning the difficulties in agreeing on security requirements doesn't significantly diversify respondents, either in terms of security budget allocated or in the number of security incidents suffered. Hence, the last hypothesis H7d is rejected.

Finally, none of the hypotheses related to the Authority stakeholder is tenable. The relationship between AEO compliance and security is rejected, likewise the influence of the perception of AEO impacts on security and efficiency. The MANOVA results show that there are significant differences in terms of security investments and security incidents between companies that are compliant and those who are not compliant with AEO (H8a). However, contrarily to the hypotheses, companies that comply with AEO or that have a positive perception of the certification invest more in security but are still more affected by security incidents. Finally no significant differences were found between companies grouped in terms of their perception of the AEO impacts on security and efficiency. So hypothesis H8b is rejected. Two issues have to be noted concerning the Authority stakeholder. First of all we experienced a strong imbalance between the groups of companies (only 8 companies claimed to be AEO compliant). This highlights the fact that most probably there are still too many companies that have no knowledge of AEO and their real estimation of the impacts of AEO may be unreliable. At the same time, given the novelty of AEO certification, it may be too early to see its real impacts on security. Secondly, the examination of the size of the companies shows that in general small companies are not compliant with AEO and also have a negative perception of the certification. This suggests that the size of the companies is particularly influencial on the factors identified for the authority stakeholder, AEO compliance and the perception of security and efficiency impacts.

Finally, according to the results of the survey, the Physical Distribution Security System framework may be updated by removing the Business Security Certification and Authority actors, since none of the hypotheses formulated could be considered to be tenable. Hence, according to the updated model, 10 hypotheses and 6 stakeholders/entities influence the security of physical distribution security.



Figure 49: The updated Physical Distribution Security System framework (PDSS) with only six actors.

Licentiate Findings

What are the fundamental stakeholders and interactions within and outside physical distribution systems from a security perspective?

The findings are outlined in the Physical Distribution Security System (PDSS) in Figure 4, where eight actors and 19 hypotheses are brought to light as factors influencing the security of physical distribution networks. More details about this part are already given in the previous section.

What mitigation measures can be implemented today to enhance the security of physical distribution operations?

This study has the ambition to provide supply chain and security managers with a comprehensive overview of security solutions including authority regulations, managerial strategies, operative routines and technical systems (Figure 7). A multi-layered approach is developed where 25 security routines, 28 technologies and 14 managerial strategies are positioned. This framework may enhance the comprehension and classification of the results as well as it make easier to identify weak spots in supply chains and related countermeasures. It also makes it possible for

managers to benchmark their security approaches with those that have been collected in this research.

How can existing investment and risk models be exploited to estimate the performance of security solutions and support investment decisions?

This part is split into two sub-sections: the first shows the application of the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) methodology to evaluate the impact of transport security solutions; the second demonstrates how the integration of Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) may enable the estimation of security measures combined into hybrid systems. The first part reports the development of an investment model, based on Quantitative Risk Assessment, and its application on a hypothetical transport assignment.

The second part shows how the combination of security devices may be quantitatively modeled by combining the Quantitative Risk Assessment approach with Reliability Block Diagrams and Monte Carlo techniques. This findings include a numerical example showing how to compare costs and benefits, in the form of risk reductions, of technical security systems for road transport (i.e. GPS, sound barrier etc.) operations against cargo theft. In particular, 7 security solutions and their combination against 6 prominent European cargo threats are evaluated and classified in terms of B/C ratios and NPVs.

8.2 Research Limitations

Doctoral Limitations

Diverse limitations may be mentioned as factors influencing the findings of the survey investigation. The definition and the items used to measure the security of the companies surveyed is the first limitation. To measure the construct of *security* that is used in all the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4, it has been decided to choose two outcome variables measuring the magnitude of investments in security and the number of security incidents. These two measures are believed to provide a sufficient overview of the protection degree of a company: the budget tells how much a company invests in protection measures and the security attacks. However, some limitations should be considered: the first is the precision of the answers, as we don't really know if respondents keep track of security budget and number of incidents.

Hence, it is difficult to determine whether the numbers provided were rough guesses or were extracted from accounting documentation or a security database developed by the company. In addition, if the security budget was extracted from accounting documentation, it is not known under which headings the companies report security expenditures in their documentation. The second limitation concerns the fact that administrative costs related to security procedures may have been difficult to estimate and therefore many companies were just including costs related to investments in technical solutions. Hence, it is possible that the reported security budgets may have some degree of uncertainty. Likewise, it is not known if and how well the companies are keeping track of security incidents. It is well known that many companies have a tendency to underestimate security incidents because they fear bad reputation, loss of market competitiveness or insurance premium increments.

Another important limitation to be mentioned is that this investigation is a cross-sectional study and therefore causality cannot be demonstrated. This implies that all the data presented in this investigation are collected at a defined time and therefore causality between the factors and security variables may not be demonstrated.

Finally, the sample used in this investigation is made of a proportionate combination of small, medium and large enterprises. Hence, these results are not meant to represent medium-large companies but the population of freight transportation companies in Sweden. According to Cochran's formula (Cochran, 1977), it is possible to affirm that the results presented may be generalized to the population considered in this study with a confidence interval of $\pm 6.71\%$ (Confidence Level 95%).

Licentiate Limitations

Limitations related to the collection of security measures to protect physical distribution networks primarily concern the survey methodology. The group of 76 respondents used to collect the data was made of a convenient sample taken from a research project run in Sweden. So, despite the sufficient response rate, external validity is a relevant concern for the study.

Other limitations and concerns have arisen also from the study concerning the development of an investment model. The dominant problem was the lack of statistical data related to the frequency of the incidents as well as to the impact of the security measures on cargo threats. It appears that organizations are not keen to compile security statistics or share them with external entities. The

main reasons are that such statistics could be used by the companies' business partners to demonstrate negligence and prove the liabilities for the damages related to security incidents. As a consequence, to avert this chain of events, many companies prefer not to track their security incidents or the impact of the security solutions. Other motivations include the fear of losing market competitiveness because of bad reputation, or fear of increments of insurance premiums. Hence, theft statistical data had to be retrieved from a Swedish database provided by the law enforcement agency. However the degree of accuracy was so low that it was necessary to combine it with the IIS database provided by TAPA EMEA. Likewise, the lack of a priori statistics related to the impact of security solutions on cargo threats had to be remedied by relying exclusively upon experts' judgments. However, this process was experienced as complicated and time demanding, since many security experts are mostly used to working with qualitative tools and felt uncomfortable when asked to express quantitative assessments. In addition, the collection of experts' judgments revealed the importance of the number of scenarios that has to be evaluated by the experts. Given *n* threats and *m* security solutions, the total number of scenarios to be evaluated is given by $n \times m$, which means that the number of scenarios grows almost exponentially whenever *n* or *m* are increased. Hence, we recommend keeping the number of security solutions and threats low; otherwise the use of experts could become practically unfeasible.

Another important limitation of the tool is also its unfeasibility to model or forecast the behavior of the antagonists. Unlikely safety accidents that are basically random occurrences, security incidents are attacks perpetrated deliberately against a target (Ekwall, 2009). This means that criminals have learning capabilities as well as access to technical and financial resources to deceive the installed security devices. This implies that the investment calculation made in the QRA, especially on long-term periods, may be misleading since the antagonists' behavior is not properly taken into account in the analysis. The RBD techniques may model the behavior of criminals, since when devices are put in series the degree of security corresponds to the protection degree of the weakest device. However, the long-term implications concerning the learning process for deceiving the security measures are not taken into account.

Finally, the economic benefits considered in the investment models concern merely the annual saved losses determined by threat reductions. However, some of the technologies considered in this investigation may bring other benefits in the form of higher efficiency or higher

transportation quality. For instance, it is well known that track and trace technologies as well as RFID systems can improve quick responses to variation of freight demand, visibility along transportation networks and supply chains, or reduce stock outs and unsatisfied customer demand etc. Hence, the inclusion of the monetary value of these factors may heavily influence the outcomes of the QRA.

8.3 Research Contribution

Overall this investigation offers an overview of the research driven within the supply chain and transportation security area between 2008 and 2009. A total of 14 articles are identified and classified into 5 areas: recommendations to enhance security, factors influencing security, security impacts, research agendas and supply chain risk management.

Another contribution consists of the Physical Distribution Security System (PDSS) where findings from literature search, interviews and observations are utilized to identify and formulate a total of 19 hypotheses concerning the factors impacting physical distribution security in terms of security budget and incidents. Thereafter, the hypotheses are systematically related to eight actors whose interactions affect the physical distribution security. Finally, the theoretical validity of the hypotheses is demonstrated by means of a survey study performed with 577 Swedish physical carriers; 9 of the hypotheses are rejected and 10 are supported. Consequently only 6 actors may be retained in the model (Figure 49).

Finally, this investigation aims to provide a descriptive and empirical study within the supply chain and transportation security area, a necessity that is also emphasized in existing research agendas (Staake et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2008). Although some surveys have been conducted in the field, there is still an imbalance between conceptual and normative studies. In addition, the majority of these investigations don't focus on physical distribution networks, but on the goods' buyers and suppliers relationships.

Examining previous research, it may be found that researchers outside the logistics and supply chain management discipline have identified the importance of the law enforcement agency but no empirical data are provided to support its influence on security (Anderson, 2007; Badolato, 2000). Moreover, the importance of collaborative activities is not mentioned in previous research.

The behavior and strategies of distribution and transport operators are also mentioned in previous research. In particular, globalization, JIT trends and performance conflicts (Crone 2006; Khemani 2007; Sheffi, 2001; Tarnef, 2006; Williams et al., 2008) are indicated as sources of security risks. However, no empirical data are provided. It is instead demonstrated that international sourcing is positively related to preferences for suppliers with higher security competences (Voss et al., 2009a; Whipple et al., 2009), as well as 1) the positive relationship between concerns over security incidents and preferences for advanced security and 2) the positive relationship between concerns over security incidents and willingness to trade off price for advanced security (Voss et al., 2009).

The relevance of criminals' actions has also been highlighted by previous research (Ekwall, 2009). Ekwall (2009) identifies three elements characterizing cargo theft: a perpetrator, a supply chain (the criminals' target) and the lack of protective measures. Insufficient protection in one of the links of a supply chain will determine a weak point and the consequent attack (crime displacement effect). Also in this case, empirical data are not provided to demonstrate how the behavior of criminals influences physical distribution security.

Contract agreements are also pointed out by diverse researchers. In particular, the importance of security related partnerships, covering contractual agreements and risk and reward sharings among actors is highlighted (Autry and Bobbitt, 2008; Voss et al., 2009b; Rice and Spayd, 2005; Williams et al., 2009). However, only Voss et al. (2009b) provide empirical evidence. In addition, none of the existing literature mentions the complexity of specifying the security requirements in contracts.

Finally, many authors indicate the central role of authority certifications as a means to enhance security in physical distribution (Sheffi, 2001; Rice and Spayd, 2005; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Williams et al., 2009b; Rice and Caniato, 2003; Sheu et al., 2006). However, empirical evidence is missing.

Hence, to our knowledge, this investigation contributes new factors impacting the security of physical distribution networks that seem to be still unknown in the academic field. These are formulated in the hypotheses belonging to the following stakeholders:

- The law enforcement agency.
- Insurance companies.

- Security Providers.
- Contract Regulatory Associations.

In addition, this investigation has the purpose to provide empirical evidence to formulated concepts in previous research. As a result, some of the hypotheses are confirmed, others are rejected and others present controversial results. The hypotheses that are confirmed are those related to the impacts of JIT trade-off with security, the specification of security requirements in contract agreements, and the influence of cargo criminals' behaviors.

According to the findings of the MANOVA, the hypothesis concerning the customers' willingness to pay is rejected, which is in opposition with the results of previously performed survey studies. The hypothesis concerning the impact of the length of distribution networks is also controversial if compared to previous research. This factor significantly affects security investments and security budget. However, increments of the security budget don't correspond to decrement of security incidents (continental and worldwide distribution networks suffer more incidents than national and regional networks). Finally, the hypotheses concerning the influence of security regulations are not supported by the data. Companies that are favorable to and comply with AEO show higher investments in security. However, the same companies are also affected by a higher number of security incidents. Moreover the uncertainty about the impact of AEO on security and efficiency has no significant impact on the security of the distribution impact.

The multi-layered logistics framewors is also an important scientific contribution. Previous research puts in evidence the importance of increasing supply chain or distribution security either by introducing mitigation measures or by joining security certifications. However many and conflicting analyses and recommendations may be found in the literature, in various articles, and handbooks on security. None of the known literature presents a comprehensive overview of security solutions, classifies it and integrates it into a logistics-based framework as was done in the licentiate study (Urciuoli, 2008; Urciuoli, 2009).

The experience related to the application of the investment model to a hypothetical case brings to light substantial implications for researchers. Previous research within the field of transportation and logistics lacks applications of tools developed in the safety and risk management discipline to handle security risks. Hence, the licentiate thesis presents an experimentation of the

Quantitative Risk Assessment approach (Kaplan, 1997) and demonstrates its feasibility to analyse investments in the transport security area.

In addition, the implementation of the Reliability Block Diagram techniques provides a numerical example showing 1) how the combination of security devices may be evaluated against cargo threats and 2) how to determine the profitability of the combined devices.

8.4 Practical Contribution

This study provides an overview of the magnitude of security investments made by Swedish physical carriers as well as the number of security incidents suffered. The findings of the survey show that today the majority of transportation companies do not invest in security (39% of the respondents), although a minor proportion of respondents (18%) claim to not have any problems with security threats. At the same time, it is emphasized that companies that have higher investments in security manage to effectively reduce the number of security incidents. This trend is particularly accentuated for small and medium enterprises. As a consequence, managers of these companies are strongly recommended to increase their security budgets to significantly reduce security attacks. Managers of larger companies are instead recommended to 1) increase their security budgets, 2) to enhance the understanding of the security threats they are subject to and thereafter 3) to enhance their abilities to tailor their security investments.

This investigation also has the purpose to enhance our understanding of the factors that significantly impact security investments in and attacks on transportation networks. The identification of these factors facilitates the work of identifying actions and recommendations that may effectively stimulate the increment of security budgets and at the same time reduce the security incidents in distribution networks. The law enforcement agency together with the national authority should outline a new legislation framework to improve the prosecution of cargo criminals. At the same time, the police have to consistently increase the allocation of resources. Finally, more companies should be engaged in the collaborative activities aiming to enhance the understanding of security, existing threats and countermeasures, and collaboration among stakeholders.

Distribution and transport stakeholders are recommended to strive to find out new routines and procedures that may enhance security while not affecting the efficiency of Just in Time operations. At the same time, this study shows that operators with longer distribution networks

invest more in security. However, the increments of security budgets don't correspond to proportionate reductions of security incidents. This implies that whenever cargo is moved across national borders, as it usually does as a consequence of globalization, security incidents grow in magnitude and most probably in typology. This suggests the hypothesis that security investments require being higher and more tailored to crime trends in foreign countries. At the same time, to eliminate weak points in transportation networks, operators working with urban transportation are strongly recommended to increase their security investments.

Results from this study raise the hypothesis that security business certifications are not impacting on the security and number of security incidents of companies. Hence, certification bodies are recommended to spread the knowledge of their regulations and to intensify their work to effectively enhance the security of their members.

Results reveal that premium discounts impact the budget allocated by companies to enhance security as well as the number of incidents suffered. In addition, the findings also show that today there are still too many companies that are not being offered premium discounts when enhancing security. Hence, insurance companies are recommended to begin offering premium discounts to gain advantage on their competitors on the transportation market. At the same time, the enhancement of the protection of transport assets and operations will be consequently affected.

Security solution providers are advised to enhance the development of security technologies that may be easily integrated into organizations, which according to this investigation seems to be a significant obstacle to investments.

Contract Regulatory Associations play a fundamental role in the security system identified in this study. This stakeholder is recommended 1) to simplify transportation contracts since many operators experience them as too complex, 2) to introduce the adoption of security requirements in standard agreements and 3) to enhance the understanding of companies to share liabilities related to security incidents. These actions are believed to support the increments in security investments as well as the reduction of security risks.

Other findings of this investigation show that the AEO certification is still unknown to many companies; therefore the national Customs are suggested to spread information about this certification and stimulate companies to comply.

The investigation concerning the collection and classification of security solutions in a logistic multi-layered framework has the ambition to provide supply chain and security managers with a comprehensive overview of security solutions including authority regulations, managerial strategies, operative routines and technical systems. It also enables managers to benchmark their security approaches with those that have been collected in this research. In addition, the developed multi-layered approach enhances the comprehension and classification of the results and makes easier to identify weak spots in supply chains and related countermeasures. More specifically, the analysis of the findings of this investigation allows proposing the following recommendations for managers:

- **Comply with compulsory regulations**. Managers are recommended to follow up and understand the upcoming compulsory regulations being issued by authorities around the world. Compliance with these will ensure free-flow at Customs and will reduce uncertainty delays.
- Increase the hardness of supply chains and eliminate weak spots. The multi-layered logistics framework may be utilized by managers to enhance their understanding of how to protect physical distribution networks, what elements (horizontal protection), what layers (vertical protection) and consequently identify weak points and select proper countermeasures.
- Exploit real time monitoring capabilities. If a security solution is not equipped with real-time event alerts then decision makers will not be able to detect and respond in proper time.
- Integrate security and supply chain management. It is fundamental to train and educate professionals who are able to integrate and harmonize security solutions into supply chains without affecting efficiency. This integration must be followed by the education of logistics and supply chain managers within the security area including risk management and assessment of antagonistic threats (or vice versa). Education should comprise the entire risk management cycle from the identification and assessment of risks, their mitigation actions followed by cost-effectiveness analyses, and the implementation and follow up of security operations
- Ensure the comprehension of security across the whole supply chain. The results collected with the survey revealed more than a simple collection of security solutions.

They disclose how main stakeholders involved in the security discussion are working with security as well as a fundamental knowledge gap among them. Goods owners and logistics service providers (LSP) show strong familiarity with security requirements and security certifications (i.e. C-TPAT, AEO etc.). On the contrary, the interviewed railway carriers merely have knowledge of security routines. Similarly, road transport carriers have very scarce knowledge of security measures, and only a few of them are actively working with customized security services. Thus, it is recommended that managers ensure the comprehension of security across the whole supply chain (including all the elements of the physical distribution network and all the layers of the logistics multi-layered framework). Finally, future research should be carried out to confirm the hypothesis of this knowledge gap and to discuss on its possible reasons.

The investigation related to the development of the investment model may support practitioners with the quantification of the impact of security solutions. This approach may enhance their ability to make decisions about what security solutions they should purchase to protect their assets. Basically, through the collection of statistical data, causal modelling, experts' judgements and computer simulations, capital investment indexes such as B/C ratios and NPVs may be computed. In addition, the adoption of probability distributions also enhances the understanding of the degree of uncertainty of the outputs and gives decision makers more information about the stability of the outcomes. Finally, unlike qualitative approaches that are widely used today among practitioners, the quantification of the risk reductions may also be utilized by stakeholders to 1) agree on freight rate increments, 2) agree on premium discounts, and 3) evaluate the impact of existing business (i.e. TAPA EMEA) and authority certifications (i.e. AEO, C-TPAT, ISPS etc.).

8.5 Future Research

Several research ideas can be drawn from the investigations performed in this doctoral thesis. These ideas are either closely linked to the survey study presented in this report or found in the previous work performed in the licentiate thesis.

The first concerns the measures developed for the constructs used for security and the 19 factors identified in this study. Most of these items were directly derived from the findings of the explorative study (literature, interviews and observations). So future research should be

conducted to validate the indicators used in this investigation and to develop robust indicators to measure these constructs. In particular, the security construct could be measured by means of the routine activity theory according to which cargo theft is characterized by three elements: a perpetrator, a supply chain (the criminals' target) and lack of protective measures (Ekwall, 2009). Hence, the usage of these three indicators may be justified by a sound theoretical background.

The survey used in this investigation is a cross-sectional study, which implies that causality between the factors and the security variables cannot be demonstrated. Therefore, to be able to test causality, future research should be carried out to perform experimental surveys according to which the factors and the outcome variables are measured at two different points in time.

The results of this investigation may be generalized to the transportation sector in Sweden (according to Cochran with a confidence level of $\pm 6.71\%$). Therefore, to extend the external validity of the findings, future research attempts should be made to include samples from other countries.

Similar surveys could be performed to understand the factors driving security for other actors belonging to the supply chain network, such as goods owners or logistics service providers. These actors, for practical reasons, were excluded from this analysis, but are still relevant to gain a complete picture of supply chain security. In addition, such a study could also be exploited to analyze the security topic under the umbrella of the supply chain risk management construct.

Finally, this investigation reveals that on some occasions higher security investments don't correspond to lower security incidents (the distribution length factor as well as compliance with AEO). As a consequence, future research should be devoted to enhance the understanding of this controversial relationship and bring to light the underlying dimensions that have determined these findings.

Other ideas for future research may be linked to the investigations performed in the licentiate thesis. Future work could be performed to enhance the investment model or to experiment on real case studies with the QRA and RBD techniques.

From a methodological viewpoint, the application of game theory could be an approach to model the opportunistic behaviours of criminals and thereby improve the reliability of the profitability indexes for long-term investment periods. Another approach to enhance the ability of the QRA to model the behaviour of antagonists concerns the gathering of further transport security statistics that could allow the observation and consequent learning of incident patterns as well as of attackers' behaviours. Thereafter, by integrating the QRA approach with economic game theory it could be possible, first of all, to predict how attackers (cargo criminals) and defenders (transportation companies) may behave under different security policies; and secondly what will be the losses or revenues for each of the scenarios developed.

Future research could be performed by exploiting the QRA approach to simulate the impact of security incidents on supply chains' efficiency in terms of inventory costs, transportation costs, number of stock outs, unsatisfied customer demand etc. Existing research has already developed simulation models showing how supply chain disruptions determine loss of efficiency and monetary costs to operators. However, since the majority of these works are addressed to safety accidents, the investigation of the impacts of security incidents could be a relevant issue for future research.

Finally, due to the lack of cargo crime statistical data, future research should be conducted to develop tools and metrics to aid operators in the gathering of transport security statistics, in particular statistics supporting risk management activities (i.e. including cargo crime statistics, *modus operandi*, impact of security solutions etc.). The access to detailed statistics may also facilitate the exploitation of experts' judgements, especially when wider sets of transport security scenarios have to be evaluated.

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APPENDIX 1 – Glossary and Abbreviations

AEO. Authorized Economic Operator.

- AMR. Advance Manifest Rule.
- ANOVA. Analysis of Variance.
- **B/C.** Benefits/Costs Ratio.
- CBP. Customs and Borders Protection.
- CCTV. Closed Circuit Television.
- CIM. International Convention concerning the carriage of goods by rail.
- CRM. Convention relative au contrat de transport international de Marchandises par route.
- CSI. Container Security Initiative.
- C-TPAT. Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism.
- EMEA. Europe Middle East Africa.
- FIATA. International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations.
- FSR. Freight Security Requirements.
- GSM. Global System for Mobile communication.
- GPRS. General Packet Radio Service.
- GPS. Global Positioning System.
- ICC. International Chamber of Commerce.
- **IMB.** International Maritime Bureau.
- IMO. International Maritime Organization.
- **INCOTERMS.** International Commercial Terms.
- **IR.** Infrared.
- ISO. International Organization for Standardization.

ISPS. International Ship and Port facility Security Code.

JIT. Just In Time.

KMO. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure.

LSP. Logistics Service Provider.

MANOVA. Multivariate Analysis Of Variance.

NPV. Net Present Value.

NSAB. Nordiskt Speditörförbunds Allmänna Bestämmelser.

OECD. Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.

PCA. Principal Component Analysis.

PDSS. Physical Distribution Security System.

QRA. Quantitative Risk Assessment.

RFID. Radio Frequency Identification.

ROI. Return Of Investment.

SOA. Service Oriented Architecture.

SOLAS. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.

TAPA EMEA. Transported Asset Protection Association.

TQM. Total Quality Management.

TSR. Trucking Security Requirements.
APPENDIX 2 – Interview Questions

Q1. Could you describe your company and your role within the company?

Q2. What is the vision and goal of your company from a security viewpoint?

Q3. What do you think are the main reasons behind the increased insecurity of supply/distribution chains?

Q3.1. According to your experience, can you describe how cargo criminals behave? Q12. What kind of agreements do you issue when you purchase/sell transportation services?

Q3.2. Do you perceive the standard agreements as complex? Has it ever happened that you preferred a verbal agreement?

Q3.3. Do you specify security requirements in the contracts? What is stated in the contracts in this case?

Q3.4. Is it possible that transport operators prefer to purchase property insurance, taking the risks to pay the premium's excesses, instead of buying security measures? Do you have any other type of insurances besides the commercial?

Q3.5. Have you got premium reductions from insurances when implementing security solutions?

Q3.6. How do you cooperate with the law enforcement agencies? What do you think about their effort in combating cargo threats?

Q3.7. Do you have knowledge of the upcoming governmental regulations concerning supply chain security? If yes how are you working to meet the AEO requirements?

Q3.8. Do you know TAPA EMEA? Are you a TAPA EMEA member?

Q5. Can you describe the security solutions you have knowledge about?

Q6. Have you ever invested in security?

Q7. What have been/would be the main reasons for investing/not investing in security?

Q7.1. How do you internalize the costs for higher security?

Q7.2. Do you perform investment analyses when purchasing or implementing a security solution?

Q7.3. Do you have specific requirements for the payback period of such investments?

APPENDIX 3 – Swedish Business Register

Table 99: standard variables included in Swedish Business Register.

N	Description						
Name	Description						
CompanyName	The Name of the Company or the Sole trader						
FirmDesignation	The Sole trader's firm (name of business) and for other legal forms the designation of the head office						
StreetAddress	Street Address						
Town	Town						
PostalAddress	Postal Address incl c/o address						
PostalCode	Postal Code						
PostalTown	Postal Town						
Telephone	National dialling code + telephone number						
Email	Email contact of the company						
MunicipalityCode	Municipality code which refers to the unit's physical location						
MunicipalityName	Municipality						
AregionCode	Aregion (01-70), regional division based on municipality code						
AregionName	Aregion (01-70), regional division based on municipality code						
MunHeadOffCode	Code which refers to the municipality where the board has its seat						
MunHeadOffText	Municipality where the board has its seat						
SizeClassCode	Size class based on number of employees						
SizeClassText	Size class based on number of employees						
Activity1	Primary Activity by SE-SIC 2007						
Activity2	Subordinate Activity						
Activity3	Subordinate Activity						
Activity4	Subordinate Activity						
Activity5	Subordinate Activity						
StartupDate	Date (yyyymmdd) of registration for VAT/employment taxes						
LegalFormCode	Legal Form						
NumLocUn	Number of local units the company has registred in Sweden						
NumFirms	Number of firms the sole trader has registred						
ConturyCode	19=Sole traders born in the 20th century						
CenturyCoue	16=Other legal form than Sole trader						
OrgNum	The company's unique identity number or the sole traders social security number excluding the last four digits						

Tabla	100 · T	Definition	ofee	mnonias'	ontogorias	in the	Swadich	Business	Degister
rable	100. L	Jerminuon	01 00	mpames	categories	in the	Sweuisii	Dusiness	Register.

	TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE	DEFINITION
49200	Freight rail transport	All freight transport by railway (not including storage, management of terminals and infrastructure, and cargo handling)
49410	Freight transport by road	All freight transport by road (not including removal companies, water, timber and waste transportation, terminal operations, packaging and postal service)
50201	Scheduled sea and coastal freight water transport	Scheduled coastal and sea transportation of goods (not including scheduled archipelago goods transport, storage, terminal operations and management (harbours), cargo handling)
50202	Non-scheduled sea and coastal freight water transport	Non-scheduled coastal and sea transportation of goods (not including non-scheduled archipelago goods transportation, storage, terminal operations and management (harbours), cargo handling and cargo ships rental)
50401	Scheduled inland freight water transport	Scheduled inland waterways (rivers, canals, lakes etc.) freight transportation
50402	Non-scheduled inland freight water transport	Non-scheduled inland waterways (rivers, canals, lakes etc.) freight transportation
51211	Scheduled freight air transport	Scheduled goods transportation by air.
51212	Non-scheduled freight air transport	Non-scheduled goods transportation by air.
52200	Warehousing and storage	Silos and granary administration, general warehouses, cold storage etc.
52219	Other service activities incidental to land transportation	Support services to inland transportation of passengers, animals and goods. It includes management of terminals (train stations, bus stations and goods terminals), train railway infrastructure, road infrastructure, taxi stations, shunting yards. Cargo handling is not included.
52220	Service activities incidental to water transportation	Support services to water transportation. This category includes organizations connected to the transportation of passengers, animals and goods by waterways, management of terminals, channels, navigation, pilotage, rescue services, salvage and towing, management of lighthouses. It doesn't include Cargo handling, 3PLs/4PLs, and management of small boat ports.
52230	Service activities incidental to air transportation	Support services to air transportation including organizations connected to air transportation of passengers, animals and goods, management of airport terminals, airport and ATC (Air Traffic Control), airfield land services.
52241	Harbour cargo handling	Cargo handling in harbours. This category includes loading and unloading of goods in the ports as well as stevedoring organizations. Management of terminals is not included.
52249	Other cargo handling	Loading and unloading of goods and baggage (except in ports). Management of terminals and loading and unloading operations in ports are not included

52290	Other transportation support activities	Cargo support services like forwarding, 3PLs, 4PLs, administration of transport documents and waybills, Customs brokers, sea and air forwarders, capacity brokerage on sea and air vessels, cargo handling (i.e. protection packaging).
53201	Other postal activities	Activities like sorting, collection, transportation and delivery of letters and packages. Goods transportation is not included.
53202	Courier activities	Home delivery services (couriers with bikes, motorbikes or taxi).
53203	Newspaper distribution	Delivery and distribution of magazines and newspapers.

APPENDIX 4 – The Survey (Swedish)

SURVEY - COVER LETTER (SWEDISH)

Bäste säkerhets-/logistik-/risk-/transportansvarig!

Du får detta brev på grund av ditt engagemang inom transport-, logistik- och/eller säkerhetshantering. Jag ber om Din hjälp att fylla i bifogad enkät som del av en undersök-ning som utförs av *Institutionen för teknisk ekonomi och logistik* vid Lunds Universitet.

Enligt tillgänglig statistik finns det stor brottslig verksamhet som påverkar godsdistributionskedjor. Brottsfrekvensens storlek samt dess konsekvenser är så höga att många företag har lyft fram "säkerhet" som en av företagsledningens främsta prioriteringar. <u>Säkerhetstillbud,</u> <u>såsom stöld, smuggling, förfalskning, piratkopiering osv, innebär inte bara ekonomiska</u> <u>förluster för inblandade företag utan också att transportoperatörer har utsatts för våld och</u> <u>skador.</u> Dessutom, om konsumtions-produkter som läkemedel och livsmedel förfalskas eller blir förorenade, kan konsek-venserna för vårt samhälle bli allvarliga.

För att kunna förbättra transportsäkerheten är det av största vikt att förstå hur företag fastställer sina säkerhetsinsatser, inklusive budget och skyddsnivå. Därför är syftet med denna undersökning att identifiera vilka faktorer det är som styr eller utgör hinder för säkerheten i transportkedjor. Arbetet finansieras av VINNOVAs kompetenscentrum NGIL, Next Generation Innovative Logistics (http://www.ngil.se). Denna studie handleds av professor Sten Wandel, professor Andreas Norrman och universitetslektor Henrik Tehler vid Lunds Universitet.

I denna studie samarbetar vi dessutom med <u>Polisen i Västra Götalands län</u>, som är starkt engagerad i transportsäkerhetsfrågor och som i framtiden kommer att använda resultaten av denna undersökning för att anpassa regler, driva samarbetsinitiativ mellan transportaktörer, utveckla och sprida information kring kostnadseffektiva säkerhetslösningar för att skydda transporter från brottslingar, osv. <u>Därför är ditt svar på detta frågeformulär av avgörande</u> <u>betvdelse för att uppnå dessa mål och därmed i framtiden säkerställa säkrare och</u> <u>effektivare transporter.</u> **VIKTIGT!** Alla svar är konfidentiella. Ditt namn, namnet på ditt företag samt dina kontaktuppgifter kommer att hållas strikt konfidentiella, och de kommer inte att avslöjas för tredje part eller i någon typ av publikation eller media. Det tar mellan 15 och 20 minuter att fylla i enkäten. Vi vill ha ditt svar senast den 30:e april 2010. Som en uppskattning för din hjälp kommer du att få en kopia av resultaten av denna analys (var vänlig specificera i frågeformuläret den e-postadress som resultaten ska skickas till).

<u>Använd svart eller blå bläckpenna för att fylla i enkäten</u>. Sätt ett kryss för varje fråga om inget annat anges. Om du sätter ett kryss fel, fyll i den felaktiga rutan så att den blir helt fylld, och sätt ett nytt kryss i den rätta rutan. När du är färdig, lägg enkäten ovikt i det frankerade kuvertet som ingår i paketet du fick, klistra igen det och skicka allt via vanlig post.

Du är välkommen att kontakta författaren nedan om du har några kommentarer eller frågor.

Tack på förhand för din hjälp!

Vänliga hälsningar,

Luca Urciuoli

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ALMÄNNA FRÅGOR

Тур	av företag:					
[1]	Järnvägstransport	[5]	Posttransport		[9]	Vet ej
[2]	Vägtransport	[6]	Kurir		[10]	Vill inte svara
[3]	Sjötransport	[7]	Tidningsutdelare			
[4]	Flygtransport	[8]	Annat:			
Före	etagets årliga försäljning (kro	nor):				
[1]	Mindre än 500 000	[5]	Från till 10 miljoner till 20 miljo	oner	[9]	Mer än 1 miljard
[2]	Från 500,000 til 1 miljon	[6]	Från 20 miljoner till 100 miljon	er	[10]	Vet ej
[3]	Från 1 miljon till 5 miljoner	[7]	Från 100 miljoner till 500 miljon	ner	[11]	Vill inte svara
[4]	Från 5 miljoner till 10 miljoner	[8]	Från 500 miljoner till 1 miljard			
	mijonei					
Anta	al anställda:					
[1]	0 anställda	[4]	50 till 250		[7]	Mer än 1000
[2]	1 till 10	[5]	251 till 500		[8]	Vet ej
[3]	10 till 49	[6]	501 till 1000		[9]	Vill inte svara
Posi	tion i företaget:					
[1]	Logistikchef	[4]	VD/Ägare [7	7]	Vill inte s	vara
[2]	Transportplanerare	[5]	Driftschef [8	8]	Annat	
[3]	Trafikledare	[6]	Säkerhetsansvarig		L	
Huv	udsakliga typer av produkter	som ti	ansporteras (flera val är möjl	iga):		
[1]	Livsmedel	[4]	Fordonselektronik	[7]	Annat:	
[2]	Kläder	[5]	Fordonskemikalier	[8]	Vet ej	
[3]	Läkemedel	[6]	Kemikalier	[9]	Vill inte	e svara
[-]		[•]		L. 1		
Ang	e i vilket län som din huvudve	erksam	het är placerad			
ہ [1]	Rlekinge län	[10]	Norrhottens län		[10]	Västerhottens län
[1]	Dalarnas län	[11]	Örebro län		[19] [20]	Västernorrlands län
[2]	Gävlehorgs län	[12]	Östergötlands län		[20]	Västmanlands län
[4]	Gotlands län	[13]	Skåne län		[22]	Västra Götalands län
[5]	Hallands län	[]4]	Södermanlands län		[23]	Vill inte svara
[6]	Jämtlands län	[15]	Stockholms län		[]	
[7]	Jönköpings län	[16]	Uppsala län			
[8]	Kalmar län	[17]	Värmlands län			
[9]	Kronobergs län	[18]	Norrbottens län			
	5					

E-postadress (ange här din e-postadress om du vill ha en kopia av resultaten):

Ange här:

SÄKERHET

Ang förel	Ange den budget (i kronor) som din organisation hade under 2009 för säkerhetskostnader (inkl. kostnader för förebyggande åtgärder och utredningskostnader):										
[1]	Ange här:										(kronor)
[2]	Vet ej.										_
[3]	Vill inte svara.										
Vän	ligen ange det tota na) som din organ	ala a nisati	ntal	let s har	säke var	rhet it in	tstillt ablan	bud daa	l (bá dii	åde f unde	örhindrade och sådana som du inte har lyckats r 2009·
stop	pa) som un organ	IISati	UII	1141	vai	10 11	i Dian	ua		anuc	7
[1]	Ange här:										
[2]	Vet ej.										
[3]	Vill inte svara.										
Ang unde	e hur stor andel (i er 2009:	i pro	cen	t) a	v ov	anst	tåenc	de k	oelo	pp s	om är säkerhetstillbud som du har lyckats stoppa
[1]	Ange här:					(0%	- 10	0%))		
[2]	Vet ej.										
[3]	Vill inte svara.										
Vänligen ange den genomsnittliga andelen (i procent) av sändningar som under 2009 inte levererades enligt överenskommet tidsfönster (leveransprecision), pga ett säkerhetstillbud:											
[1]	Ange här:		Ì			(0%	- 1 0	0%))		
[2]	Vet ej.										
[3]	Vill inte svara.										

	••	
12 2 1 1 1 N 1		

Under 2009	Håller inte alls med	Håller inte med	Varken instämmer eller inte instämmer	Håller med	Håller helt med	Kan inte svara
har den svenska åklagarmyndighetens ansträngning att åtala transportbrottslingar varit mycket bra.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
när brottslingar som angriper vår verksamhet har gripits, har det tagit lång tid innan de frigivits från fängelset.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har transportbrottslingar alltid snabbt gripits och ställts till svars på ett korrekt sätt av polis och åklagare.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har vårt förtroende för de ansträngningar som de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna vidtagit för att åtala brottslingar ökat.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har vi märkt att brottslingar som en gång gripits sedan har hållit sig borta från vår verksamhet.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har vi märkt att transportbrott alltid har fått hårda straff.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har vår organisation alltid rapporterat säkerhetstillbud till de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har de brottsbekämpande myndigheternas insatser att gripa brottslingar varit mycket bra.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna avsatt tillräckliga resurser för att bekämpa transportbrottslighet.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har vi alltid rapporterat säkerhetstillbud till de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna eftersom vi har förtroende för att lämpliga åtgärder mot brottslingar kommer att vidtas.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
hade rapportering av säkerhetstillbud högsta prioritet i vår organisation.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
märkte vi att ju mer vi rapporterade säkerhetstillbud desto bättre har insatserna från de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna varit.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

Under 2009	Håller inte alls med	Håller inte med	Varken instämmer eller inte instämmer	Håller med	Håller helt med	Kan inte svara
har vår organisation alltid deltagit på seminarier och andra aktiviteter som anordnas av de nationella brottsbekämpande organen.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har vår organisation, genom att delta i seminarier och aktiviteter som organiseras av de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna, stimulerats att öka säkerheten.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har vår organisation, genom att delta i seminarier och aktiviteter som organiseras av de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna, stimulerats att öka kunskapen om hur man kan skydda sig från tillbud.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har vi märkt att vi, under seminarier och aktiviteter som vi har deltagit i, kunnat diskutera problemet med andra företag och kommit fram till intressanta initiativ för skyddande av gods.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har vi märkt att det är viktigt att stärka samarbetet med de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna för att effektivt bekämpa transportbrottslighet.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har vi märkt att samarbetet med de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna förbättrat vår förmåga att förebygga och återställa säkerhetstillbud.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

DISTRIBUTIONS- OCH TRANSPORTOPERATÖRER

När du förbättrar säkerheten, vad är den genomsnittliga prisökning som accepteras av dina kunder (vänligen hänvisa till den genomsnittliga prisökningen som ni har kommit överens om under 2009)?

[1] Ange här ökningen per sänding: (0% - 100%)

[2] Vet ej.

[3] Vill inte svara.

Under 2009	Håller inte alls med	Håller inte med	Varken instämmer eller inte instämmer	Håller med	Håller helt med	Kan inte svara
begärde våra kunder ofta högre säkerhet men ville inte betala för det.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
märkte vi att det är svårt att införa säkerhetsåtgärder eftersom vi inte hade råd med dem.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
märkte vi att vi inte kunde höja våra priser eftersom kunderna inte var villiga att betala för säkerheten.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
insåg vi att de marginella intäkter som vi har i vår verksamhet gör det svårt att investera i säkerhet.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har vår organisation fortsatt att vara konkurrenskraftig på marknaden trots att vi inte investerar i säkerhet.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
var andelen kunder som är villiga att betala för säkrare transporter mycket låg.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har vi haft svårigheter att kontrollera säkerheten eftersom vår organisation har en hög grad av Just In Time (JIT).	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
hände det ofta att fordon blev angripna medan de väntade på att lossa vid en terminal.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har tillämpningen av JIT-principen ökat risken för brottsliga angrepp.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har vi varit tvungna att balansera säkerhet mot JIT-effektivitet.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
har vi insett att JIT-principen ökar godsflödet på vägarna och därmed även antal säkerhetstillbud.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
var det stora dilemmat inom vår organisation om vi bör prioritera JIT-principen eller säkerhet.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

- [1] Inom stad
- Hela världen [5]
- Inom regionen [2] [6] Vet ej
- [3] Inom landet
- [7] Vill inte svara
- Kontinentalt [4] [8]

Välj en av följande säkerhetsåtgärder (svar kopplas till efterföljande fråga):

[1] GPS Track and Trace

Kontroll av anställdas [5]

- bakgrund
- **Fordons-/Containerlarm**

[2] Mekaniska Lås

[4] Ljudbarriär

- Elektroniska sigill. [6]
- Tanklockslås [10]

- Skåp med hårda väggar [3]
- VHF tracker [7] Startspärr för fordonet [8]
- Annan: [11]

[9]

Införandet av ovan vald säkerhetslösning kommer	Håller inte alls med	Håller inte med	Varken instämmer eller inte instämmer	Håller med	Håller helt med	Kan inte svara
att negativt påverka kundtillfredsställelsen.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
att ha negativ inverkan på punktliga leveranser.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
öka våra kostnader för arbetskraft.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
öka våra administrativa kostnader.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
att göra vårt arbete för att tillfredsställa kunderna svårare.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
oundvikligen att öka leveransförseningar.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
oundvikligen att öka mängden rutiner som operatörerna måste följa.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
att göra transportoperatörernas arbetsmiljö för komplicerad och resurskrävande.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
oundvikligen att öka mängden teknik som operatörerna måste lära sig och använda varje dag.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

- Ej tillämpligt

SÄKERHETSCERTIFIERING

Ange vilka av följande certifieringar / riktlinjer du följer för att förbättra säkerheten (flera alternativ möjliga):

[1] TAPA EMEA.

[2]

ISO28000.

[4] Inte någon av ovanstående.

[5] Vet ej

- [3] Annat:
- [6] Vill inte svara

FÖRSÄKRINGSBOLAG

Vänligen ange den del av sändningar som var fullt försäkrade mot säkerhetstillbud under 2009 (oavsett vem som betalade försäkringen).

[1] Ange här: (0% - 100%)

- [2] Vet ej.
- [3] Vill inte svara.

I hur stor andel av dina sändingar saknar godsägaren en varuförsäkring (enligt NSAB2000)?

[1] Ange här:		(0% - 100%)
---------------	--	-------------

- [2] Vet ej.
- [3] Vill inte svara.

Hur stor är andelen av dina sändningar som medförde ett utökat ansvar jämfört med NSAB2000?

- [1] Ange här: (0% 100%)
- [2] Vet ej.
- [3] Vill inte svara.

Om ditt företag har ett captivebolag för sitt försäkringsprogram, hur stor andel av förluster i samband med säkerhetstillbud täcktes under 2009 av det bolaget?

- [1] Ange här: (0% 100%)
- [2] Vet ej.
- [3] Vill inte svara.

Ange den högsta rabatt (%) som du fått under 2009 från ditt försäkringsbolag efter installation eller genomförande av en säkerhetsåtgärd:

Ange vilken säkerhetslösning:

[1]	Ange här högsta rabatt:		(0% - 100%)
[0]	X 7 / •		

- [2] Vet ej.
- [3] Vill inte svara.

	Håller inte alls med	Håller inte med	Varken instämmer eller inte instämmer	Håller med	Håller helt med	Kan inte svara
Försäkringar är den bästa lösningen för att täcka ekonomiska förluster vid säkerhetstillbud.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Vår organisation har omfattande användning av kommersiella försäkringar för att täcka förluster i samband med säkerhetstillbud.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
För att täcka förluster i samband med säkerhetstillbud har vår organisation ett captivebolag för sitt försäkringsprogram.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Vår organisation använder sig av försäkringar för att täcka direkta och indirekta förluster orsakade av säkerhetstillbud.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Alla de ekonomiska förluster som uppkommer i samband med säkerhetstillbud omfattas av våra försäkringar.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Genom att teckna försäkringar kommer vi aldrig att förlora pengar i händelse av tillbud.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Vår organisation får premierabatter från försäkringsbolag när skyddsåtgärder genomförs.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Det är lätt att komma överens om premierabatter med försäkringsbolag.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Att diskutera premierabatter med vårt försäkringsbolag är aldrig en tids- och resursförlust.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Att installera säkerhetsteknik kommer att hjälpa organisationen att spara pengar på försäkringspremien.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Att genomföra säkerhetsrutiner gör att vår organisation sparar pengar på försäkringspremien.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Premierabatter erbjuds alltid organisationer som arbetar aktivt med säkerhet.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

SÄKERHETSLÖSNINGAR

	Håller inte alls med	Håller inte med	Varken instämmer eller inte instämmer	Håller med	Håller helt med	Kan inte svara
Den säkerhetsteknik som verkar ha den kortaste återbetalningstiden är fortfarande inte redo för industriellt bruk.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Det kommer att ta för mycket tid och arbete innan en avancerad säkerhetslösning implementeras i vår organisation.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Säkerhetsprototyper misslyckas ofta med att öka säkerheten och kommer aldrig förvandlas till pålitliga produkter.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Det mesta av befintlig säkerhetsteknik är för svår att integrera inom vår organisation.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Det mesta av befintlig säkerhetsteknik är för svår att integrera med våra aktiviteter.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
De mest effektiva och avancerade säkerhetslösningarna är för dyra.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
De säkerhetslösningar som vi har råd med kan inte effektivt hindra transportbrottslighet.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Vår säkerhetsbudget är inte tillräckligt hög för att köpa de mest effektiva säkerhetslösningarna.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Återbetalningstiden för de mest effektiva säkerhetslösningarna är för lång.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Säkerhetskostnaderna ökar avsevärt vid inköp av säkerhetssystem som skall installeras på hela organisationens fordonsflotta.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

BROTTSLINGAR

	Håller inte alls med	Håller inte med	Varken instämmer eller inte instämmer	Håller med	Håller helt med	Kan inte svara
Det spelar ingen roll hur mycket skydd vi upprättar på våra tillgångar, kriminella kommer alltid att hitta sätt att slå till mot oss.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Vår organisation har erfarenhet av att brottslingarna snabbt lär sig hur man kan överlista nya skyddsåtgärder.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
De kriminella gruppernas organisation är alltför avancerad för att bekämpas endast med genomförande av säkerhetsåtgärder (både tekniska och icke tekniska).	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
De flesta av säkerhetstillbuden begås med hjälp av insiders som vet vilka säkerhetsåtgärder vi använder.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Idag finns det ingen optimal teknik eller metod för att effektivt hindra transportbrottslighet.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Det spelar ingen roll hur mycket skydd vi upprättar på våra tillgångar, kriminella kommer alltid att hitta sätt att slå till mot oss.Vår organisation har erfarenhet av att brottslingarna snabbt lär sig hur man kan överlista nya skyddsåtgärder.De kriminella gruppernas organisation är alltför avancerad för att bekämpas endast med genomförande av säkerhetsåtgärder (både tekniska och icke tekniska).De flesta av säkerhetstillbuden begås med hjälp av insiders som vet vilka 	aller inte alls med [1] [1] [1] [1] [1]	Håller inte med [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2]	er inte instämmer [3] [3] [3] [3] [3]	Håller med [4] [4] [4] [4]	Håller helt med [5] [5] [5] [5]	Kan inte svara [6] [6] [6] [6]

KONTRAKTLAGSTIFTNING

Ange hur stor andel (%) av kontrakt som slutits av företaget under 2009, där ansvar fördelas mellan de inblandade parterna (annat än vad som beskrivits i NSAB2000).

[1] Ange här: (0% - 100%).

[2] Vet ej.

[3] Vill inte svara.

Vänligen ange den del av alla avtal som organisationen år 2009 endast slöt muntligt med kunderna.

- [1] Ange här: (0% 100%).
- [2] Vet ej.
- [3] Vill inte svara.

	Håller inte alls med	Håller inte med	Varken instämmer eller inte instämmer	Håller med	Håller helt med	Kan inte svara
Under 2009 har vår organisation använt sig av skriftliga avtal för att specificera riskdelning mellan båda parter som är inblandade i distribution / lagring av varor.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Det är viktigt att alla inblandade parter i distribution och lagring av gods delar ansvaret i händelse av tillbud.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Kontrakt måste vara tydliga för att ange vilken typ av standardavtal som måste följas och vem som är ansvarig för vad.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Det är viktigt att undvika användning av otydliga avtal där ansvar mellan parterna inte är specificerade.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
I våra kontrakt som fastställts under 2009, definieras fördelning av ansvar i enlighet med NSAB 2000.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Avtal med våra kunder är alltför komplexa för att definiera och enas om.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Eftersom avtalsöverenskommelserna med våra kunder är alltför komplexa att definiera och enas om föredrar vi muntliga överenskommelser.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Det tar för lång tid och för mycket resurser att utarbeta och teckna avtal.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Även om vi använder skriftliga avtal förstår vi inte riktigt deras betydelse och nytta för vår organisation.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Vi har använt skriftliga avtal men vi vet inte riktigt hur man ska utnyttja dem i fall ett säkerhetstillbud inträffar.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

Vänligen ange den del av skriftliga avtal som din organisation fastställt med kunder under 2009, där säkerhetskraven är angivna i texten.

- [1] Ange här: (0% 100%).
- [2] Vet ej.
- [3] Vill inte svara.

	Håller inte alls med	Håller inte med	Varken instämmer eller inte instämmer	Håller med	Håller helt med	Kan inte svara
Under 2009 har våra kunder alltid angett i avtalen vilka säkerhetskrav som bör tillämpas.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Det är viktigt att specificera säkerhetskraven för att klargöra skyddsgraden som behövs under distribution / lagring av varor.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Under 2009 har de flesta av våra kunder bett att specificera säkerhetskraven i avtalen.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Under 2009 har vår organisation alltid föreslagit detaljerad beskrivning av säkerhetskrav i avtal.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Under 2009 har både vår organisation och våra kunder enkelt kommit överens om hur man specificerar säkerhetskraven i avtalen.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Under 2009 har vi haft svårigheter att komma överens med våra partners om vilka säkerhetskrav som bör anges i avtal.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Överenskommelseprocessen om säkerhetskrav i avtal tar för mycket tid och resurser från vår organisation.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Vi föredrar att undvika att specificera säkerhetskrav i avtal eftersom det är alltför komplicerat.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Vi vet inte riktigt hur man ska specificera säkerhetskrav eftersom det är svårt att uppskatta effekterna på säkerhet för de utvalda åtgärderna.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Under 2009 har vi och våra kunder ofta haft olika åsikter om effekterna av befintliga lösningar på säkerhetshot.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

TULLVERKET

Vår organisation innehar eller förbereder sig inför följande certifiering:

[1] **AEO-C.**

[5] Vet ej.[6] Vill inte svara.

- [2] AEO-S.[3] AEO-F.
- [4] Ingen av dem.

	Håller inte alls med	Håller inte med	Varken instämmer eller inte instämmer	Håller med	Håller helt med	Kan inte svara
Vår organisation uppfattar AEO:s krav som förvirrande.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
AEO-certifieringen kommer inte att öka vår säkerhet.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Förberedelsearbete för AEO-certifiering kommer att kosta oss för mycket tid och resurser i förhållande till de förmåner en AEO certifiering innebär.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Det kommer inte att vara nödvändigt att vara AEO certifierad ur ett konkurrensperspektiv.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
De krav som finns i AEO-riktlinjerna minskar effektiviteten i vår verksamhet.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

Nu är Du färdig, stort tack för dina svar! Lägg enkäten ovikt i det frankerade kuvertet som ingår i paketet du fick, klistra igen det och skicka allt via vanlig post

REMINDER LETTER (Swedish)

Bäste säkerhets-/logistik-/risk-/transportansvarig!

För en tid sedan fick du enkäten om *Transportsäkerhet*, där vi <u>i samarbete med Polisen i</u> <u>Västra Götalands Län</u> försöker förstå hur företag fastställer sina säkerhetsinsatser, inklusive budget och skyddsnivå. Syftet med undersökningen är att identifiera vilka faktorer det är som styr eller utgör hinder för säkerheten i transportkedjor.

En del har besvarat enkäten före det angivna slutdatumet (den 30 april 2010). Men tyvärr är svarsfrekvensen för låg för att vi skall kunna formulera signifikanta slutsatser. Enligt vår databas har vi tyvärr inte fått ditt svar än, och därför vill vi påminna dig om att fylla i och skicka enkäten snarast.

Ditt svar på detta frågeformulär är av avgörande betydelse för att i framtiden säkerställa säkrare och effektivare transporter.

VIKTIGT! Alla svar är konfidentiella. Ditt namn, namnet på ditt företag samt dina kontaktuppgifter kommer att hållas strikt konfidentiella, och de kommer inte att avslöjas för tredje part eller i någon typ av publikation eller media. Det tar mellan 15 och 20 minuter att fylla i enkäten. Vi vill ha ditt svar senast den 25 maj 2010. Som en uppskattning för din hjälp kommer du att få en kopia av resultaten av denna analys (var vänlig specificera i frågeformuläret den e-postadress som resultaten ska skickas till).

Använd svart eller blå bläckpenna för att fylla i enkäten. Sätt ett kryss för varje fråga om inget annat anges. Om du sätter ett kryss fel, fyll i den felaktiga rutan så att den blir helt fylld och sätt ett nytt kryss i den rätta rutan. När du är färdig, lägg enkäten ovikt i det frankerade kuvertet som ingår i paketet du fick, klistra igen det och skicka allt via vanlig post.

För att kunna öka svarsfrekvensen kan du välja mellan att använda den tryckta enkäten som finns bifogat i detta kuvert eller en webbenkät som du hittar på följande adress: http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/transportsecurity

Har du redan skickat in dina svar, ber vi dig att bortse från denna påminnelse och tackar för din medverkan.

Du är välkommen att kontakta författaren nedan om du har några kommentarer eller frågor. Tack på förhand för din hjälp!

Vänliga hälsningar,

Luca Urciuoli

MSc (Eng), Lic.Tek. Luca Urciuoli Institutionen för Teknisk Ekonomi och Logistik Tel. xxxx xx xx xx, epost: luca.urciuoli@tlog.lth.se

APPENDIX 5 – The Survey (English)

Dear security/logistics/risk/transportation manager

You are receiving this email because of your involvement in transportation, logistics, and/or security management. I am asking for your help to fill out the enclosed survey as part of an investigation that is being carried out by the *Dept. of Industrial Management and Logistics*, *Engineering Logistics*, at Lund University.

Available statistics report the existence of several criminal activities affecting physical distribution chains. The magnitude of their frequency as well as of the related consequences is so high that many firms have indicated "*security*" as one of their management's top priorities. Security incidents like theft, smuggling, counterfeiting, piracy etc. don't imply merely economic losses for the involved firms, but also increased violence and injuries for transport operators. In addition, in case consumable products like pharmaceutical or food are counterfeited or contaminated, the consequences for our society may become devastating.

In order to improve transport safety is of paramount importance to understand how companies determine their security efforts, including budget and protection degree. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to identify what factors control the security of transportation networks. This work is funded by the VINNOVA competence center NGIL, Next Generation Innovative Logistics (http://www.ngil.se) and is being supervised by Professor Sten Wandel, Professor Andreas Norrman and Ass. Professor Henrik Tehler at Lund University.

In this study, we also cooperate with the <u>law enforcement agency of Västra Götaland county</u>, which is strongly involved in transportation security issues and which in the future will use the results of this study to tailor regulations, pursue collaboration initiatives between transport operators, develop and disseminate information about cost-effective security solutions to protect shipments from criminals, and so on. <u>Therefore, your response to this questionnaire is crucial to achieving these goals and thereafter to ensure more secure, safe and efficient transpiration in the future.</u>

IMPORTANT! ALL RESPONSES ARE CONFIDENTIAL. Your name, the name of your company, as well as your contact information will be kept strictly confidential and will not be disclosed to any third person or in any kinds of publications or media. The survey should take between 15 – 20 minutes to complete. We would like to have your response **no later than April 30, 2010**. In appreciation for your help you will receive a summary of the findings of this analysis (please specify in the questionnaire to which email address the results should be sent).

<u>Use black or blue ink pen to complete the survey.</u> Put a cross for each question unless otherwise is indicated. If you put a cross by mistake, please fill in the wrong box so that it becomes completely full, and insert a new cross in the appropriate box. When finished, place the unfolded questionnaire in the prepaid envelope included in the package you received, seal it and send everything by regular mail.

You are welcome to contact the author below if you have any comments or questions.

Thanks in advance for your help!

Best Regards,

Luca Urciuoli

MSc (Eng), Lic.Eng. Luca Urciuoli

PhD student Dept. of Industrial Management and Logistics Engineering Logistics Tel. xxxx xx xx <u>luca.urciuoli@tlog.lth.se</u>

Generic Questions

Тур	e of company:					
[1]	Freight Rail Transport	[5]	Mail Transport		[9]	Don't know
[2]	Freight Road Transport	[6]	Courier		[10]	Don't want to answer
[3]	Freight Water Transport	[7]	Newspaper distribution			
[4]	Freight Air Transport	[8]	Other:			
Con	ıpany annual sales (sek):					
[1]	Less than 500 000	[5]	10 million to 20 million		[9]	More than 1 billion
[2]	500,000 to 1 million	[6]	20 million to 100 million		[10]	Don't know
[3]	1 million to 5 million	[7]	100 million to 500 million		[11]	Don't want to answer
[4]	5 million to 10 million	[8]	500 million to 1 billion			
Nun	nber of employees:					
[1]	0	[4]	50 to 250		[7]	More than 1000
[2]	1 to 10	[5]	251 to 500		[8]	Don't know
[3]	10 to 49	[6]	501 to 1000		[9]	Don't want to answer
Posi	tion in the company:					
[1]	Logistics manager	[4]	CEO/Owner	[7]	Don't war	nt to answer
[2]	Transport manager	[5]	Operations manager	[8]	Other	
[3]	Traffic manager	[6]	Security manager		L	
Mai	n types of products shipped (several	choices are possible):			
[1]	Food	[4]	Automotive electronics	[7]	Other	
[2]	Clothes	[5]	Automotive chemicals	[8]	Don't k	now
[3]	Pharmaceuticals	[6]	Chemicals	[9]	Don't w	ant to answer
Spee	cify the county where your h	eadquar	ters are located:			
[1]	Blekinge county	[10]	Norrbottens county		[19]	Västerbottens county
[2]	Dalarnas county	[11]	Örebro county		[20]	Västernorrlands county
[3]	Gävleborgs county	[12]	Östergötlands county		[21]	Västmanlands county
[4]	Gotlands county	[13]	Skåne county		[22]	Västra Götalands county
[5]	Hallands county	[14]	Södermanlands county		[23]	Don't want to answer
[6]	Jämtlands county	[15]	Stockholms county			
[7]	Jönköpings county	[16]	Uppsala county			
[8]	Kalmar county	[17]	Värmlands county			
[9]	Kronobergs county	[18]	Norrbottens county			
E-m	ail (specify here your e-mail	if you w	ant to receive an executive	summa	ry of the	findings):

Specify here:

SECURITY

Enter the budget (in sek) that your organization allocated for security expenditures in 2009 (incl. costs for security measures and investigation costs):

- [2] Don't know.
- [3] Don't want to answer.

Enter the total number of security incidents (both stopped and not stopped) that your organization has borne in 2009:

[1] Specify here:

- [2] Don't know.
- [3] Don't want to answer.

Enter the proportion of security incidents (in percent) that you have managed to stop in 2009:

[1] Specify here:		(0%	- 100%)
-------------------	--	-----	---------

- [2] Don't know.
- [3] Don't want to answer.

Enter the average proportion of shipments (in percent) that in 2009 were not delivered within the agreed timewindow, because of security incidents:

- [1] Specify here: (0% 100%)
- [2] Don't know.
- [3] Don't want to answer.

Law Enforcement Agency

In 2009	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Can't answer
the Swedish Prosecutor's effort to prosecute transport offenders was very good.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
\dots when criminals who attacked our business were arrested, there has been a long time before they have been released from prison.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
cargo criminals have always been promptly captured and kept in custody by the Swedish police and the Prosecutor.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
\ldots our confidence in the efforts of law enforcement authorities to prosecute offenders has increased.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we have noticed that criminals, once arrested stayed away from our operations.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we have noticed that cargo crime has always been severely punished.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
our organization has always reported security incidents to the law enforcement agency.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
the law enforcement efforts to arrest criminals has been very good.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
the law enforcement agency has devoted sufficient resources to combat cargo crime.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we have always reported security incidents to law enforcement authorities as we have confidence that appropriate action against offenders will be taken.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
reporting security incidents was a top priority in our organization.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we noticed that the more we reported security incidents, the better the efforts of law enforcement authorities had been.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

In 2009	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Can't answer
our organization has always taken part in seminars and other activities organized by the national law enforcement agency.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
our organization, by participating in seminars and activities organized by the law enforcement authorities, was stimulated to increase security.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
our organization, by participating in seminars and activities organized by the law enforcement authorities, was stimulated to increase knowledge about how to protect themselves from such incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we have noticed that, during seminars and activities, we have been able to come up with interesting initiatives for protection of goods.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
We have noticed that it is important to strengthen cooperation with law enforcement authorities to combat cargo crime.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we have noted that cooperation with law enforcement agency has improved our ability to prevent and recover security incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSPORT OPERATOR

When you improve security, what is the average price increase accepted by your customers (please refer to the average price increase that you have agreed upon in 2009)?

[1] Average price per shipment:

(0% - 100%)

[2] Do not know.

[3] Do not want to answer.

In 2009	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Can't answer
we asked our customers often for higher security but they did not want to pay for it.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we noticed that it is difficult to provide security because we could not afford it.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we found that we could not raise our prices because customers were not willing to pay for security.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we realized that the little income that we have in our business makes it difficult to invest in security.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
our organization has continued to be competitive in the market although we do not invest in security.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
the proportion of customers willing to pay for secured transports is very low.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
We have had difficulty controlling security because our organization has a high degree of Just In Time (JIT).	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
it often happened that the vehicles were attacked while they were waiting to unload at a terminal.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
the application of JIT principles has increased the risk of criminal attacks.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we have had to balance security against JIT effectiveness.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
we have learned that JIT principles increase the flow of goods on the roads and thereafter the number of security incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
the great dilemma of our organization was whether we should prioritize JIT principles or security.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

Please choose below the option that best characterizes the average distance that your vehicle fleet is running:

[1] Urban

[4]

[4]

[5] Worldwide

Regional [2]

- Don't know [6]
- National [3]
- [7] Don't want to answer
- Continental Not applicable [8]

Choose one of the following security measures (response linked to subsequent terms):

[1] **GPS Track and Trace**

Employees background [5] screening

[6] E-seal

[8]

[2] **Mechanical Lock** [3] **Rigid curtains**

Sound Barrier

- **VHF tracer** [7]
 - Vehicle Immobilizer
- **Neither Agree nor Disagree Strongly Disagree Strongly Disagree** Can't answer Disagree Agree The introduction of the security solution chosen above will adversely affect customer satisfaction. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [6] ... have a negative impact on timely delivery. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] ... increase our labor costs. [1] [2] [3] [4] [6] [5] ... increase our administrative costs. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] ... do our work to satisfy customers more difficult. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] ... inevitably increase the delivery delays. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] ... inevitably increase the number of procedures that operators must follow. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [1] ... make the transport operators' working environment too complex and resource [1] [4] [6] [2] [3] [5] intensive. ... inevitably increase the number of technology that operators must learn and use [1] [2] [3] [5] [6] [4] every day.

- Vehicle-/Container alarm
- [11] Other:
- [10] **Fuel cap lock**

[9]

BUSINESS SECURITY CERTIFICATIONS

Indicate which of the following certifications / gui answer is possible):	idennes you comply with to improve security (more than one
[1] TAPA EMEA.	[4] None of them.
[2] ISO28000.	[5] Don't know.
[3] Other:	[6] Don't want to answer.
INSURANCE COMPANIES	
Plasse indicate the properties of shipmonts (in p	arount) that were fully insured against security insidents in
2009 (regardless of who paid the insurance).	ercent) that were fully insured against security incluents in
[1] Specify (0% - 100%)	
[2] Don't know.	
[3] Don't want to answer.	
What proportion of your shipments is not insured	d by goods owners (according to NSAB2000)?
[1] Specify here: (0% - 100%)	
[2] Don't know.	
[3] Don't want to answer.	
What proportion of your shipments had an incre	ased liability compared to NSAB2000 requirements?
What proportion of your shipments had an incre	ased liability compared to NSAB2000 requirements?
What proportion of your shipments had an increase [1] Specify here: (0% - 100%)	ased liability compared to NSAB2000 requirements?
What proportion of your shipments had an increase [1] Specify here: [2] Don't know.	ased liability compared to NSAB2000 requirements?
What proportion of your shipments had an increation [1] Specify here: (0% - 100%) [2] Don't know. [3] Don't want to answer.	ased liability compared to NSAB2000 requirements?
What proportion of your shipments had an increation [1] Specify (0% - 100%) [2] Don't know. [3] Don't want to answer. If your company has a captive of its insurance prwere covered in 2009 by the captive company?	ased liability compared to NSAB2000 requirements? rogram, what proportion of losses related to security incidents
What proportion of your shipments had an increation [1] Specify (0% - 100%) [2] Don't know. [3] Don't want to answer. If your company has a captive of its insurance provered in 2009 by the captive company? [1] Specify here: [1] Specify here:	ased liability compared to NSAB2000 requirements? rogram, what proportion of losses related to security incidents
What proportion of your shipments had an increation [1] Specify (0% - 100%) [2] Don't know. [3] Don't want to answer. If your company has a captive of its insurance provered in 2009 by the captive company? [1] Specify here: [2] Don't know.	ased liability compared to NSAB2000 requirements? rogram, what proportion of losses related to security incidents
What proportion of your shipments had an increation [1] Specify (0% - 100%) [2] Don't know. [3] Don't want to answer. If your company has a captive of its insurance provered in 2009 by the captive company? [1] Specify here: [2] Don't know. [3] Don't know. [3] Don't know. [3] Don't want to answer.	ased liability compared to NSAB2000 requirements? rogram, what proportion of losses related to security incidents
What proportion of your shipments had an increation [1] Specify (0% - 100%) [2] Don't know. [3] Don't want to answer. If your company has a captive of its insurance provered in 2009 by the captive company? [1] Specify here: [2] Don't know. [3] Don't know. [3] Don't know. [3] Don't want to answer.	ased liability compared to NSAB2000 requirements? rogram, what proportion of losses related to security incidents
What proportion of your shipments had an increation [1] Specify (0% - 100%) [2] Don't know. [3] Don't want to answer. If your company has a captive of its insurance provered in 2009 by the captive company? [1] Specify here: [2] Don't know. [3] Don't know. [3] Don't know. [3] Don't want to answer. Enter the maximum discount (%) that you receive implementing a security measure:	ased liability compared to NSAB2000 requirements? rogram, what proportion of losses related to security incidents red in 2009 from your insurance company after installing or
What proportion of your shipments had an increation of your shipments had an increation of your shipments had an increation of the provide the provided of the	ased liability compared to NSAB2000 requirements? rogram, what proportion of losses related to security incidents red in 2009 from your insurance company after installing or
What proportion of your shipments had an increation of your shipments had an increation of your shipments had an increation of the provided of	ased liability compared to NSAB2000 requirements? Fogram, what proportion of losses related to security incidents //ed in 2009 from your insurance company after installing or (0% - 100%)
What proportion of your shipments had an increation [1] Specify here: [2] Don't know. [3] Don't want to answer. If your company has a captive of its insurance provered in 2009 by the captive company? [1] Specify here: [2] Don't know. [3] Don't know. [3] Don't know. [3] Don't know. [3] Don't want to answer. Enter the maximum discount (%) that you receive implementing a security measure: Specify what security measure: [1] [1] Specify here: [2] Don't know.	ased liability compared to NSAB2000 requirements? rogram, what proportion of losses related to security incidents /ed in 2009 from your insurance company after installing or (0% - 100%)

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Can't answer
Insurances are the best solution to cover the economic losses from security incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Our organization makes extensive use of commercial insurance to cover losses related to security incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
In order to cover losses associated with security incidents, our organization has a captive company for its insurance program.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Our organization makes use of insurance to cover direct and indirect losses caused by security incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
All the financial losses caused by security incidents are covered by our insurances.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
By purchasing insurances, we will never lose money in the event of incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Our organization earns premium discounts from insurance companies when protective measures are implemented.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
It is easy to agree on premium discounts with insurance companies.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Agreements on premium discounts with our insurance company are never a loss of time and resource.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Installing security technologies will help the organization to save money on insurance premium.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
The implementation of security procedures saves money on insurance premium.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Premium Discounts are always offered to organizations that actively work with security.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

SECURITY SOLUTION PROVIDERS

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Can't answer
The security device that seems to have the shortest payback period is not ready for industrial use yet.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
It will take too much time and effort before an advanced security solution is implemented in our organization.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Security prototypes often fail to improve security and will never turn into reliable products.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Most of the existing security technology is too difficult to integrate within our organization.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Most of the existing security technology is too difficult to integrate with our business processes.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
The most effective and advanced security solutions are too expensive.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
The security solutions that we can afford cannot effectively prevent the cargo crime.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Our security budget is not high enough to buy the most effective security solutions.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
The payback period for the most effective security solutions is too long.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Security costs increase considerably when purchasing devices to be installed on the whole fleet of vehicles of our organization.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

CRIMINALS

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Can't answer
No matter how much protection we establish on our assets, criminals will always find ways to strike us.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Our organization has experience of criminals that quickly learn how to outsmart the new security measures.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
The criminal groups are too advanced to be fought only with the implementation of security measures (both technical and non technical).	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
The majority of the security incidents are perpetrated with the support of insiders that know what security measures we use and how to deceive them.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Today, there is no ideal technique or method to effectively prevent cargo crime.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

CONTRACT REGULATORY ASSOCIATIONS

Enter the percentage (%) of contracts signed by your company in 2009 where liabilities are shared among the involved parties:

- [1] Specify here: (0% 100%).
- [2] Don't know.
- [3] Don't want to answer.

Enter the proportion of verbal agreements performed by your organization with your customers in 2009:

- [1] Specify here: (0% 100%).
- [2] Don't know.
- [3] Don't want to answer.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Can't answer
In 2009, our organization has made use of written agreements to specify risk-sharing between the parties involved in the distribution/storage of goods.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
It is important that all parties involved in distribution and storage of goods share the responsibility in case of incidents.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Contracts must clearly indicate what standard agreements must be followed and who is responsible for what.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
It is important to avoid the use of unclear agreements where the liability between the parties is not specified.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
In our contracts established in 2009, the sharing of liabilities is defined in accordance with NSAB 2000.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Agreements with our customers are too complex to define and agree on.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Since the contract agreements with our customers are too complex to define and agree on, we prefer verbal agreements.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
It takes too much time and too many resources to draw up and underwrite contracts.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Even if we use written agreements we do not understand their true meaning and benefit for our organization.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
We have used written contracts but we do not really know how to use them in case a security incident occurs.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

Please indicate the proportion of contract agreements (in percent) that your organization stipulated with its customers in 2009, in which security requirements are specified in the text:

- [1] Specify (0% 100%).
- [2] Don't know
- [3] Don't want to answer.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Can't answer
In 2009, our customers have always specified in contract agreements which security requirements should be applied.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
It is important to specify security requirements in order to clarify the protection that is required for distribution/storage of goods.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
In 2009, most of our customers asked to specify the security requirements in contract agreements.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
In 2009, our organization has always proposed detailed descriptions of security requirements in contracts.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
In 2009, both our organization and our customers have easily agreed on how to specify security requirements in contracts.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
In 2009, we had difficulty getting along with our partners on the security requirements that should be specified in the agreement.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Agreement processes on the security requirements to be specified in contracts takes too much time and resources from our organization.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
We prefer to avoid the specification of security requirements in contract agreements because it is too complicated.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
We do not really know how to specify security requirements because it is difficult to estimate the impact on security of the measures selected.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
In 2009, we and our customers often had different opinions about the performance of security solutions on cargo threats.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

AUTHORITY

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Our organization con	inlies with or is	nlanning	g to compl	v with the	e tollowing	certifications:
our organization con	ipnes with or is	Pranning	5 to compi	y ******* ****	. 10110	cer unications.

- [1] AEO-C.
- [5] Don't know

[2] AEO-S.

[6] **Don't want to answer.**

- [3] AEO-F.
- [4] None of them.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Can't answer
Our organization perceives the AEO's requirements as confusing.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
The AEO certification will not increase the security of our organization.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Complying with the AEO certification will cost us too much time and resources in relation to the benefits.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
It is not necessary to be AEO certified from a competitive advantage perspective.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
The requirements of the AEO guidelines reduce the efficiency of our operations.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]

Now you have finished, many thanks for your contribution!

You may now place the unfolded questionnaire in the prepaid envelope included in the package you received, seal it and send everything by regular mail

REMINDER LETTER (English)

Dear security/logistics/risk/transportation manager! Some time ago, you received a questionnaire concerning Transportation Security, according to which we, **in cooperation with the Law Enforcement agency in Västra Götaland County**, are trying to understand how companies determine their security efforts, including budget and protection degree. The purpose of the study is to identify what factors control the security of the transport chains.

Some have responded to the questionnaire before the deadline (30 April 2010). But unfortunately the response rate is too low to allow us to formulate significant conclusions. According to our database we have unfortunately not received your answer yet, and therefore we want to remind you to complete and return the questionnaire as soon as possible.

Your response to this questionnaire is of vital importance to ensure more secure, safe and efficient transportation in the future.

IMPORTANT! All responses are confidential. Your name, the name of your company, as well as your contact information will be kept strictly confidential and will not be disclosed to any third person or in any kind of publications and media. The survey should take between 15 - 20 minutes to complete. We would like to have your response **no later than May 25, 2010**. As an appreciation for your help you will receive a summary of the findings of this analysis (please specify in the questionnaire to which email address the results should be sent).

<u>Use black or blue ink pen to complete the survey.</u> Put a cross for each question unless otherwise is indicated. If you put a cross by mistake, please fill in the wrong box so that it becomes completely full, and insert a new cross in the appropriate box. When finished, place the unfolded questionnaire in the prepaid envelope included in the package you received, seal it and send everything by regular mail.

In order to increase the response rate, you can choose between using the printed questionnaire, which is enclosed in this envelope, or a web-survey which can be found at: http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/transportsecurity

If you have already submitted your answer, please disregard this reminder and thank you for your participation.

You are welcome to contact the author below if you have any comments or questions. Thanks in advance for your help!

Best Regards,

Luca Urciuoli **MSc (Eng), Lic.Tek. Luca Urciuoli** Institutionen för Teknisk Ekonomi och Logistik Tel. xxxx xx xx, epost: <u>luca.urciuoli@tlog.lth.se</u>